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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
There are many moments in life that something new has to be learned. 
Sometimes it is possible to grab a textbook or surf on the internet to obtain full 
instruction or explanation. Other times you have to try out things and induce 
rules from the results of your experiments, like scientists do. This latter type 
of learning is called inductive learning, and is the main topic of this thesis. 
In four laboratory studies novice learners were asked to infer rules by 
conducting experiments in a complex computer-simulated learning 
environment. The determinants of successful inductive learning, i.e., the 
learner’s metacognitive skillfulness and intellectual ability (Veenman, 1993) 
were of special interest. It was hypothesized that the impact of these two 
determinants varies, depending on levels of task complexity. 
Chapters 2 and 3 will introduce the concepts and theories of inductive 
learning, task complexity, metacognitive skillfulness, and intellectual ability. 
In addition, Elshout’s (1987) theory of the threshold of problematicity is 
described. The main hypotheses of this thesis are derived from this theory. 
The study in Chapter 4 tests the hypothesis that during initial inductive 
learning metacognitive skillfulness is the main determinant of good learning 
outcomes. In Chapter 5 we investigate whether the pattern of correlations 
between metacognitive skillfulness, intellectual ability, and learning outcomes 
of novice learners in a relative easy task will be similar to the pattern of 
correlations of advanced learners in an intermediate or complex task. Chapter 
6 is about the generality of novices’ metacognitive skillfulness, basically a 
replication of the study of Veenman, Elshout, and Meijer (1997). And finally, 
in the study described in Chapter 7 we test whether instructional support 
increases the impact of intellectual ability, relative to an unsupported 
environment. 
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Chapter 8 lists the main conclusions of the four studies and examines the 
theoretical and practical implications of the findings. Is metacognitive 
skillfulness the booster of inductive learning in a complex environment? What 
is the role of intellectual ability during inductive learning? What kind of 
knowledge is acquired in complex inductive-learning environments? And, 
how useful are these environments for educational practice? 
 
32 
INDUCTIVE LEARNING: 
THEORIES, TASKS, AND PRODUCTS 
 
According to Holland, Holyoak, Nisbett, and Thagard (1986), induction 
encompasses “all inferential processes that expand knowledge in the face of 
uncertainty” (p. 1). This is a kind of general description, but then, it is a rather 
general concept. Induction can also be defined more specifically as inferring 
rules from examples and that is how it is conceived here. Popper (1959) called 
an inference inductive if “... it passes from singular statements (...), such as 
accounts of the results of observations or experiments, to universal 
statements, such as hypotheses or theories” (p. 27). For instance, 
distinguishing the meanings of your child’s different ways of crying, based on 
the various successful and unsuccessful attempts to comfort him, is an 
example of induction. Perceiving the cultural rules of the country that granted 
you political asylum, by closely watching the behavior of the people in the 
local supermarket, is an example of induction. If, in addition, a person’s 
repertoire of knowledge and skills is changed, one can speak of inductive 
learning. 
There is substantial overlap between the concepts of inductive learning and 
discovery learning. Basically, in science these concepts are used for more or 
less the same processes, but the label inductive emphasizes the mechanism of 
learning, i.e., inferring rules from examples, while discovery leaves this 
mechanism implicit. It is actually possible to discover something without 
induction. For instance, one can discover that there is a basketball game on TV 
by just accidentally touching the remote control. Furthermore, the label 
discovery learning suggests that something existing or something true is 
found, while inductive learning allows for all kinds of misconceptions; and 
some learners do make inferential mistakes, for instance due to confirmation 
bias (e.g. Kuhn, Garcia-Mila, Zohar, & Andersen, 1995). Thus, inductive 
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processes produce new but uncertain knowledge (Bisanz, Bisanz, & Korpan, 
1994). For these reasons, inductive learning is the label used predominantly 
throughout this thesis. 
Before the research questions of this thesis can be phrased in detail, first 
one’s vocabulary has to be expanded by sketching available and useful 
theories considering inductive learning. Second, one should be familiar with 
characteristics of inductive-learning tasks. These characteristics partly 
determine task complexity, which is an important concept in this thesis. 
Finally, the possible products of inductive learning, i.e. types of acquired 
knowledge as well as its assessment, have to be discussed.  
 
Theories on inductive learning 
In essence, inductive learning can be based on an existing data set, but also on 
a data set that is gathered by learners themselves. The self-directed way of 
inductive learning is studied in this thesis. If learners have to gather their own 
data set, they are forced to decide about the nature of their experiments, about 
the order of experiments, and about the number of experiments. In fact, 
because of the uncertainty of inductive inferences, a clear stop rule to 
terminate searching is absent. It is up to the learner to decide whether enough 
data has been collected, whether the expected costs of extra experiments will 
be compensated by the benefits. 
Klahr and Dunbar's SDDS model (1988; Dunbar & Klahr, 1989; Klahr, 2000) 
applies to self-directed inductive learning. SDDS stands for Scientific Discovery 
as Dual Search. Their assumption is that discovery learning is a type of 
problem solving (see also Simon, 1989, p. 386). A person is confronted with a 
problem when she wants something and does not know immediately what 
series of actions she can perform to get it (Newell & Simon, 1972). In other 
words, a problem consists of an initial state, a goal state, and a set of operators 
that, when executed in the right sequence, results in a solution path from the 
initial state to the goal state. Problem solving can be conceptualized as a 
search for that solution path and takes place in a single problem space: a space 
of rules. Rule induction, on the other hand, requires search in two problem 
spaces: a space of rules and a space of instances (Simon & Lea, 1974). In rule-
induction tasks persons search the rule space if they want to select a rule or to 
change from one rule to the other. To confirm or disconfirm a rule, an instance 
has to be selected and checked. Instance selection requires searching the 
instance space. Analogously, in scientific discovery, a person has to search the 
hypothesis space and the experiment space (Klahr & Dunbar, 1988). The 
5hypothesis space contains all possible hypotheses about a certain domain, 
irrespective of their plausibility or truth-value. The experiment space consists 
of all possible experiments that can be performed and the outcomes of the 
experiments. Prior knowledge and experimental results guide the search in 
the hypothesis space, while the current hypothesis guides the search in the 
experiment space. Experimentation in the SDDS model can be multi-purpose: 
experiments may be conducted to generate a hypothesis, to specify a hypothesis, 
or to test a hypothesis. However a specified hypothesis is only needed for the 
last purpose. Hypothesis testing has a strong deductive aspect (Bisanz, Bisanz, 
& Korpan, 1994, p. 181). Another main component in the SDDS model is the 
evaluation of evidence, by which it is decided whether the cumulative evidence 
justifies acceptance, rejection, or continued consideration of the current 
hypothesis. See Klahr and Dunbar (1988) for a more detailed description of 
the SDDS model. 
The SDDS model was extended by van Joolingen and de Jong (1997; van 
Joolingen, 1995), especially for the design of supportive environments for 
discovery learning. They argued that a more detailed description of the 
changes of learner's knowledge about the domain is needed to provide 
adequate support. Van Joolingen and de Jong distinguished two subspaces of 
the hypothesis space, a variable space and a relation space. Learners need to 
search variable space to identify variables about which to state a hypothesis 
and they have to search relation space to select a relation that applies to two 
or more variables. For relation space, different levels of precision exist. 
Following Plötzner and Spada (1992), van Joolingen and de Jong 
distinguished a qualitative-relational level (e.g., if A increases, so does B), a 
quantitative-relational level (e.g., if A doubles, B quadruples), and a 
quantitative-numerical level (e.g., B=3A2; examples adapted from van 
Joolingen, 1995). Learner’s knowledge can be described in terms of the 
decomposed hypothesis space. There is the universal hypothesis space, containing 
all possible hypotheses about a particular domain, irrespective of their truth 
value and plausibility. Two subspaces of the universal hypothesis space 
represent the learner’s knowledge about a domain. First there is the learner 
hypothesis space, which contains learner’s knowledge of variables and 
relations. This knowledge defines the part of the hypothesis space that the 
learner can search directly. If a learner wants to go outside this space, she 
must acquire knowledge about new relations and variables. Second, there is 
the effective learner search space, a subspace of the learner’s hypothesis space, 
which contains hypotheses that the learner decides are worthwhile testing. 
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Presumably, the learner considers these hypotheses as plausible hypotheses 
(Klahr, Fay, & Dunbar, 1993). Van Joolingen and de Jong (1997) also 
distinguished the space of true hypotheses, containing all true hypotheses that 
describe the domain, and the target conceptual model, a subset of true 
hypotheses from which all true hypotheses that describe the domain can be 
derived. The aim of inductive learning is to bring the learner’s hypothesis 
space close to the target conceptual model. 
 
Modeling inductive learning 
Modeling the inductive-learning process by a computational representation 
could increase the understanding of the process. In these computational 
models cognitive mechanisms are specified in detail by using computational 
systems. The adequacy of those mechanisms for performing some tasks is 
tested by mapping the model’s performance to human performance 
(Carpenter & Just, 1999). Newell and Simon (1972) used a production system 
representation to describe general human problem solving. Similarly, the 
vocabulary of a production system representation could be used to describe 
the search processes of inductive learning (Holland et al., 1986; Schunn & 
Anderson, 1998). Neches, Langley, and Klahr (1987) defined the most 
fundamental form of a production system as a system that consists of two 
interacting data structures, connected through a simple processing cycle. The 
first is a working memory, consisting of a collection of symbolic data items 
called working memory elements. The second is a production memory 
consisting of condition-action rules called productions, whose conditions 
describe configurations of elements that might appear in working memory 
and whose actions specify modifications to the content of working memory. 
Production memory and working memory are related through the recognize-
act cycle in three distinct stages. The first stage is the match process, which 
finds productions whose conditions match the current state of working 
memory. Each such mapping is called instantiation. Next, the conflict resolution 
process takes place, in which one or more instantiated productions are 
selected for applications. Finally there is the act process ('firing'), in which the 
instantiated actions of the selected rules are applied and, thus, the contents of 
working memory is modified. The basic recognize-act process operates in 
cycles, with one or more rules being selected and applied. New contents of 
memory lead to selection and application of another set of rules and so forth. 
This cycling continues until no rules are matched or until an explicit halt 
command is encountered (Neches, Langley, & Klahr, 1987, pp. 4-5). 
7One of the best-known production system theories is the rationality-based 
Atomic Components of Though (ACT-R) theory of Anderson and Lebiere (1998). 
ACT-R assumes that there are two types of knowledge, declarative and 
procedural. Declarative knowledge is represented in units called chunks and 
corresponds to knowledge that people are aware of and can describe. 
Procedural knowledge is represented in units called production rules and 
corresponds to knowledge that people can display in their behavior but of 
which they are not conscious. Production rules specify how to retrieve and 
use declarative knowledge to solve problems (Anderson & Lebiere, 1998, pp. 
5-6). In ACT-R, there is a stack of goals, which encodes the hierarchy of 
intentions that guides behavior. The bottom goal is the most general and the 
goals above it are sub-goals. Productions are selected to fire through a conflict 
resolution process. During this process, productions that satisfy the current 
goal are placed into a conflict set and ordered in terms of their expected gain. 
The most highly valued production will fire. One of the useful properties of 
production systems is that the productions are modular forms of knowledge. 
Consequently, new knowledge can be added without drastically changing the 
system’s performance (Carpenter & Just, 1999). Anderson and Lebiere (1998) 
claimed that their architecture describes the atomic components of cognition: 
productions define the units with which thought progresses, and chunks 
define the units with which knowledge is retrieved from declarative memory. 
There are four ways of learning in ACT-R. First, chunks can be created by 
either direct encoding from the environment or by production rules. Second, 
productions can be created by a process called production compilation 
(Anderson & Lebiere, 1998; Taatgen, 1999, 2000). This is a transition from 
declarative to procedural knowledge, which has been called knowledge 
compilation in the earlier ACT-R theories (e.g., Anderson, 1993). Third, 
declarative parameters can be learned, which are important to selecting what 
chunks to retrieve and how fast. Fourth, procedural parameters can be 
updated. These parameters determine which productions to fire and how fast 
these productions will fire.  
A study by Schunn and Anderson (1998) is illustrative of how the 
vocabulary of ACT-R can be used to model inductive learning. Schunn and 
Anderson built an ACT-R model of a particular inductive-learning task, 
because such a model might give insights to enable comprehension of the 
differences found between experts and novices in inductive-learning tasks. 
The top-level goal of the task was a DISCOVERY goal. The DISCOVERY goal 
led to repeated pushing of EXPERIMENT goals to perform individual 
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experiments and of EVALUATE-EVIDENCE goals to examine whether these 
experiments have produced results that satisfy the DISCOVERY goal. Each 
EXPERIMENT goal, in turn, led to the design, running, and encoding of one 
experiment. Three different EXPERIMENT goals existed: HYPOTHESIS-
TESTING refers to designing experiments relevant to the hypothesis, 
EXPLORE-SYSTEM refers to simply investigating the effects of variables, and 
TEST-FACTOR refers to designing experiments for further exploring 
ambiguous results of a previous experiment. Especially the first two 
EXPERIMENT goals fit well into the SDDS model of Klahr and Dunbar (1988). 
Finally, the terminating condition of the EVALUATE-EVIDENCE goal was 
that some consequence of the hypothesis being tested had directly proven 
true or false.  
There is no intention here to create a computational model of inductive 
learning. However, in this thesis some of the vocabulary of production 
systems is borrowed for to allow comprehension and explanation of the 
previously described inductive-learning process and individual differences in 
inductive learning, which will be discussed in the next chapter. Important 
concepts are the goal directedness of behavior and the distinction between 
declarative and procedural knowledge. 
 
Task characteristics and task complexity  
Basically, in an inductive-learning task, learners have to infer rules from 
examples. These examples can be gathered by the learner via the design of 
experiments. Computer simulations are well suited for self-directed inductive 
learning. De Jong and van Joolingen (1998) described computer simulations as 
programs that contain a model of a real system. In these programs a learner 
can design experiments by changing values of input variables and, 
subsequently, observe the resulting changes in values of output variables. By 
carrying out experiments, relations between input and output variables can be 
inferred. In the past decades computer-simulated environments were created, 
for example, in the domains of theory of heat (Heat Lab, Veenman, 1993; 
Veenman, Elshout, & Meijer, 1997), statistics (Stat Lab, Veenman & Elshout, 
1995; Veenman, Elshout, & Meijer, 1997), electricity (Voltaville, Schauble, 
Glaser, Raghavan, & Reiner, 1991, Glaser, Schauble, Raghavan & Zeitz, 1992; 
Electricity Lab, Veenman & Elshout, 1995, Veenman, Elshout, & Busato, 1994), 
microeconomics (Smithtown, Shute & Glaser, 1990; Glaser, Schauble, 
Raghavan & Zeitz, 1992), refraction of light (Refract, Reimann, 1991; Glaser, 
Schauble, Raghavan & Zeitz, 1992), elastic collisions (Swaak & de Jong, 1996; 
9Veermans, de Jong, & van Joolingen, 2000), oscillatory motion (Swaak, van 
Joolingen, & de Jong, 1998), geometrical optics (Hulshof, 2001; Optics Lab, 
Veenman, Prins, & Elshout, 2002; Chapters 4 – 7 of this thesis), psychology 
(Rat Lab, Veenman, 1993), and in knowledge-lean domains (Big Trak, Klahr & 
Dunbar, 1988, Klahr, 2000; Bubbles, Hulshof, 2001; Deton Lab, Veenman, 
Elshout, & Meijer, 1997; Peter Task, Wilhelm, 2001, Wilhelm & Beishuizen, 
1999). For a review see de Jong and van Joolingen (1998). 
Inductive-learning tasks in computer-simulated environments are rather 
complex. Here, task complexity is conceived as an objective task characteristic, 
as distinct from experienced task complexity or task difficulty. The latter refers 
to an interaction between task complexity and individual knowledge and 
skills, meaning that a task of specified complexity may be difficult for one 
person, but not for another (Campbell, 1988; Stankov, 2000). Campbell (1988) 
suggested four contributors to the objective task complexity: (1) the presence 
of multiple solution paths to a desired goal state, (2) the presence of multiple 
goal states, (3) the presence of conflicting interdependence among paths (e.g., 
the problem has to solved accurately and quickly), and (4) the presence of 
uncertain or probabilistic linkages (e.g., when potential paths cannot be 
eliminated, when more effective paths must be considered, or when desired 
outcomes are uncertain). However, an exact ordering of tasks from less to 
more complex remains difficult because the relative contribution to 
complexity of each of the four attributes is unknown (Campbell, 1988). An 
inductive-learning task in a computer-simulated environment contains 
multiple solution paths, multiple goal states and uncertainty of desired 
outcomes. The learner has to choose between solution paths, has to determine 
the order of solution paths, and has to decide when to terminate the learning 
process. Therefore, computer simulations can be seen as complex learner-
centered environments that make learning a realistic and meaningful process 
(e.g. Jonassen, 1991, 1992; Land & Hannafin, 2000; Reigeluth, 1999; Spiro, 
Feltovitch, Jacobson & Coulson, 1995). 
To compare the objective task complexity of various inductive-learning 
tasks, a closer look is necessary. The models to be induced in computer-
simulated learning environments (e.g., a model concerning optics or 
electricity) may differ considerably in complexity (de Jong & van Joolingen, 
1998) and may thus be a source of differences in the complexity of several 
inductive-learning tasks. The assumption is that increases or decreases in the 
task complexity of an inductive-learning task can be described in terms of 
increases or decreases in the size of the search spaces determined by the 
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model. In other words, if the number of variables in the simulated model of a 
specific real system increases (variable space), if the number of relations 
between variables increases (relation space), or if the number of possible 
experiments increases (experiment space), complexity will increase. The sizes 
of these three search spaces are related, i.e., the presence of more variables 
means that there are more possible relations and that there are more possible 
experiments to perform. Moreover, if variables are continuous instead of 
discrete, the experiment space will be larger. For instance, the Optics Lab, a 
computer simulation of geometrical optics (Hulshof, 2001; Veenman, Prins, & 
Elshout, 2002; Chapter 4 – 7 of this thesis) has continuous variables and, 
therefore, it has an infinite experiment space. In contrast, the FILE 
environment (Wilhelm, 2001; Wilhelm & Beishuizen, 1999) contains only 
discrete variables and thus has a limited experiment space of 48 possible 
experiments. Larger search spaces may foster incomplete, uninformative and 
unsystematic searches. In other words, this aspect of task complexity concerns 
evidence generation (Schauble et al., 1991; Schauble, Glaser, Raghavan, & 
Reiner, 1992). 
In addition, the relations between system variables that have to be inferred 
may differ in complexity. Linear relations, for instance, are less complex than 
hyperbolic relations. Furthermore, relations with restrictions are likely to be 
more complex than relations without restrictions (e.g., if A increases, B 
decreases, as long as C is smaller than D). Finally, the level of precision of 
relations may have an impact on the complexity, i.e., relations on the 
qualitative-relational level will probably be less complex than relations of a 
quantitative-numerical nature. The more complex relations are that underlie a 
pattern of data, the harder they are to identify. This aspect of complexity 
concerns evidence interpretation (Schauble et al., 1991; Schauble et al., 1992). 
The simulated model of a particular real system is not the only determinant 
of task complexity. The assignments and the user-interface provided may also 
have an impact on the objective complexity of the task. Usually, in the 
assignment the goal state is defined. The goal state can be fuzzy (e.g., Try to 
find as many laws and regularities as possible) or more explicit (e.g., Try to find the 
relation between A and B). A fuzzy goal state implies a fuzzy termination 
condition or stop rule and will increase complexity concerning evidence 
generation. Moreover, the latter example of the assignment contains the 
independent and dependent system variables explicitly, which means that 
learners do not have to identify these system variables. This will likely 
decrease complexity concerning evidence generation. The interface can do the 
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same for learners. For example, in the studies of Schunn and Anderson (1999) 
and Wilhelm and Beishuizen (1999; Wilhelm, 2001) the independent and 
dependent variables of the simulated model are depicted on the screen. 
Learners only have to choose values of the independent system variables. 
Finally, provision of a theory or possible hypotheses may affect the 
complexity concerning search actions and rule induction. It should be noted 
that provision of domain knowledge and specific assignments are actually 
methods of instructional support (de Jong & van Joolingen, 1998). Obviously, 
support is aimed at making the task less difficult, which can be obtained by 
making the task less complex. Instructional support is discussed in the next 
chapter on individual differences in inductive learning, because problems that 
learners encounter during inductive learning are often related to learner's 
insufficient knowledge and skills. 
There is evidence that learners adapt their experimental search to task 
characteristics and the nature of the domain. Schauble et al. (1991) let twelve 
university undergraduates pass through computer-based laboratories in 
electricity (Voltaville), microeconomics (Smithtown), and refraction of light 
(Refract). Smithtown was judged to be the learning environment that was the 
most complex and difficult to master, given its relative large number of 
parameters and variables as well as its overall larger experiment space. For 
the same reason Refract was judged as being of intermediate complexity and 
with Voltaville containing the least complexity. Results showed that the 
generation of evidence was most important in Smithtown, the environment 
that required the identification of relevant variables and the discovery of 
correlational regularities. The proportion of conducted experiments in which 
variables were controlled, that is, only one variable was varied at a time, was 
larger in Smithtown than in the other two environments. In the environments 
where the regularities were functional rules, like Refract and Voltaville, 
evidence interpretation became more important. When the rules were 
quantitative, as in Voltaville, mathematic and algebraic heuristics were of 
more importance. Moreover, learners did not tend to apply activities and 
processes across the three laboratories, which supports the idea that 
differences in search behavior are due to task characteristics. 
In sum, inductive-learning tasks may differ on characteristics concerning 
the size of the search spaces, the nature of the relations between variables, the 
amount of theory, the assignments and interface. These differences could 
affect the generation of evidence, the evidence interpretation, and thus, the 
objective task complexity. As the relative contribution of different aspects of 
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task complexity is unknown, learning environments can only be compared 
when they differ on a single aspect of complexity, for instance, on the number 
of variables, or on the complexity of the relations of the model. 
 
Knowledge acquisition 
When learners have spent a substantial period of time in a computer-
simulated learning environment, the learning process will be terminated (by 
either the learner or the researcher) and, usually, the acquired knowledge will 
be assessed by a post-test. The post-test should correspond to the type of 
knowledge that is expected to be acquired. 
In their review, de Jong and van Joolingen (1998) claimed that inductive 
learning with computer simulations leads to knowledge "... that is more 
intuitive and deeply rooted in a learner's knowledge base (...) and that has a 
more qualitative character" (p. 193). This intuitive knowledge is characterized 
as hard to verbalize and its manifestation can be described as a quick 
perception of meaningful situations (Swaak & de Jong, 1996). Consequently, 
this knowledge cannot be assessed with a definitional test that measures 
explicit declarative knowledge. Swaak and de Jong created a speed WHAT-IF 
test to measure intuitive knowledge. Each test item of the WHAT-IF test 
contains three parts: conditions, actions, and predictions. The conditions are 
presented by depicting a possible state of the system and some text. The 
action, a change of a system's variable, as well as the predictions are presented 
in text. When completing the WHAT-IF test, the learner has to decide as 
accurately and quickly as possible which predicted state will follow from the 
given condition as a result of the presented action (Swaak, van Joolingen, & 
de Jong, 1998, p. 241). In essence, solving WHAT-IF items is a deductive task, 
where learners have to make predictions based on learned rules. 
Swaak and de Jong (1996; Swaak et al., 1998) put forward at least two 
claims: (1) novice learners acquire intuitive knowledge during discovery 
learning in a computer-simulated environment, and (2) this intuitive 
knowledge can be assessed with a speed WHAT-IF test. To begin with the 
first claim, intuitive knowledge is associated with fluid, domain- or situation- 
specific, deep, automatic knowledge (e.g., de Jong and Ferguson-Hessler, 
1996) or, in other words, with knowledge that is compiled (Anderson & 
Lebiere, 1998). The process of compilation needs repeated practice (Taatgen, 
1999, 2000). Consequently, this knowledge is likely to be reserved for experts, 
or at least for advanced learners. The knowledge of novice learners, on the 
other hand, could be characterized as "... superficial elements of knowledge 
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that are direct copies of external information that have not been related to 
fundamental principle of the domain" (de Jong and Ferguson-Hessler, 1996, p. 
111; see also Glaser & Chi, 1988). Therefore, the intuitive knowledge of novice 
learners could be conceived as surface situational (de Jong & Ferguson-Hessler, 
1996) or instance-based. During inductive learning, the knowledge acquired by 
novice learners probably consists, more or less, of copies of external 
information, i.e., specific situations or experiments. These instances could be 
used when novice learners answer post-test questions, even if the instances 
partially match the situations depicted in the post-test questions. Thus, it is 
possible that there are two kinds of intuitive knowledge: (1) the instance-
based knowledge of the novice learner, and (2) the compiled knowledge of 
the expert. Both may lead to fast reaction times during test completion and 
both may be hard to verbalize. In contrast, knowledge that is based on the 
generalization of examples, i.e., rules, may be more explicit and suitable for 
verbalization.  
The second claim of Swaak and de Jong (1996) is that a speed WHAT-IF 
test is appropriate for assessing intuitive knowledge. However, results of their 
experiments (see also Swaak et al., 1998) showed that intuitive knowledge 
scores correlated substantially with scores on the definitional post-test. Thus, 
both scores have some common source. Moreover, the mean time needed by 
learners to complete a WHAT-IF item was approximately 15 to 20 seconds. 
This seems to be enough time to apply a rule that has been previously inferred. 
Furthermore, a substantial part of a WHAT-IF item is presented in text, which 
probably slows down the necessary (and assumed) quick perception of the 
situation. 
Another issue concerning the products of inductive learning is the level of 
precision of the inferred relations between model variables. According to 
Plötzner and Spada (1992; see also van Joolingen, 1995), novice learners most 
likely start reasoning on the qualitative-relational level. This implies that 
computer simulations should allow qualitative manipulation of variables and, 
more importantly, that assessment of acquired knowledge should take place 
at the qualitative-relational level. The format of the WHAT-IF test seems to be 
appropriate for measuring qualitative knowledge concerning relations 
between variables of the simulated model. After some time and experience in 
the learning environment, reasoning may gradually shift from a qualitative-
relational to a quantitative-relational and perhaps even to a quantitative-
numerical level. Therefore, post-tests for novice learners should contain items 
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that probe qualitative relations as well as items that question quantitative 
relations. 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, theories concerning inductive learning were described to 
create a vocabulary that is needed to discuss the inductive-learning process 
and individual differences in inductive learning, which will be discussed in 
the next chapter. Inductive learning can be considered as a type of problem 
solving, which can be described in terms of the SDDS model of Klahr and 
Dunbar (1988) and the extended model of van Joolingen and de Jong (1997). 
Searching hypothesis space and searching experiment space are the central 
concepts. The sizes of these spaces mainly determine the objective task 
complexity. Moreover, it is important to distinguish evidence generation and 
evidence interpretation. During inductive learning novice learners may be 
acquiring intuitive knowledge, but it is likely to be instance-based. This 
instance-based knowledge could be used for solving WHAT-IF items, but 
mean reaction time does not rule out the possibility of rule-based answers. 
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3 
INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 
IN INDUCTIVE LEARNING 
 
No two learners are the same. For instance, one learner could have a better-
organized knowledge base about the task domain, while the other might 
possess a higher quality of regulatory skills. In this chapter, individual 
differences that are relevant to inductive learning will be discussed, where 
possible, in terms of the theories and frameworks from the previous chapter. 
Differences in prior domain knowledge, metacognitive skillfulness, and intellectual 
ability are the main topics. We will, especially, look in detail at the concept of 
metacognition, because of the supposed fuzziness of the concept, the difficulty 
of its assessment, its unclear relation with intellectual ability, and, on the other 
hand, its high impact on inductive learning (e.g., Veenman, 1993). Next, 
Elshout's (1987) theory of the threshold of problematicity will be described. This 
theory relates the impact of intellectual ability on learning to the level of 
experienced task complexity. The main research questions and hypotheses of 
this thesis arise from Elshout's theory. Furthermore, methods of instructional 
support, aimed at either task characteristics or at the learner's knowledge and 
skills, will be discussed briefly. The chapter ends with the research questions 
and a preview of the empirical studies of this thesis. 
 
Prior domain knowledge 
Due to a lack of experience in the task domain, novice learners have little or no 
relevant domain knowledge. Experts, on the other hand, have spent numerous 
hours on practice. For instance, around 30,000 hours of practice are required 
to become a chess master (Simon & Chase, 1973). Ericsson and Lehmann 
(1996) spoke of a 10-year rule of necessary preparation needed to attain an 
international level of performance in domains such as sports, art and sciences. 
Novices and experts are the two extreme poles of the expertise axis. In 
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between there are, of course, several intermediate levels of expertise, such as 
an advanced level, or an advanced-beginner level. It is important to note that 
expertise is domain specific (Ericsson & Smith, 1991). In other words, being 
advanced (or novice) in one domain does not offer any guarantees concerning 
the expertise in another domain. In the studies reported in this thesis, novice 
and advanced learners were selected on their experience with physics 
education, that is, they differed on domain knowledge. It was assumed that 
participants had limited experience with computer-simulated inductive-
learning tasks. 
Novices and experts do differ in many respects. Experts tend to see and 
represent a problem in their domain at a more abstract and deeper level than 
novices (e.g., Anzai, 1991; Charness, 1991; Chi, Feltovich, & Glaser, 1981; de 
Groot, 1965). Moreover, experts’ problem-solving methods are strong and 
therefore fast and not very error prone (Anzai, 1991). These strong methods 
may result in solutions after little or no search and are specifically adaptable 
to the problem domain. Novices, on the other hand, have no strong methods 
available. They have to use weak methods instead to constrain their search to 
the exploration of only a part of the problem space. Weak methods are 
applicable in a wide variety of contexts and selective (heuristic) search 
processes are especially central to the weak methods (Klahr & Simon, 1999). 
There are five major weak methods for problem solving: generate and test 
(often called trial and error), hill climbing, means-ends analysis, planning, and 
analogy (Klahr, 2000; VanLehn, 1989). 
With respect to inductive-learning tasks, differences between domain 
knowledge of novices and experts could be described in terms of the 
decomposed hypothesis space, suggested by van Joolingen and de Jong (1997) in 
their extended SDDS model (see Chapter 2). Contrary to the advanced 
learners, novices are supposed to have limited or no knowledge about 
independent and dependent variables of the domain, that is, they have a 
limited learner hypothesis space. Consequently, they will have a limited effective 
learner search space as well. These differences in learner hypothesis space 
between novice and advanced learners will likely lead to different search 
behaviors during inductive-learning tasks. Klahr and Dunbar (1988) 
distinguished theorists and experimenters (see also Popper, 1959, p. 27), based 
on the analysis of think-aloud protocols. Theorists were model-driven and 
they predominantly had a hypothesis in mind while they were conducting 
experiments. Experimenters, in contrast, conducted many experiments 
without an explicit hypothesis and were predominantly data-driven. 
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Although experimenters as well as theorists started by using hypotheses to 
guide search in the experiment space, they diverged in the way they searched 
for new hypotheses once the initial hypotheses were rejected: theorists 
searched the hypothesis space for a new hypothesis, while experimenters 
explored the experiment space without a hypothesis in mind. Klahr (2000) 
suggested that experts tend to behave like theorists, that is, they tend to 
search the hypothesis space, and that novices tend to search the experiment 
space. Indeed, without the expert's knowledge about variables and relations, a 
search of the hypothesis space may fail and the novice learner has to turn to a 
search of the experiment space (Klahr, 2000). In simulation environments the 
independent and dependent variables are not always given. In these cases, 
because of their limited knowledge about relevant variables, novice learners 
have to conduct experiments to identify independent and dependent 
variables before hypotheses can be generated (van Joolingen & de Jong, 1997). 
Consequently, during the initial phase of the inductive-learning process, 
novices are likely to be involved with generating hypotheses and not so much 
with testing hypotheses. On the other hand, there are also situations in which 
experts search the experiment space to generate hypotheses, for instance, if 
scientists approach the boundaries of their knowledge (Klahr & Simon, 1999). 
These experiments are called exploratory studies. 
A study by Schunn and Anderson (1998) illustrates these differences 
between novices and experts. During inductive learning in the domain of 
memory research in cognitive psychology, all experts had a theory in mind 
while conducting the experiments. The majority of the novice learners, on the 
other hand, designed experiments to just explore the effects of the various 
variables. Furthermore, experts used the same constant values of variables 
across experiments, to make comparisons across experiments easier. Experts 
also kept their experiments relatively simple. Novices, in contrast, showed 
more value variation and they were often overwhelmed with the large data 
tables they produced. The model built in ACT-R by Schunn and Anderson 
(1998) was able to account for some of the differences between novices and 
experts. For example, when the expected gain of the EXPLORE-FACTORS 
productions was higher than that of the HYPOTHESIS-TESTING productions, 
or when the HYPOTHESIS-TESTING production was removed, the model 
behaved like a novice. In addition, a model without the HYPOTHESIS-
TESTING production focused on different variables compared to a model that 
contained the HYPOTHESIS-TESTING production. The model of the experts 
contained a specific production that made the model vary by only one 
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variable per experiment. A model of the novice learners, without this 
production, randomly selected whether to vary or hold a variable constant. 
The behavior of the ACT-R model resembled the behavior of the participants 
of the study of Schunn and Anderson (1998). 
Besides affecting the process of evidence generation, prior knowledge may 
affect the process of evidence interpretation as well (Glaser, Schauble, 
Raghavan, & Zeitz, 1992). Learners may have several expectations about 
likely causes and effects in the domain and these effects may be better 
recognizable. Haverty, Koedinger, Klahr, and Alibali (2000) suggested that 
numerical knowledge is essential to the detection of patterns. Similarly, 
Plötzner and Spada (1992) argued that mathematical knowledge about 
functional relations and arithmetical procedures is needed for the 
interpretation of evidence. However, novice learners most likely start 
reasoning on the qualitative relational level based on their everyday 
knowledge (Plötzner & Spada, 1992). Thus, in the initial stage of inductive-
learning process numerical or mathematical knowledge may not be relevant. 
The results from three studies by Hulshof (2001) illustrated this, for he found 
no relation between mathematical knowledge and learning outcomes for 
learners working in the complex Optics Lab learning environment. The 
complexity of the environment, learners’ limited prior knowledge and the 
highly complex quantitative-numerical relations of optics probably prevented 
learners from reasoning on a quantitative-numerical level. 
How well defined a problem is, depends on the knowledge that is available 
to the problem solver (Klahr, 2000). In inductive-learning tasks, prior domain 
knowledge may facilitate search in the hypothesis space and also make the 
interpretation of the gathered data easier. Thus, it is assumed that inductive-
learning tasks of a particular objective task complexity will be more difficult 
for novices than for advanced learners. That is, for novice learners the 
experienced task complexity is higher than for advanced learners. However, 
there is also a possibility that prior knowledge is misleading. If prior 
knowledge is deeply rooted and incorrect or just partly correct, learners may 
reject the data without justification, or partially accept the data without theory 
revision (Glaser et al., 1992; Chinn & Brewer, 1993, 1998). Whether 
misconceptions will substantially affect the experienced task complexity is 
hard to tell. 
Finally, prior domain knowledge may positively affect learning (Lavoie & 
Good, 1988; Schauble et al., 1991). However, one cannot simply state that 
superior prior domain knowledge leads to better inductive learning. First, a 
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distinction should be made between post-test scores and learning gains. For 
example, it is possible that novice learners have lower post-test scores but that 
they have gained more knowledge, relative to advanced learners. In the study 
of Lavoie and Good (1988) the focus was on post-test scores, while the study 
of Schauble et al. (1991) focused on the impact of prior knowledge on 
knowledge gain. Preferably, the focus should be on post-test scores as well as 
knowledge gain. Second, the distance between the learner hypothesis space 
and the target conceptual model (van Joolingen & de Jong, 1997) should be 
considered. Experts may have a learner hypothesis space that closely 
resembles the target conceptual model, which limits the possible knowledge 
gain, while for novice learners the road to the target conceptual model may be 
quite long. Third, one should be cautious about using a median split to obtain 
a group with high- and a group with low prior knowledge if differences in 
prior knowledge are relatively small. In the study by Hulshof (2001), where 
all students scored low on the pretest, differences with respect to prior 
knowledge were too small to have an impact on post-test scores or knowledge 
gains.  
In conclusion, differences in prior domain knowledge can be described in 
terms of the extended SDDS model suggested by van Joolingen and de Jong 
(1997). Furthermore, novices and advanced learner may differ with respect to 
the generation of evidence and the interpretation of evidence. To generate a 
new hypothesis, novice learners tend to behave like experimenters and 
explore variables of the simulated model without a hypothesis in mind. 
Finally, due to the differences in prior domain knowledge, a particular 
inductive-learning task may be experienced as more difficult by novices than 
by advanced learners. 
 
Unraveling metacognition 
It has been frequently stated  that (1) metacognition is an important 
determinant of successful learning (e.g., Brown, 1987; Butler, 1998; Glaser, 
1989; Veenman & Elshout, 1999; Wang, Haertel, & Walberg, 1990) and (2) that 
metacognition is a fuzzy concept (e.g., Borkowski, 1996; Brown, 1987; Butler, 
1998; Hacker, 1998; Reder & Schunn, 1996; Schneider, 1998, Weinert, 1987). 
We shall begin with the latter statement. 
When introducing metacognition, John Flavell (1976, 1979) defined it as 
knowledge about the interplay between person characteristics, task 
characteristics and strategies. This is, indeed, a rather general definition, 
leaving space for idiosyncrasy. Also other current definitions of 
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metacognition, such as thoughts about thoughts (Weinert, 1987), an individual’s 
cognition about his or her cognitions (Nelson, 1999), knowledge of and control over 
one's own cognition (Schraw & Moshman, 1995), knowledge about one's own 
declarative and procedural knowledge (Dunlosky, 1998), knowledge and cognition 
about cognitive phenomena (Flavell, 1979), the monitoring of what is stored in 
memory and the initiation of control of future processing (Shimamura, 2000), 
cognition that reflects on, monitors, or regulates first-order cognition (Kuhn, 2000), 
or understanding and control of cognitive processes (Sternberg, 1998), allow 
scientists to have their own interpretation of the concept and to focus on just a 
small, sometimes isolated, psychological phenomenon, which they label 
metacognitive. What has been arising in the past two and a half decades is a 
large collection of descriptions of phenomena, processes, and mechanisms, all 
of which are labeled metacognitive, with many overlapping similarities. 
However, according to Brown (1987), these phenomena seem to lack a 
common feature and only show what Wittgenstein (1953) called 
Familienähnlichkeiten (family resemblances). A nice illustration of this is a 
special issue on metacognition in the journal Learning and Individual 
Differences, wherein Reder (1996) commented that the four articles in this 
special issue "seem to be addressing phenomena that frequently share little 
except a label" (p. 383). 
More than a decennium after the introduction of the concept of 
metacognition, Flavell (1987) argued that there is need for deeper insight into 
the entire concept of metacognition. Indeed, the concept could use some 
refinement, some differentiation. There should be further clarification of 
relations between the various metacognitive phenomena, a decision should be 
made as to whether metacognition is limited to conscious processes or not, 
and a decision should be made as to whether metacognition and cognition are 
different by nature (Kobes, 1997). Moreover, boundaries between 
metacognition and related concepts such as self-regulated learning (e.g., 
Zimmerman, 1995; Zimmerman & Pons, 1986), cognitive strategies (Gagné, 
1984; van Hout-Wolters, 1992), executive control (Gagné, 1984; Kluwe, 1987), 
motivational self-regulation (e.g., Boekaerts, 1997), or regulative processes (e.g., 
Njoo & de Jong, 1993) should be made clear. In other words, a theoretical 
framework, or at least a more differentiated vocabulary is needed to prevent 
researchers from vague or inaccurate labeling. Therefore, an attempt is made 
here to integrate current theories and frameworks on metacognition by using 
the basic vocabulary of production rules (see Chapter 2). This vocabulary is 
chosen for three reasons: (1) important current theories on cognition and 
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problem solving are based on production rules (e.g., Newell, 1990; Anderson 
& Lebiere, 1998), (2) production rules theory suggests some of the 
mechanisms of problem solving, and (3) in production rules declarative and 
procedural knowledge as well as goals, conditions and actions are differentiated. 
In particular a distinction is frequently made in the literature (e.g., Brown, 
1987; Roberts & Erdos, 1993; Schnotz, 1991; Veenman & Elshout, 1999) 
between metacognitive knowledge (declarative knowledge) and 
metacognitive skills (procedural knowledge) . In addition, reasoning about 
metacognition in terms of goals, conditions and actions could make 
metacognitive phenomena more specific and thus decrease its fuzziness. In 
the following paragraphs, contemporary ideas concerning metacognition will 
be briefly presented and, in passing, will be viewed with production-rule-
colored glasses. 
The concept of metacognition springs from ideas on metamemory (Flavell, 
1976), a sub-variety of metacognition that refers to the monitoring and control 
of one’s own memory during the acquisition of new information and during 
the retrieval of previous acquired information (Nelson, 1999). Nelson and 
Narens (1990, 1994; Nelson, 1996, 1999) postulated a rather abstract theory on 
metamemory and metacognition. Basically, they argued that cognitive 
processes could be split into two or more specific interrelated hierarchically 
organized levels, called meta-level and object-level (see Figure 3.1). The 
relation between levels determines whether a level could be seen as meta-
level or object-level. In other words, there is no particular aspect of cognition 
that is always at the meta-level in any absolute sense. There are two kinds of 
dominance relations, which are defined in terms of the direction of the flow of 
information between the meta-level and object-level. Information flowing 
from the object-level to the meta-level is called monitoring and this informs the 
meta-level about what state the object-level is in. Information flowing from 
the meta-level to the object-level is called control and this informs the object-
level what to do next. The meta-level modifies the object-level, but not vice 
versa. Moreover, it is assumed that the meta-level has some kind of model 
containing a goal and the ways in which the meta-level can use the object-
level to accomplish that goal. Examples of control processes in metamemory 
are allocation of study time, termination of study, and selection of search 
strategy. Monitoring processes in metamemory are, for instance, ease-of-
learning judgments, feeling-of-knowing judgments, and confidence in 
retrieved answers. According to Nelson and Narens, the distinction between 
meta-level and object-level can easily be generalized to more than two levels, 
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that is, meta-metacognition (Schraw & Moshman, 1995) or meta-meta-
metacognition. For instance, learners may have confidence in their feeling-of-
knowing judgments. 
The simplicity of the theory seems appealing: just a few hierarchical 
organized levels (more than three levels is hardly imaginable) and two 
operations (monitoring and control). On the other hand, Nelson and Narens’ 
theory is unclear about the nature of the information flowing from object-level 
to meta-level. Dunlosky (1998) argued that the meta-level system does not 
have direct access to the underlying processes that occur within the object-
level system, but it does have access to products from object-level processes. 
Thus, information about the products goes up. Learners probably use the 
output of monitoring to control subsequent processing, such as deciding to 
terminate studying or deciding which strategies to use to solve a problem 
(Davidson & Sternberg, 1998; Dunlosky, 1998; Winne & Hadwin, 1998). Also 
the nature of the information that goes down, from meta-level to object-level, 
is as yet undefined. Furthermore, the goal-directedness of problem solving 
and learning (Newell & Simon, 1972; see also Davidson, Deuser, & Sternberg, 
1994; Davidson & Sternberg, 1998) is neglected in the theory of Nelson and 
Narens. Without specifying goals of monitoring and control processes, these 
operations become almost meaningless. Finally, the meta-level and object-
level are not observable and, thus, hard to distinguish. Nelson and Narens 
(1994, p. 13) acknowledged that “the boundary between object-level versus 
OBJECT-LEVEL 
META-LEVEL 
monitoring control 
model 
Figure 3.1. A representation of metacognition, adapted from Nelson and Narens (1990, 1994).
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meta-level (...) is sometimes sharp and at other times may be more fuzzy”. In 
conclusion, the surplus value of the distinction between Nelson and Narens’ 
abstract meta-level and object-level for a clarifying theory on metacognition 
seems limited (Kobes, 1997). The concepts of monitoring and control as well 
as the idea of flow of information could be useful, but only after serious 
refinement of these concepts. 
In many theoretical articles, metacognition is divided into a declarative part 
and a procedural part (e.g., Brown, 1987; Roberts & Erdos, 1993; Schnotz, 1991). 
Declarative metacognitive knowledge includes an understanding of task 
demands, of oneself as a learner, of strategies, of content, and the 
relationships between them, which very much resembles Flavell’s (1979) early 
definition of metacognition. Examples of declarative metacognitive 
knowledge are: the awareness of one’s prior knowledge, awareness of the 
previous experiences with the content to be learned, the information 
regarding one’s skill at employing the various types of learning strategies 
suggested by the task (Ertmer & Newby, 1996). Moreover, declarative 
metacognitive knowledge is assumed to be relatively stable and state-able 
(Brown, 1987). The other part of metacognition, the procedural one, is also 
known as metacognitive control (Ertmer & Newby, 1996), metacognitive skills 
(e.g., Veenman & Elshout, 1999), executive decisions (Kluwe, 1987), or regulation 
(Brown, 1987; Schraw, 1998). It concerns the self-regulatory activities that are 
actually being performed by a learner (Veenman, 1993). This procedural 
metacognitive knowledge is supposed to be relatively unstable (i.e., task and 
situation dependent) and not necessarily state-able (Brown, 1987). Many 
researchers (e.g., Boekaerts, 1997; Brown, 1987; Ertmer and Newby, 1996; Lin 
& Lehman, 1999; Schoenfeld, 1987; Schraw, 1998; Schraw & Moshman, 1995; 
Sternberg, 1998; Veenman, 1993) argued that procedural metacognitive 
knowledge (i.e., control of cognitive processes) includes planning, monitoring, 
and evaluating activities. (Note that Nelson and Narens (1990, 1994) 
distinguished control from monitoring whilst here, control includes 
monitoring.) In addition, orientation activities and elaboration activities may 
be regarded as manifestations of metacognitive skills (Veenman, 1993).  
Planning involves the selection of appropriate strategies and the allocation 
of resources that affect performance (Schraw & Moshman, 1995). Planning can 
be further divided into local planning and global planning (Brown, 1987), or 
into planning one step ahead and two (or more) steps ahead (Berardi-Coletta, 
Buyer, Dominowski, & Rellinger, 1995), or into local, task-oriented planning 
and goal-oriented planning (Schauble et al., 1991). Monitoring refers to one’s 
 24
on-line awareness of comprehension and task performance and evaluation 
refers to appraising the products and regulatory processes of one’s learning 
(Schraw & Moshman, 1995). The boundary between monitoring and 
evaluation activities is rather vague. Otero (1998), for instance, considered 
evaluation as a component of monitoring and also Kluwe (1987) stated that 
evaluation serves a monitoring purpose whereas Veenman (1993) conceived 
monitoring as a part of evaluation activities. What these three conceptions of 
monitoring and evaluation have in common is that monitoring is assumed to 
takes place concurrently during problem solving and evaluation at specific 
moments during a problem-solving task, for instance halfway and at the end. 
Also for monitoring and evaluation activities different levels can be 
distinguished. According to Berardi-Coletta et al. (1995), monitoring and 
evaluation activities could take place on the personal level (e.g., “This is easy 
for me”), the processing level (e.g., “That was a mistake”), and the problem 
level (e.g., “This problem is too hard”). Orientation activities concern the 
preparation for a specific task, such as activating prior knowledge, analyzing 
the problem statement, building a mental model of the task, and generating 
hypotheses and predictions. Elaboration activities concern the intention of 
storing findings and concepts in memory by recapitulating, drawing 
conclusions, relating these conclusions to the subject matter, and generating 
explanations. 
Surprisingly, there seems to be a third component of metacognition besides 
declarative and procedural metacognitive knowledge. Schraw and Moshman 
(1995; Schraw, 1998) as well as Osman and Hannafin (1992), Schneider (1998) 
and Winne (1996) also distinguished conditional metacognitive knowledge, 
analogous to ideas of Alexander and Judy (1988). Schraw and Moshman 
claimed that declarative knowledge refers to knowing “about” things, 
procedural knowledge refers to knowing “how” to do things, and conditional 
knowledge refers to knowing the “why” and “when” aspects of cognition. 
They argued that conditional knowledge might be thought of as declarative 
knowledge about the relative utility of cognitive procedures. Thus, 
conditional knowledge can be seen as a special kind of declarative knowledge. 
An example of conditional metacognitive knowledge is knowledge about the 
assumed effectiveness of a particular problem-solving strategy for a particular 
situation (Schraw & Moshman, 1995). Presumably, retrieving this kind of 
knowledge from memory serves a purpose. It may be necessary, that is, 
conditional for actually selecting the appropriate strategy for solving the 
problem. Apparently, conditional metacognitive knowledge could have two 
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meanings: (1) declarative knowledge about conditions (Schraw & Moshman, 
1995), or (2) declarative metacognitive knowledge that functions as condition 
for the attainment of a particular goal (Veenman, 1998; Winne, 1996). 
Knowledge about the appropriateness of a problem-solving strategy for a 
particular task covers the first meaning. If, and only if, this knowledge is also 
necessary for the selection and execution of that strategy, the second meaning 
is covered. The possibility of two meanings makes the term, conditional 
metacognitive knowledge, somewhat confusing. The only additional value of 
the term, conditional metacognitive knowledge, is that it reveals a part of the 
interaction between the declarative and procedural components of 
metacognition. Where Brown (1987) and Ertmer and Newby (1996) simply 
stated that this interaction is dynamic, we suggest here that particular 
declarative metacognitive knowledge is likely to be retrieved, based on a 
current goal, and can thus function as a conditional entity for the execution of 
particular problem-solving and learning strategies. This occurs in a similar 
way as retrieved chunks of declarative knowledge serve as constraints or 
conditions for the firing of particular production rules in production rules 
theory. 
Following Elshout (1976), Veenman (1993; Veenman & Elshout, 1999) 
suggested that a task schema represents the metacognitive skills that are 
involved in cognitive performance. A task schema contains a set of 
instructions for initiating and regulating the problem solving and learning 
process. Novice learners have no task-specific solution paths at their disposal 
to solve an unfamiliar problem, so they have to assemble a solution path out of 
available elementary operations and routines, according to a general task 
schema (see also Resnick & Glaser, 1976). In familiar situations, in contrast, 
the general task schema has been instantiated (i.e., specialized) for that 
particular task in that particular domain and, thus, has become task-specific. 
The task-specific schema contains a specific planning structure for the 
execution of problem-solving strategies. If this task-specific schema is 
frequently used, the problem-solving process for that particular task may 
even be automatized and stored in memory, independently of the general 
task schema (Veenman, 1993). Consequently, metacognitive skills of novice 
learners are initially domain-general, but during the acquisition of expertise in 
a certain domain these general metacognitive skills may transform gradually 
into domain-specific regulatory procedures. In terms of production systems, 
continued practice may lead to composition, which involves combining 
production rules, possibly leading to speeding up the actions of a problem-
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solving procedure, and, ultimately, it may lead to automatization (cf. Taatgen, 
1999). 
Hacker (1998) wondered whether thoughts that were once metacognitive 
but have since become automatic and non-conscious through repeated use 
and over-learning should still be called metacognitive. This dilemma is 
referred to as the consciousness-problem (Weinert, 1987). Schimamura (2000) 
stated that in many situations, such as selective attention and task switching, 
metacognition seems to imply conscious control of information processing. 
Similarly, Schnotz (1991, p. 367) suggested that researchers “should restrict 
the concept of metacognitive procedural knowledge to conscious evaluation 
and control processes, i.e. procedures which lead to (conscious) declarative 
knowledge about the actual state of comprehension or which operate on this 
knowledge”. This more or less implies that the label metacognitive is 
predominantly used for activities during initial learning processes, when the 
problem-solving process still has to be assembled. Activities during the actual 
task performance of experts are thus unlikely to be called metacognitive. Reder 
and Schunn (1996, p. 45), on the other hand, argued that “some aspects of 
metacognition typically called monitoring, and therefore implying awareness, 
actually operate without much awareness. Moreover, the control processes 
that operate to affect strategy choice are frequently influenced by implicit 
processes.” Reder and Schunn believed that strategy choice is influenced by 
past experience and that the learner is often unaware of these influences. 
Brown (1987) and Butler (1998) also supported the idea that outside-of-
awareness processes (e.g., strategy selection and self-monitoring) are 
metacognitive if they serve to regulate learners’ approaches to tasks. 
Consequently, non-conscious good and bad habits may be called 
metacognitive as well (Veenman, 1993). Unfortunately, automatic, non-
conscious activities are hard to detect (Ericsson & Simon, 1993). Thus, there 
are two contrasting views concerning the consciousness-problem. It seems 
just a matter of choice to use consciousness of an activity as a decisive 
criterion for labeling it metacognitive. 
The theories discussed so far do not explicitly state how metacognitive 
activities and cognitive activities are related and connected. As a matter of 
fact, distinguishing metacognitive from cognitive activities happens to be 
rather difficult (Brown, 1987; Butler, 1998). Veenman, Samarapungavan, van 
Hout-Wolters, and Beishuizen (1992) suggested that metacognitive and 
cognitive activities have the same characteristics, but differ in their goals or 
functions. Flavell (1979), Brown (1987) and Butler (1998) also suggested that 
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the goal or function of a particular activity or strategy determines whether it 
must be labeled metacognitive or cognitive. Activities aiming at knowledge 
improvement can be labeled cognitive and activities aiming at the regulation 
of approaches to tasks can be labeled metacognitive (Butler, 1998). For 
instance, looking for main points during reading is a cognitive strategy if it 
serves the goal of reading for meaning, but it is a metacognitive strategy if it is 
used to self-test comprehension (Brown, 1987; Butler, 1998). However, in 
order to execute a particular metacognitive activity, some cognitive activities 
may have to be executed first (Veenman et al., 1992). For instance, first 
learners have to read for meaning before they can self-test comprehension of 
the text. Thus, the interplay between metacognitive and cognitive activities 
may be determined by the learner’s goal structure. In addition, a goal structure 
perspective may be helpful in determining the boundary as well as the 
relation between self-regulated learning and metacognition. Boekaerts (1998), 
following Carver and Scheier (1990; Carver, Lawrence & Scheier, 1996), 
distinguished learner goals at various levels of abstraction. Basically, there are 
goals at the principle control level, the so-called be goals, and goals at the 
(lower) action program level and at the (lowest) script level, the do goals. For 
instance, “trying to be a good student” is assumed to be at the principle level, 
“using the deep-level processing mode to get good grades“ is assumed to be 
at the action program level, and “making summaries” is assumed to be at the 
script level. Lower-order goals derive from higher-order goals and are more 
concrete, which makes it easier for learners to determine whether lower-order 
goals are attained, relative to higher-order goals. Furthermore, learners do not 
have to be constantly aware of higher-order goals when they are pursuing 
lower-order goals. This makes it possible for peers, teachers, and researchers 
to set a lower-order goal within the learner’s goal structure, which may 
undermine goals at a higher level. For example, “trying to be a good student” 
may be forgotten when a fellow student asks you whether you want to go out 
the evening before an exam, and “I do not like physics” may be ignored when 
a researcher asks you to work for two hours in an Optics Lab. Motivational 
self-regulation (Boekaerts, 1999), central in self-regulated learning, concerns 
goal setting and goal pursuing at the higher level, involving psychological 
needs of the self. Metacognitive and cognitive activities, on the other hand, 
concern goal setting and goal pursuing at the lower levels. Boekaerts (1997, 
1999) emphasized that including motivational beliefs, such as goal orientation, 
interest, attitudes, and self-concept of ability as part of metacognitive 
knowledge is unwarranted, mainly because it decreases the explanatory 
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power of the various constructs. The interplay between self-regulated 
learning, metacognitive activities, and cognitive activities lies in the idea that 
the goals of the lower level are derived from goals of the higher level, that is, 
it lies in the view that goals are hierarchically nested. 
Production rules theory may suggest how a learner’s goal structure could 
be organized. For instance, in ACT-R (Anderson & Lebiere, 1998; Anderson & 
Schunn, 2000) the goal structure has the form of a goal stack. This goal stack 
records the hierarchy of the system’s intentions, in which the bottom goal of 
the stack is the most general goal and the goals above it are sub-goals set in its 
service. ACT-R is always trying to achieve the goal that is on top of the stack. 
If the top goal is achieved, this goal will be removed from the stack and ACT-
R focuses on the next goal. In ACT-R, a production rule can also push a new 
goal onto the stack, in which case that goal takes over as the focus of 
attention. For instance, if learners are involved in a discovery task in which 
they have to discover rules of geometrical optics (the goal implemented by the 
researcher), a sequence of sub-goals should be achieved before the task can be 
successfully finished. These sub-goals may vary from wanting to read the 
theory section and turning to the next page to wanting to change the system 
variables, and from wanting to orientate, plan, and evaluate to wanting to 
write down the rules one has discovered on a piece of paper. 
In sum, by using the vocabulary of production rules, different parts of 
metacognition and their roles can be distinguished. Moreover, production 
rules theory sheds light on the domain generality-specificity problem, on the 
consciousness problem, and it suggests how metacognition is related to 
concepts such as executive control, regulative processes, and cognitive 
strategies. In addition, the goal orientation perspective suggests how 
motivational beliefs and metacognition are related and how metacognition 
activities and cognitive activities are intertwined. Nonetheless, metacognition 
remains a blanket term, as Brown (1987) and Boekaerts (1999) called it. So 
why use metacognition if other concepts resemble it so closely, if other 
concepts are more specific and thus more meaningful? Well, the concept of 
metacognition is used in the studies of this thesis as an umbrella concept, 
which permits reference to orientation activities, planning activities, 
evaluation activities and elaboration activities by just one label. Studies of 
Veenman (e.g., 1993) showed that these components of metacognitive skills 
are strongly related, that is, good orientation leads to good planning and a 
systematic execution of actions, which, in turn, facilitates evaluation and 
elaboration. The operationalization of metacognition is based on more specific 
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and more meaningful concepts such as orientation, planning, evaluation, and 
elaboration. 
 
Assessing metacognition 
The division of metacognition into a declarative part and a procedural part is 
reflected in the current methods used to assess metacognition. Declarative 
knowledge about metacognitive activities is predominantly measured by self-
report questionnaires, whereas the think-aloud method is often used for 
assessing metacognitive skills. Both methods have their pros and cons, which 
will be discussed in this section. Moreover, there are alternative ways to 
assess metacognition (van Hout-Wolters, 2000), such as stimulated recall 
techniques, systematic observation (e.g., Veenman, Kerseboom, & Imthorn, 
2000), and the use of log file measures (Shute & Glaser, 1990; Veenman, 
Elshout, & Groen, 1993). The method of using log file measures will also 
shortly be discussed, because this method is explored in some of the studies 
described in this thesis.  
Generally, in self-report questionnaires, students are presented with 
questions or statements with regard to cognitive, affective, and/or 
metacognitive activities (van Hout-Wolters, 2000). Students are asked to 
answer these questions or to indicate on a scale the degree to which they use 
the described activity or the degree to which the phrased motive or view 
corresponded to their own motives or views. For instance, a self-regulation 
item from the Inventory of Learning Styles (Vermunt & van Rijswijk, 1987; 
Vermunt, 1992, 1998) is “To test my learning progress, I try to answer 
questions about the subject matter which I make up myself”. The Likert-type 
scale varies from 1 (I seldom or never do this), to 5 (I (almost) always do this). A 
planning item from the State Metacognitive Inventory (O’Neil & Abedi, 1996) 
is “I explicitly planned my course of action,” to which a student could answer: 
1 (not at all), 2 (somewhat), 3 (moderately), or 4 (very much so). However, self-
report questionnaires have some important disadvantages. First, declarative 
metacognitive knowledge does not have to be complete or correct, that is, 
students may know more than they tell (Garner & Alexander, 1989), they may 
tell more than they know (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977), or they may tell more or 
less than they actually do (Dominowski, 1998). Second, social desirability may 
play a role during completion of the questionnaire (Prins, Busato, Elshout & 
Hamaker, 1998; van Hout-Wolters, 2000). And third, completing general 
questions about metacognitive activities does not capture the ability to tune to 
specific task demands (van Hout-Wolters, 2000), that is, in general questions 
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about metacognitive activities, the goal-directness of specific metacognitive 
activities is not taken into account. Some metacognitive activities are 
appropriate some of the time but not all metacognitive activities are 
appropriate all the time. Not surprisingly, studies into the validity of self-
report measures have indicated that there is hardly any relation between 
measures of self-reported activities and measures of actual behavior (Prins, 
Busato, Hamaker, & Visser, 1996; Prins, Busato, Elshout & Hamaker, 1998; 
Veenman, Prins & Verheij, 2002). Thus, self-report questionnaires are only 
useful for assessing opinions concerning the occurrence of metacognitive 
activities, not for assessing the occurrence of metacognitive activities itself. 
A more valid but also a more time-consuming method of assessing the 
occurrence of metacognitive activities is the use of think-aloud protocols 
(Brown, 1987; Garner & Alexander, 1989; Veenman, 1993; Veenman, Elshout 
& Meijer, 1997). Basically, to obtain think-aloud protocols, learners are 
instructed to verbalize the information they attend to while solving a 
problem. They are not asked to rationalize, justify, or explain what they are 
doing. This think-aloud instruction does not affect the performance of the 
primary task, but it may slow down the problem-solving process (Chi, 1997; 
Ericsson & Simon, 1993; van Someren, Barnard, & Sandberg, 1994; Veenman, 
Elshout, & Groen, 1993). Ericsson and Simon (1993) argued that the 
potentially reportable knowledge corresponds to the contents of working 
memory. Consequently, in terms of production systems, production rules 
themselves and the states of activation of the declarative elements are not 
reportable (Anderson, 1996b). Similarly, metacognitive processes, as they take 
the form of productions, remain inaccessible. These processes reveal 
themselves through their inputs and outputs. Hence, they can only be 
inferred from behavior and from goals of which the learner is aware (Simon, 
1996). Similarly, automatic processes remain predominantly inaccessible 
(Garner & Alexander, 1989; Ericsson & Simon, 1993), which makes the think-
aloud method more valuable for assessment of novice learners’ metacognitive 
behavior, relative to metacognitive behavior of advanced learners and 
experts. Once the protocols are collected and transcribed, segments of the 
protocol have to be coded according to a coding scheme that is relevant for 
the hypothesis one wishes to test. Again there are two approaches: (1) 
analyses are done with frequencies of activities (Berardi-Colletta et al., 1995; 
Elshout, Veenman, & van Hell, 1993; Prins et al., 1998), or (2) the focus is on 
the quality of the metacognitive activities (e.g., Veenman, 1993). The frequency 
approach ignores the idea that some strategies do not have to be quite so 
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effective at particular moments of time. Furthermore, the quality-approach 
also takes into account the ‘deepness’ and elaborateness of metacognitive 
activity (Veenman, Kerseboom, & Imthorn, 2000). For those reasons, the 
quality approach is chosen in the studies of this thesis. 
In a number of studies, Veenman and Elshout (Elshout & Veenman, 1992; 
Veenman & Elshout, 1991, 1992, 1995; Veenman, Elshout, & Busato, 1994; 
Veenman, Elshout, & Groen, 1993; Veenman, Elshout, & Meijer, 1997) 
assessed learners’ metacognitive skillfulness, that is, the quality of their 
metacognitive skills, by analyzing their think-aloud protocols. Metacognitive 
skillfulness was scored on five, positively related subscales: orientation 
activities, systematic orderliness, accuracy, evaluation, and elaboration 
activities. Orientation activities concern the preparation for the task, such as 
analyzing the problem statement, identifying the independent and dependent 
system variables, building a mental model of the task, and generating 
hypotheses and predictions. Systematic orderliness concerns planning 
activities and the consecutive execution of plans. Accuracy scores were based 
on note taking and calculational precision. Evaluation activities concern 
monitoring and checking, both on the local level of detecting errors and 
checking calculations as well as on the global level of keeping track of 
progress being made. And finally, elaboration activities concern the storing of 
findings and concepts in memory, recapitulating, drawing conclusions, 
relating these conclusions to the subject matter, and generating explanations. 
The subscales of metacognitive skillfulness were rated on a five-point scale, 
ranging from 0 to 4. A sum score over the four subscales for each participant 
was computed to obtain a total score for metacognitive skillfulness. In order 
to avoid confusion with learning performance, aspects of metacognitive 
skillfulness were judged on the quality of performing regulatory activities, 
not on the correctness of the information that resulted from these activities. 
For instance, generating well-considered, though incorrect predictions or 
incorrect conclusions may still result in high scores on orientation or 
elaboration.  
But what is good metacognition? What are the criteria that allow specific 
metacognitive activities to be judged as having a better quality than other 
metacognitive activities? There are at least three issues concerning the 
assessment of the quality of metacognitive skills. First, it is tempting to relate 
the quality of metacognitive skills to whether or not the learner goals are 
attained. For instance, if learners want to study for an exam with limited 
effort, just enough to pass, and they succeed, one could argue that their 
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metacognitive skills are of good quality. And if they do not succeed, one 
could argue that their metacognitive skills are not of good quality. However, 
there is more to task success than the quality of metacognitive skills. Learners 
with good metacognitive skills could fail because of insufficient prior 
knowledge, or because they do not feel well during the exam. Therefore, it is 
recommended that the quality of metacognitive skills should be assessed 
independently of task success and learner goals, that is, the focus should be 
on learners’ behavior. Second, what is good is partly task dependent, that is, 
the quality of metacognitive skills may manifest itself in different behaviors 
on different tasks. For instance, note taking may be more appropriate whilst 
studying a difficult text than during the memorization of a list of Italian 
words. In addition, conducting a large number of experiments appears to be 
more appropriate in a simulation with associative relations between system 
variables such as in Smithtown than in a simulation with quantitative 
numerical relations such as in Voltaville (Glaser et al., 1992). According to 
O’Neil and Abedi (1996), a domain-independent measure like metacognition 
must be instantiated in a context. That means that there should be a 
determination per task of what can be considered as the manifestation of good 
general metacognitive skills. However, different manifestations may spring 
from the same source of skills, as was found by Veenman, Elshout, and Meijer 
(1997) and by Veenman and Verheij (2001). The results of their studies 
indicate that measures of the quality of metacognitive skills for different tasks 
in different domains are positively related. 
Second, in order to guarantee enough variance for discrimination amongst 
participants, it is advisable to let the scale of the quality of general 
metacognitive skills be sample dependent. The learner with the best 
metacognitive skills and the learner with the worst metacognitive skills 
determine the boundaries of the scale. That makes scores concerning the 
quality of metacognitive skills relative scores, not absolute scores. 
Third, determining what is good has an interpretative character, inherent to 
protocol analysis. Interpretation takes place during coding of the protocol 
segments (e.g., identifying orientation or evaluation activities) as well as 
during the assessment of quality (e.g., ratings of orientation quality). Raters 
normally base their interpretations on a coding system, sometimes after 
several training sessions with coding system experts. Notwithstanding a clear 
coding system and excellent training sessions, the possibility of rater’s 
idiosyncrasy remains, especially when more than one aspect of a specific skill 
has to be weighted. For instance, judges may have to decide whether it is 
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better to have a global, systematic plan without executing the plan or to have 
half a plan and work systematically for the first half of the task. Similarly, 
judges may to decide whether it is better to generate two general hypotheses 
or to generate a specific one, they may have to decide what is good timing of 
evaluation activities. A coding system is not normally so detailed as to decide 
on the manifold possible situations. Therefore, an inter-rater reliability has to 
be calculated to determine if the raters coded the protocols the same way. In 
the above-mentioned studies by Veenman and Elshout (e.g., 1991, 1995), the 
raters performed the protocol analyses together, arguing until agreement was 
reached. This method does not allow for the calculation of an inter-rater 
reliability. Veenman and Elshout’s method may reduce idiosyncrasy amongst 
judges by having judges mutually scrutinize their judgments, but it does not 
permit idiosyncrasy to be detected. However, inter-rater reliabilities 
exceeding .81 have been obtained for protocol-analyses judgments (Veenman, 
Beishuizen, & Niewold, 1997; Veenman & Verheij, 2001) and a stability 
measure of r = .87 has been obtained by re-analyzing protocols after one-year 
delay (Veenman, 1993). In the studies described in Chapters 4 and 6, inter-
rater reliability will be calculated. 
Thus, the quality of metacognitive skills is partly task dependent and the 
quality scale is sample dependent. Still, there are also criteria independent of 
task and sample that guide the rating process of the protocols obtained in 
studies of this thesis. The quality of orientation activities will probably 
increase if learners build a mental model of the task and if they generate 
hypotheses and predictions, thereby mentioning the independent and 
dependent variables as well as the direction of the expected relation between 
the variables. Timing is also important. Orientation at the beginning of the 
problem-solving process, not halfway, is preferred. The quality of 
systematical orderliness will increase when learners complete an orderly 
sequence of actions and avoid unsystematic events such as varying two 
variables at the same time (e.g., Veenman, 1993; Shute & Glaser, 1990). As far 
as planning activities are concerned, good planners make decisions at a higher 
level of abstraction and they recognize the importance of global planning, 
whereas poor planners heavily rely on local plans (Brown, 1987; Shute & 
Glaser, 1990). Evaluation activities are assumed to be of higher quality when 
learners identify mistakes or incomprehension (Ferguson-Hessler & de Jong, 
1990) and when action is undertaken to correct the mistakes or reduce this 
incomprehension (Chi, Bassok, Lewis, Reimann, & Glaser, 1989; Ertmer & 
Newby, 1996). Finally, in the studies included in this thesis, elaboration 
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activities are rated as of better quality when learners draw conclusions at a 
higher level of precision (van Joolingen, 1995) and when they relate 
conclusions to prior knowledge or earlier results of experiments they 
conducted. The above-mentioned studies by Veenman and Elshout show that 
the five sub-scales of the quality of metacognitive skills are positively related. 
Furthermore, two of their studies (Veenman, 1993; Elshout, Veenman, & van 
Hell, 1994) revealed that the relation between the quality of metacognitive 
skills and scores for systematical approach to problem solving (Mettes, Pilot, 
& Roosink, 1981) were positively related (.87 ≤ r ≤ .95).  
Many computer simulations (e.g., Glaser et al., 1992; Shute & Glaser, 1990, 
Veenman, 1993) can log activities of learners. Basically, the log files contain 
information on frequencies and sequences of manipulation activities, on 
frequencies of measurement activities, on time on task, and on time used to 
read instructions and theory. If a simulation has a notebook tool, a hypothesis 
scratchpad (van Joolingen, 1993), or a planning menu, then content-related 
and planning-related learner behavior can also be logged. Shute and Glaser 
(1990) distinguished three categories of log file measures, which they called 
learning indicators. First, there are learning indicators at the general activity 
level, such as total number of actions, total number of experiments, and 
number of independent variables changed. Second, there are indicators for 
data management skills, which contain mainly notebook entry activities. Lastly, 
there are indicators for thinking and planning skills, which contain entries of 
Planning Menu items, the number of times that variables that had been 
specified beforehand in the Planning Menu were changed, and the number of 
times the Prediction Menu was used to specify a particular outcome to an 
event. Findings from Shute and Glaser’s (1990) study showed that the most 
effective learning behavior is related to thinking and planning skills, whereas 
indicators at the general level are unrelated to learning outcomes. It remains 
unclear, however, whether these learning indicators may be an alternative 
assessment method for the quality of metacognition, because the latter has not 
fully been assessed. Veenman, Elshout, and Groen (1993) compared learner’s 
log file measures with measures of the quality of metacognitive skills during 
experimenting in a computer simulation about heat theory. The log file 
measures used in their study contained an indicator for the number of 
experiments, but also indicators for the number of times a learner failed to 
measure an initial or final temperature. A composite score of these indicators 
correlated substantially (r = .62) with the quality of metacognitive skills. Also 
the scores for the quality of metacognitive skills in a more recent study by 
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Veenman and Verheij (2001) were compared with log file measures. This time, 
log file measures were based on sequences of learner’s activities. The more 
systematically a learner varied and combined the variables of the simulation, 
the higher the learner scored on the log file measure. This method is described 
in more detail in Chapter 7. Log file measure and measures of quality of 
metacognitive skills correlated .93.  
The log file measures are domain-specific and sometimes even simulation-
specific when special tools such as a planning tool or a notebook facility are 
involved. It is assumed that log file measures are an instantiation of domain-
general metacognitive skills, but that should, of course, be validated. 
According to van Hout-Wolters (2000), quantitative data about learning time 
and learning order give, at most, indications that metacognitive processes 
took place. The appropriateness or quality of learning activities is difficult to 
grasp with frequencies of learning activities. One advantage of the use of log 
file measures for the assessment of the quality of metacognitive skills is that it 
reduces the interference with the learning process (Kunz, Drewniak, & Schott, 
1992).  
 
Metacognition, intellectual ability and inductive learning 
Now that there is some clarity about the concept of metacognition and about 
the way one could assess it, the focus of attention will shift to experimental 
studies concerning the relation between metacognition and intellectual ability, 
and to their role in the inductive-learning process. Intellectual ability, not yet 
defined in this thesis, is regarded here as the acquired repertoire of general 
cognitive skills that is available to a person at a particular point of time 
(Elshout, 1983; Humphreys, 1968; Snow & Lohman, 1984). According to this 
view, performance on mental ability tests can be understood in terms of a 
relatively small number of basic information-processing components (Carroll, 
1976; Simon, 1976; Sternberg, 1988). As Anderson (1996a, p. 356) phrased it, 
“intelligence is the simple accrual and tuning of many small units of 
knowledge that in total produce complex cognition. The whole is no more 
than the sum of its parts, but it has a lot of parts.” In other words, intellectual 
ability is regarded here as a cognitive toolbox. An intelligence test samples the 
intellectual repertoire (Veenman, 1993). The intellectual ability of the 
participants of the studies described in this thesis was assessed by a series of 
tests including five primary intelligence factors: inductive reasoning, 
quantitative reasoning, verbal ability, closure flexibility, and sequential 
reasoning (Carroll, 1993). The test battery included tests for vocabulary, 
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verbal analogies, linear syllogisms, number series, number speed, and 
embedded figures. The unweighted mean of the scores on these six tests may 
be regarded as a measure of intellectual ability or an IQ equivalent (Veenman 
& Elshout, 1999). For an overview of different concepts of intelligence and 
methods of assessment, see for instance Brody (1992), Neisser, Boodoo, 
Bouchard, Boykin, Brody, Ceci, Halpern, Loehlin, Perloff, Sternberg, and 
Urbina (1996), or Sternberg (1994). 
It is an interesting question whether and how metacognition and 
intellectual ability are related. Sternberg (1985, 1988, 1994) conceived 
metacomponents, performance components, and knowledge-acquisition components 
as essential parts of human intelligence. Metacomponents are used to decide 
what to do, to monitor it while it is being done, and to evaluate what one has 
done after it is completed. Performance components are lower-order 
processes used to execute various strategies in task performance, such as 
encoding, inferring, and applying inferred relations. Knowledge-acquisition 
components are processes involved in learning new information and storing it 
in memory. The metacomponents are comparable to metacognitive skills and, 
thus, in Sternberg’s opinion, metacognitive skills are part of intellectual 
ability. Again it seems a matter of choice: one can just decide that 
metacognition is included within intellectual ability or that it goes beyond 
intellectual ability. There are, however, some reasons to separate the concepts 
of metacognitive skills and intellectual ability. First, metacognitive skills 
appear to be applicable over a wide range of tasks, while mental abilities, such 
as verbal ability and inductive reasoning, apply to a smaller range of tasks 
(Sternberg, 1988; Schraw, 1998). Second, evidence implies that the frontal 
lobes of the brain are of critical importance for human metacognition 
(Metcalfe, 1996; Shimamura, 1996, 2000), whereas cognitive operations are 
located in other areas of the brain (Kalat, 1992; Posner, Petersen, Fox & 
Raichle, 1988). Consequently, a person who has lost the most central 
metacognitive abilities because of brain damage “… appear to drift about like 
a rudderless ship”, even given a high level of cognitive abilities as measured 
by a variety of tests (Metcalfe, 1996, p. 404). Third, metacognitive skills are 
teachable and supportable (Brown & Palincsar, 1989; Campione, Brown, & 
Ferrara, 1982; Schraw, 1998; Veenman, Elshout, & Busato, 1994; see also the 
next section), whereas change of more specific cognitive abilities through 
training and support is rather difficult to achieve (Elshout, 1987). Fourth, 
metacognitive skills and intellectual ability are normally assessed by different 
methods.  
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Separating metacognition and intellectual ability theoretically does not 
mean that the two are not related. Veenman (1993) described three possible 
models that may represent the relation between metacognition and 
intellectual ability. The first one is called the intelligence model. This model 
regards metacognitions as a manifestation of intellectual ability (cf. Sternberg, 
1988; Davidson, Deuser, & Sternberg, 1994) and predicts that metacognitive 
skills and intellectual ability will correlate highly and that metacognitive skills 
do not have a predictive value for learning independent of intellectual ability. 
Support for the intelligence model was found by Elshout and Veenman 
(1992). The second model, referred to as the independency model, predicts the 
opposite. Metacognitive skills and intellectual ability do not correlate 
substantially and they are, thus, independent determinants of learning. 
Swanson (1990) provided evidence for this model. In his study, high 
performance on problem-solving tasks was more closely related to higher 
performance on the metacognitive questionnaire than on the intellectual 
aptitude measures. Also a study by Maqsud (1997) showed that 
metacognition and intellectual ability were independent predictors of 
learning. Swanson (1990) as well as Maqsud (1997) used a 2 by 2 design, with 
metacognition and intellectual ability as orthogonal factors. However, the 
cells were equally distributed, which indicated that measures of 
metacognition and intellectual ability were not related. Furthermore, results 
of a study by Minnaert (1996) indicated that the executive control of 
university students, measured by the self-report questionnaires Inventory of 
Learning Styles (Vermunt & van Rijswijk, 1987) and the Leuven Executive 
Regulation Questionnaire (LERQ), was unrelated to measures of intellectual 
ability. Similarly, no significant relation between metacognition and 
intellectual ability of adolescents was found by Allon, Gutkin, and Bruning 
(1994). The last model, called the mixed model, predicts that metacognitive 
skills and intellectual ability share variance but that metacognitive skills have 
a surplus value on top of intellectual ability for the prediction of leaning. 
Evidence for the mixed model was, for instance, obtained by Berger and Reid 
(1989). They found that measures for monitoring and intellectual ability were 
related for learning-disabled and mentally-retarded adults. For university 
students performing inductive-learning tasks, the mixed model was 
corroborated in several studies of Veenman and Elshout (Elshout & Veenman, 
1992; Veenman & Elshout, 1991, 1992, 1995, 1999; Veenman, Elshout, & 
Busato, 1994; Veenman, Elshout, & Groen, 1993; Veenman, Elshout, & Hoeks, 
1993; Veenman, Elshout, & Meijer, 1997; Veenman & Verheij, 2001). Results of 
 38
their studies showed that the learning outcomes of novices could be predicted 
by the weighted sum of general metacognitive skillfulness and intellectual 
ability. Metacognitive skillfulness, although correlated to intellectual ability, 
appeared to contribute partly independently of (i.e., additional to) intellectual 
ability to the prediction of novice learning performances. However, results of 
their studies also showed that the metacognitive skills employed by more 
advanced learners were entirely unrelated to intellectual ability, which 
resembles the independency model. It appeared that the impact of intellectual 
ability on learning decreased when learners gained expertise (Veenman, 1993; 
Veenman & Elshout, 1999). 
The above-mentioned studies differed with respect to their methods of 
assessing metacognition, to their sample characteristics, and to their research 
designs. In some studies metacognitive knowledge was measured by means 
of a questionnaire (e.g., Minnaert, 1996; Swanson, 1990), whereas in other 
studies metacognitive skillfulness was assessed by means of think-aloud 
protocols (e.g., Veenman & Elshout, 1995). Participants in the studies were 
university students (e.g., Minnaert, 1996; Veenman & Elshout, 1995), 
adolescents (Allon et al., 1994), or incarcerated learning disabled and mentally 
retarded adults (Berger & Reid, 1989). Either metacognition and intellectual 
ability were continuous variables (e.g., Veenman & Verheij, 2001) or they 
were assessed as orthogonal factors (e.g., Maqsud, 1997; Swanson, 1990). 
Therefore, it is difficult to decide which model is the right one. Veenman and 
Verheij (2001) concluded that most of the research reports supported the 
mixed model. This is at least true for the studies that were focused on 
metacognitive skillfulness as predictor of inductive learning. Results from the 
above-mentioned studies, however, suggest that the mixed model and the 
independency model may be limited to specific situations. Thus, it is 
worthwhile examining the conditions under which the patterns of correlations 
between metacognitive skills, intellectual ability, and learning outcomes vary. 
 
Threshold of problematicity 
Elshout’s (1987) theory of the threshold of problematicity (see also Raaheim, 
1988, 1991) may provide insight into when and why the pattern of 
correlations between metacognitive skills, intellectual ability, and learning 
outcomes changes. The theory assumes a varying impact of intellectual ability 
on learning outcomes, depending on the task complexity. Elshout suggested 
that, at a very low and at a very high level of task complexity, intellectual 
ability practically has no impact on learning outcomes. At an intermediate 
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level of task complexity there is a maximum impact of intellectual ability. This 
relation between task complexity and the impact of intellectual ability on 
learning outcomes can be described by an inverse U-curve. Two of these 
curves are depicted in Figure 3.2. 
Looking at Figure 3.2, it is tempting to conclude that the reason for the low 
impact of intellectual ability on learning outcomes at the right and left sides of 
the curve is a lack of variance in learning outcomes. When a task is very 
difficult, hardly anyone could perform it, while almost every student could 
perform a very easy task. As is known, limited variance could cause low or 
zero correlations. Indeed, for the far ends of the curves, this may be the case. 
However, in several empirical studies that investigated the varying impact of 
intellectual ability on learning outcomes (Raaheim, 1988, 1991; Veenman & 
Elshout, 1999), variance in learning outcomes at both ends of the curve was 
found and still intellectual ability had little impact. 
If intellectual ability has practically no influence when tasks are very easy 
or very complex, there must be other determinants causing the variance of 
learning outcomes. It is hypothesized here that at the right end of the curve, 
that is, when tasks are very complex, the quality of metacognitive skills rather 
than intellectual ability is the main determinant of learning outcomes. Why 
would that be? Elshout (1987) argued that for every person there is a critical 
Impact of 
intellectual 
ability on 
learning 
Increasing task complexity 
Novice 
learners 
Advanced 
learners 
Figure 3.2. The relation between task complexity and the impact of intellectual ability on learning
outcomes. 
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point on the task complexity continuum, which he called the threshold of 
problematicity. Below this threshold, that is, for easy tasks, smooth, 
internalized, and fast problem-solving activities may be observed. The flow of 
activity is relatively automatic and algorithmic and errors mostly come from 
cognitive slips rather than fundamental inadequacies of the learner. Above 
the threshold, that is, during more complex tasks, task-specific ability 
becomes increasingly inadequate. Therefore, problem-solving behavior with 
increasing emphasis on weak, domain independent methods of search may be 
expected. When no stored problem-solving strategy is available, the learner 
must operate in a heuristic, improvisational mode and will shift to processes 
aimed at assembling a strategy. Snow (1989), for that reason, labeled the 
threshold of problematicity the algorithmic-heuristic threshold. To be able to 
behave heuristically or to improvise means to be able to design one’s own 
behavior, which is a manifestation of metacognition (Elshout, 1987). As was 
described in a previous section, Veenman (1993) suggested that learners who 
are confronted with unfamiliar tasks assemble a solution path according to a 
general task schema, which represents metacognitive skills. This view 
supports the hypothesis that metacognitive skills will be an important 
determinant of learning outcomes in very complex tasks, but it does not 
provide information about the lack of impact of intellectual ability on learning 
outcomes in very complex tasks. Elshout (1987) suggested that intellectual 
ability could be supportive of the problem-solving process whenever this 
process generates sub-tasks that are themselves below threshold. Perhaps 
during initial learning in a very complex environment, learners either do not 
have to or are not able to generate these sub-tasks. In other words, knowledge 
components, associated with intellectual ability, are not called upon during 
initial inductive learning in complex environments. This would decrease the 
correlation between intellectual ability and task performance, but also 
between metacognitive skills and intellectual ability. If these sub-tasks below 
the threshold are necessary for successful problem solving, infrequently 
generating them will likely decrease learning outcomes. With respect to 
inductive-learning tasks, however, it is hypothesized that novice learners start 
out qualitatively, trying to identify variables and generate data by conducting 
experiments (see Chapter 2). This is probably a heuristic, improvisational 
assembly process. Therefore, the initial part of the inductive-learning task 
may well be successful without the knowledge components associated with 
intellectual ability. Later on during the inductive-learning process, learners 
may be more involved in interpreting data on a qualitative and quantitative 
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level. Data interpretation may require the cognitive sub tasks, associated with 
intellectual ability, which for some learners are located below their threshold. 
Consequently, during initial inductive learning, data generation is likely 
associated with metacognitive skillfulness, whereas data interpretation is 
mainly associated with intellectual ability. Veenman, Elshout, and Meijer 
(1997) nicely illustrated this with their description of four prototypical 
learners, selected as representing the extremes of both intellectual ability as 
well as metacognitive skillfulness. The two learners with low metacognitive 
skillfulness gathered unorganized data whereas the two learners with high 
metacognitive skillfulness gathered data step-by-step, irrespective of their 
level of intellectual ability. The low intelligent learners had problems with 
drawing conclusions whereas the high intelligent learners formulated 
relevant conclusions, irrespective of their level of metacognitive skillfulness. 
Operating slightly above one’s threshold is the better way to learn (Elshout, 
1987; Snow, 1989), because learners are then challenged to extend their 
heuristic and improvisational abilities. When learners operate too far above 
their threshold, the heuristic behavior will degrade into helpless muddling 
through. Problem solving as well as learning will then become almost 
impossible. On the other hand, learners working far below their thresholds 
may only strengthen habitual automatic performance. Successful assembly 
processes will be strengthened and automatized by continued practice. They 
become, in Veenman’s (1993) terms, task-specific task schema, which are 
stored in memory, independently of the general task schema from which they  
derive. Moreover, continued practice may gradually raise a learner’s threshold 
of problematicity for a particular task: more and more difficult instances of a 
task type become non-problematical and automatic (Elshout, 1987). Learners 
may at a particular point of time be considered as experts who have adequate 
problem-solving strategies available. In that case, one should rather speak of 
task performance instead of problem solving and learning. The possibility of 
raising the individual’s threshold of problematicity for a particular task by 
continued practice implies that the threshold of novices will likely differ from 
the threshold of advanced learners. In other words, a particular learning task 
is experienced as less complex by advanced learners relative to novice learners 
(Elshout, 1987; Snow, 1989). This is shown by the two hypothetical curves of 
Figure 3.2, which indicate that the pattern of correlations between intellectual 
ability and learning outcomes depends on the experienced task complexity. 
With increasing expertise in a particular domain, the individual curve shifts to 
the right (Veenman & Elshout, 1999). 
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Testing the theory of the threshold of problematicity is not that easy. For 
instance, there is no method available to determine a learner’s individual 
threshold. To make it even more complicated, for every sub-task there is, in 
fact, a separate threshold. If one wants to provide proof for the existence of a 
curve that is depending on the experienced task complexity, there are several 
options: (1) Use the microgenetic method (Siegler & Crowley, 1991), which 
involves the observation throughout the period of change, a high density of 
observations relative to the rate of change within that period, and intensive 
analyses intended to infer the processes that gave rise to the change. For an 
inductive-learning process that could be a close observation of learners’ 
behavior during a task wherein learners gradually acquire expertise. (2) 
Observe learners’ behavior and learning outcomes in a within-subject design 
with several tasks of calibrated different complexity. (3) Observe learners’ 
behavior and learning outcomes in a between-subject design with several 
groups of different levels of expertise. (4) Observe learners’ behavior and 
learning outcomes in a design that is a combination of the three. Moreover, if 
one wants to determine the pattern of correlations between the quality of 
metacognitive skills, intellectual ability and learning outcomes for tasks that 
are far below a  learner’s threshold, one is confronted with the difficulty of 
measuring automatic processes using think-aloud protocols. Still, there is 
some empirical evidence for the threshold of problematicity. Raaheim (1988, 
1991) found parts of the hypothesized curve by use of the aforementioned 
longitudinal design. He let students solve a particular task several times and 
results showed that the impact of intellectual ability gradually increased. 
Minnaert (1996) concluded that when individuals are relatively unfamiliar 
with the subject area, the correlation between intellectual ability and 
metacognition tends to zero. When more domain-specific expertise in the 
subject area is achieved, metacognition is more interrelated with general 
thinking skill measures. Also the general finding that intellectual ability is 
either unrelated or weakly related to performance of experts in several 
domains (Ericsson & Smith, 1991; Ericsson & Lehman, 1996) is consistent with 
Elshout’s (1987) theory. Veenman and Elshout (1999) provided support for the 
theory of the threshold of problematicity for learning-by-doing tasks in the 
domain of thermodynamics. For novice learners the pattern of correlations 
between measures of metacognitive skills, intellectual ability, and learning 
outcomes resembled the mixed model. Both determinants shared variance 
and both made an independent contribution to learning outcomes, for three 
levels of task complexity. For advanced learners, on the other hand, the 
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impact of intellectual ability was absent during the relatively easy and 
intermediate level of task complexity, but re-entered during the relatively 
complex level. With respect to inductive-learning tasks, some support for the 
theory of the threshold of problematicity was found by Veenman, Elshout, 
and Hoeks (1993). Results of their study indicated that for novice learners the 
pattern of correlation resembled the mixed model. Analyses for advanced 
learners showed low correlations between intellectual ability on the one hand 
and metacognitive skills and learning outcomes on the other.  
The results of these studies are difficult to interpret, because it is unknown 
whether the experienced task complexity of the participants in the one study 
resembles the experienced task complexity of the other. According to 
Elshout’s (1987) theory, the experienced level of task complexity in the study 
conducted by Minnaert (1996) must be higher than the one in the study by 
Veenman and Elshout (1999), but that is, of course, circular reasoning. One 
should predict the impact of metacognitive skillfulness and intellectual ability 
on learning outcomes based on the experienced task complexity, not the other 
way around. The varying impact of intellectual ability caused by different 
levels of complexity and different levels of expertise must be investigated in 
one design, as Veenman and Elshout (1999) did. In the studies conducted in 
this thesis, the pattern of correlations between metacognitive skillfulness, 
intellectual ability, and learning outcomes will be examined for an inductive-
learning task that is assumed to be even more complex than the learning-by-
doing task used by Veenman and Elshout (1999). Thus, the focus is on the far 
right side of the curves of Figure 3.2. Hence, according to Elshout’s (1987) 
threshold theory and in combination with the ideas that novice learners 
assemble a problem-solving strategy, it is expected that metacognitive 
skillfulness will be the main determinant for learning outcomes.  
 
Instructional support 
In general, inductive-learning tasks are complex tasks because of their 
multiple solution paths, their multiple goal-states and their uncertain 
outcomes (see Chapter 2). Learners have to choose between solution paths, 
have to determine the order of solution paths, and have to decide when to 
terminate the learning process. Some learners, especially novice learners, may 
not have the appropriate knowledge and skills for successful task 
performance; that is, they have no adequate algorithmic strategies or 
heuristics available. The task complexity is then outside their zone of tolerable 
problematicity (Elshout, 1987). A task that is initially too difficult for novice 
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learners could become more appropriate for learning when instructional 
support is provided. Thus, instructional support could affect the experienced 
task complexity and, consequently, it could affect the impact of metacognitive 
skillfulness and intellectual ability on learning outcomes. 
De Jong and van Joolingen (1998) classified the problems that learners 
encounter in inductive-learning environment as well as the matching 
instructional support that could be provided with four main inductive-
learning processes: hypothesis generation, design of experiments, interpretation of 
data, and regulation of learning. Although the classification we have just 
mentioned is a bit awkward because regulation of learning is of a different 
level of abstraction than the other three processes, especially support aimed at  
the regulation of learning is presumed to affect the impact of metacognitive 
skills on inductive learning. According to de Jong and van Joolingen, support 
aimed at the regulation of learning can be provided by (1) model progression, 
(2) planning support, (3) monitoring support, and (4) structuring the 
discovery process. In model progression, the model of the simulation is 
introduced step-by-step, from a simplified version of the model to a complex 
version, preventing the learners from drowning in the full complexity of the 
simulation (White & Frederiksen, 1987, 1990). Planning support is aimed at 
taking away some decisions from the learners, which could help them to 
manage their learning process. This could be done, for instance, by providing 
a normative step-by-step action program such as the Systematic Approach to 
Problem solving (Mettes, Pilot, & Roosink, 1981), or by providing a structured 
set of so-called telling experiments (Veenman & Elshout, 1991, 1995) in which 
learners are told explicitly which experiments they have to conduct. Planning 
support may be helpful for novice learners in particular (Charney, Reder, & 
Kusbit, 1990). Monitoring support can be given by overviews of what the 
learner has been doing in the simulation environment. Finally, support aimed 
at structuring the discovery process leads learners through different stages of the 
inductive-learning process, for instance, by providing learners with a 
sequence of experimentation steps (de Jong & van Joolingen, 1998). There is 
an overlap between planning support and support that is aimed at structuring 
the discovery process. The same holds true for support aimed the regulation 
of learning in general and support for the design of experiments: providing 
telling experiments is an example of both methods. 
Learners may not demonstrate adequate problem-solving behavior because 
they fail to spontaneously enact the appropriate strategy, which is 
characterized as a production deficiency, or because they do not have the 
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appropriate skill available in their repertoire, which is characterized as an 
availability deficiency (Flavell, 1976; Veenman et al., 2000). Thus, in addition to 
the classification of de Jong and van Joolingen (1998), instructional support 
could be aimed at (1) prompting at particular moments of time a specific 
problem-solving activity available to the learner, or at (2) embedding a specific 
problem-solving activity not available to the learner in the learning 
environment by means of special features of the environment or the task. 
Prompting is likely to be used when learners have the appropriate strategy 
available, but need to be explicitly cued to use that particular strategy. 
According to Flavell (1976), problems in metacognition may be an explanation 
for production deficiencies. (For that matter, Winne (1996) preferred the term 
production differences to production deficiency when expressing the individual 
differences in metacognitive knowledge). Not surprisingly, metacognitive 
mediation is based on prompting. In a study of Veenman, Elshout, and Busato 
(1994), the metacognitive mediation consisted of prompts to paraphrase the 
question, to generate a hypothesis, to think out a detailed action plan, to 
evaluate experimental outcomes, to draw conclusions elaborating on the 
subject matter, and to make notes. Similarly, Veenman, Kerseboom and 
Imthorn (2000) prompted similar metacognitive activities during math 
problem solving by secondary school students. Prompting facilitated both 
metacognitive as well as problem-solving performance. Other examples of 
prompting a range of important problem-solving processes are the Systematic 
Approach to Problem solving (Mettes, Pilot, & Roosink, 1981), the Inquiry 
Cycle (White & Frederiksen, 1998) and the Paired Writing system (Yarrow & 
Topping, 2001). It is, of course, also possible to prompt a single metacognitive 
skill, such as evaluation (Lin, 2001; Lin & Lehman, 1999). Finally, it seems 
ideal to adapt prompts to the actual behavior of the learner, as is the case 
when learners work with an intelligent tutoring system that provides student-
tailored feedback (e.g., Shute & Glaser, 1990; Veermans, de Jong, & van 
Joolingen, 2000). 
Embedding problem-solving processes in the learning environment means 
that these processes are executed by features of the environment or by specific 
task characteristics, not by the learner. This is especially necessary when 
learners do not have the appropriate skills and knowledge available in their 
repertoire. Many inductive-learning processes could be embedded in the 
learning environment. For instance, when a hypothesis menu is provided 
(Shute & Glaser, 1990), the variables of the simulated model are already 
identified and shown in the menu. Learners do not have to identify variables 
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of the simulated model. Another example of embedding problem-solving 
processes in the learning environment is structuring the data generation 
processes by model progression or telling experiments. Metacognitive 
activities such as sub-goaling and planning are then partly taken out of 
learners’ hands.  
In general, there are two possible goals of instructional support for 
inductive-learning tasks in computer simulations. First, support could be 
aimed at improving conceptual knowledge acquisition in computer 
simulations, that is, it could be aimed at improving the task performance. 
Improvement of task performance is called the effect with the support 
(Salomon, 1995). Second, the support could be aimed at improving the 
performance on a subsequent similar but unsupported task, that is, it could be 
aimed at learning how to acquire conceptual knowledge in computer 
simulations. This is called the effect of the support (Salomon, 1995) or transfer. 
In a similar, unsupported, post-instructional situation, learners then should be 
able to execute activities that were prompted or modeled in the instructional 
task. In many studies on the effectiveness of instructional support methods 
for inductive learning, the performance goal was to be attained, such as in the 
study described in Chapter 7 of this thesis. Attaining the learning goal, that is, 
training metacognitive skills instead of providing support that compensates for 
production deficiencies and availability deficiencies, will generally take more 
time, more sessions, and instructional techniques such as fading and 
scaffolding (e.g., Elshout-Mohr, 1992; Vanderlocht & van Damme, 1989). 
The effectiveness of a particular method of instructional support depends 
on the match between the skills required for successful problem solving, the 
knowledge and skills of the learner, and the chosen method of instructional 
support. Conducting skill decomposition and developing a skills hierarchy (van 
Merriënboer, 1997) could identify the required skills and the relations 
between them. For inductive learning, the skill hierarchy will be very similar 
to the SDDS goal structure of Klahr and Dunbar (1988), combined with the 
metacognitive skills, described earlier in this chapter, for coordination of the 
execution of skills needed to attain the SDDS goals. De Jong and van 
Joolingen (1998) reviewed the effectiveness of various methods of 
instructional support for inductive learning with computer simulations. Their 
review indicated that the above-mentioned methods of instructional support 
were effective some of the time, for a particular group of learners. When 
effectiveness depends on the combination of the instructional support and the 
skills of the learner, it is called an aptitude-treatment interaction (ATI). 
47
According to Snow (1989), measures of intellectual ability enter interactions 
more frequently than other indicants of aptitude, despite the fact that 
measures of intellectual ability also show strong main aptitude effects. The 
strongest ATIs with respect to intellectual ability involved treatments that 
differed in the structuredness of instruction. In highly structured treatments 
the instructional task is broken down into small units in a clear sequence, 
identical to the above-mentioned planning support. This has been found to be 
beneficial for learners with relatively low intellectual ability, but not for 
learners with a high intellectual ability. In low structured treatments, on the 
other hand, learners must act more independently and rely more on their own 
structuring. It has been found that learners with high intellectual ability do 
well in low structure environments and learners with relatively low 
intellectual ability do poorly. Snow (1989) suggested that these ATIs could be 
interpreted in terms of metacognitive skills associated with high intellectual 
ability, but he did not explain more of how this could be done. The need for 
explanatory principles appears to be a persistent issue in ATI research 
(Jonassen & Grabowski, 1993). 
Veenman and Elshout (1995) investigated an ATI for novice learners with 
metacognitive skillfulness and intellectual ability as aptitudes and 
structuredness of the inductive-learning environment as treatment. The 
structured condition included planning support by means of pre-set telling 
experiments. The results revealed a main effect for metacognitive skillfulness 
and intellectual ability, but not for instructional support. However, a complex 
interaction effect was found. For learners with relatively low intellectual 
ability and low metacognitive skillfulness, structuring the learning 
environment appeared to be helpful, whereas it was detrimental to learners 
with low intellectual ability and high metacognitive skillfulness. For learners 
with high intellectual ability, structuredness of the learning environment did 
not affect learning outcomes. Veenman and Elshout (1995) explained these 
results by stating that learners with high intellectual ability may rely on 
flexible metacognitive strategies, while learners with low intellectual ability 
may rely more on inflexible metacognitive habits. In other words, 
metacognitive strategies of high intelligent learners are presumed to be more 
flexible. But why would that be? Veenman and Elshout argued that the 
construction of metacognitive strategies involves cognitive activity. 
Consequently, the metacognitive strategies of high intelligent learners may 
become fully integrated into the cognitive repertoire and, therefore, high 
intelligent learners may more easily adapt their strategies to a situation that is 
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forced upon them. The explanation given by Veenman and Elshout, however, 
is based on the assumption that metacognitive skillfulness and intellectual 
ability are substantially correlated, as was the case in their study. In other 
words, their explanation is based on the mixed model. It is doubtful whether 
the ATI found by Veenman and Elshout will also occur when correlations 
between metacognitive skillfulness and intellectual ability are close to zero, as 
is expected in more complex learning environments. Nevertheless, examining 
the impact of metacognitive skillfulness and intellectual ability on learning 
outcomes in an unsupported as well as a supported learning environment 
may provide valuable insights into the role of these two determinants during 
the inductive-learning process of novice learners. Elshout’s (1987) threshold 
theory predicted that, in the supported learning environment, intellectual 
ability will have more impact on learning outcomes than in the unsupported 
and thus more complex learning environment. The assumption that novice 
learners are initially involved in assembling problem-solving strategies 
predicts that metacognitive skillfulness rather than intellectual ability will be 
the main determinant of learning outcomes in the unsupported learning 
environment but not in the supported one. 
 
Conclusion and preview 
In the present and the previous chapters, theories and concepts concerning 
inductive learning, task complexity, prior knowledge, metacognition, 
intellectual ability, and the threshold of problematicity were described, if 
possible by using the vocabulary of production rules theory. This theory 
emphasizes the components-of-knowledge perspective, which is basic to 
Elshout’s (1987) threshold theory and to the theory on assembling problem-
solving strategies. With these theories and concepts in mind, the roles of 
metacognitive skillfulness and intellectual ability in different stages of the 
inductive-learning process in a complex computer-simulated learning 
environment can be examined. 
To investigate these roles, there are several options: (1) Let novice learners 
pass through a very complex learning environment and determine the pattern 
of correlations between metacognitive skillfulness, intellectual ability, and 
learning outcomes. The observed pattern of correlations can be compared 
with patterns found in earlier studies where less complex learning 
environments were used. This will be done in Chapter 4. It is expected that for 
initial inductive learning in a complex environment, metacognitive skillfulness 
will be the main determinant for learning rather than intellectual ability. (2) 
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Vary the experienced task complexity, that is, compare the pattern of 
correlations between metacognitive skillfulness, intellectual ability, and 
learning outcomes of novices and advanced learners in an inductive-learning 
environment with different levels of complexity. This is done in Chapter 5. It 
is expected that the pattern of correlations of novices at the easy level will be 
similar to the pattern of correlations of advanced learners at the intermediate 
or complex level. (3) Vary the objective task complexity by instructional 
support and compare the pattern of correlations between metacognitive 
skillfulness, intellectual ability, and learning outcomes of learners who 
received support and learners who did not receive support. This will be done 
in Chapter 7. Basically, it is expected that metacognitive skillfulness will be 
the main determinant for learning outcomes in the unsupported environment 
because metacognitive skillfulness is associated with data generation. 
Furthermore, intellectual ability is expected to be the main determinant in the 
supported environment because intellectual ability is associated with data 
interpretation. 
The studies described in Chapters 4, 5, and 7 are based on inductive 
learning in the Optics Lab. The Optics Lab is a complex computer-simulated 
learning environment in the domain of geometrical optics in which learners 
can manipulate objects in a qualitative way by dragging and in a quantitative 
way by the input of numbers. In the learning environments used by Veenman 
and Elshout (1995; Veenman, Elshout, & Meijer, 1997), in contrast, it is mainly 
possible to quantitatively manipulate objects. These task characteristics might 
perhaps affect the assessment of metacognitive skillfulness and the combined 
effect of both predictors of learning. In Chapter 6 assessment of metacognitive 
skillfulness in the Optics Lab and in the Heat Lab will be studied, to 
investigate whether assessment of metacognitive skillfulness is domain-
independent.  
Finally, in the epilog, the results and conclusions of the studies described in 
Chapters 4 to 7 will be put together. In this discussion, theoretical issues as 
well as implications for research and educational practice will be addressed. 
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4 
INITIAL INDUCTIVE LEARNING 
 
 
This chapter focuses on the relation between metacognitive skillfulness, 
intellectual ability, learning behavior and learning outcomes during initial 
inductive learning. Novices in the domain of physics will be asked to infer 
rules by running experiments in the Optics Lab, a computer-based learning 
environment in the domain of geometrical optics. The Optics Lab is a fairly 
complex environment, at least more complex than the learning environments 
used in the experiments of Veenman (1993), which makes it very useful for 
examining the initial phase of inductive learning. At a higher level of task 
complexity the initial learning process will likely yield more learning actions 
and is, therefore, suitable for observation.  
As has been described in the previous chapter, results of a series of 
experiments of Veenman (1993; Veenman & Elshout, 1995, 1999; Veenman, 
Elshout, & Meijer, 1997) showed that metacognitive skillfulness and 
intellectual ability are two important determinants of successful inductive 
learning. However, their impact may vary. For instance, learning outcomes of 
novices can be predicted by the weighted sum of general metacognitive 
skillfulness and intellectual ability. Veenman (1993) found that metacognitive 
skillfulness, although correlated to intellectual ability, appeared to contribute, 
partly independently of (i.e. additional to) intellectual ability, to the prediction 
of novice learning outcomes. In contrast, the metacognitive skills employed 
by more advanced learners were more domain-specific and entirely unrelated 
to intellectual ability (Veenman, 1993). Moreover, Veenman and Elshout 
(1999) found that for advanced learners correlations between intellectual 
ability on learning outcomes tended to zero. This varying impact of 
intellectual ability is in accordance with Elshout’s (1987) theory of the threshold 
of problematicity. Elshout argued that for every person there is a critical point 
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on the task complexity continuum, which he called the threshold of 
problematicity. Below the threshold smooth, internalized, relatively fast 
problem-solving activities may be observed. Above the threshold, problem-
solving behavior with increasing emphasis on weak domain-independent 
methods of search may be expected, because task specific ability becomes 
increasingly inadequate. During the initial phase of inductive learning in a 
particular domain, learners are confronted with a task that is positioned 
above their threshold of problematicity. Lack of familiarity with this task or 
with the domain forces these learners to operate in a heuristic mode. 
Therefore, it is hypothesized that general metacognitive skillfulness is a more 
important determinant for learning behavior and, consequently, for learning 
outcomes during the initial phase, rather than intellectual ability. The impact 
of intellectual ability on learning outcomes is expected to be, at most, 
moderate. 
According to the model of Klahr and Dunbar (1988; Klahr, 2000; Klahr & 
Simon, 1999), called scientific discovery as dual search (SDDS), inductive 
learning can be characterized as a search process in two different spaces. 
Hypothesis space consists of possible rules that can be induced in the learning 
environment, and experiment space consists of all possible experiments that 
can be conducted in the learning environment. The two spaces are related: 
hypotheses can be tested or generated by evaluating experiments. Since 
novice learners have limited prior knowledge, it is assumed that initially their 
main activity in the learning environment is searching the experiment space. 
Klahr and Dunbar (1988) called these learners experimenters. Experiments are 
then conducted to identify variables (Van Joolingen & De Jong, 1997) and 
generate hypotheses. In this study it is expected that, during initial inductive 
learning, good metacognitive skills result in systematical search of the 
experiment space. During advanced knowledge acquisition (Jonassen, 1992; 
Spiro, Feltovich, Jacobson & Coulson, 1995), learners might become theorists 
(Klahr & Dunbar, 1988), basically searching hypothesis space. At this stage, 
the relation between good metacognitive skills and systematical search of the 
experiment space may decrease.  
Besides determining what skills and behaviors are essential for initial 
inductive learning, it is important to know what kind of knowledge is 
acquired. Van Joolingen (1995), for instance, stated that in many cases learners 
reason about a simulation domain at a qualitative level. For that reason, 
qualitative as well as quantitative knowledge should be assessed. Swaak and 
De Jong (1996) argued that inductive learning with simulation-based learning 
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environments results in the acquisition of so-called intuitive knowledge, which 
is characterized as hard to verbalize. The manifestation of this type of 
knowledge can be described as a quick perception of meaningful situations 
and, consequently, this knowledge cannot be assessed with a definitional test 
that measures explicit declarative knowledge. Swaak and De Jong created a 
speed WHAT-IF test to measure intuitive knowledge. However, the results of 
their experiments showed that intuitive knowledge scores correlated 
substantially with definitional post-test scores, which suggests that intuitive 
knowledge and definitional knowledge are more or less inseparable. 
Nevertheless, the format of the speed WHAT-IF test is well suited to 
measuring knowledge concerning qualitative relations between variables. 
Such qualitative knowledge will be assessed with a speed WHAT-IF test in 
the present study. A second test, without speed instruction, will be used to 
assess quantitative aspects of domain knowledge. 
Thus, the central question to be examined here is: what is the impact of 
metacognitive skillfulness and intellectual ability on learning behavior and 
learning outcomes during the initial phase of the inductive-learning process? 
It is hypothesized that metacognitive skillfulness will make a positive 
contribution to learning outcomes. According to Elshout (1987) and Raaheim 
(1988, 1991), the contribution of intellectual ability to learning outcomes is 
expected to be rather moderate at the very beginning of inductive learning.  
 
Method 
Participants 
Four months prior to the experiment, the intellectual ability of 329 first year 
psychology students was assessed in a series of tests including five primary 
intelligence factors: inductive reasoning, quantitative reasoning, verbal ability, 
closure flexibility, and sequential reasoning (Carroll, 1993). The test battery 
included tests for vocabulary, verbal analogies, linear syllogisms, number 
series, number speed, and embedded figures. The unweighted mean of the 
scores on these six tests may be regarded as an IQ equivalent (Veenman & 
Elshout, 1999). Those students, whose intellectual ability score deviated at 
least one standard deviation from the mean, were classified as either being of 
high or relatively low intellectual ability. Participants in this study were 
sixteen low and seven high intellectual ability students who had not received 
any physics education for at least the past 3 years and whose total amount of 
physics education was less than 3 years. 
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Figure 4.1. An example of an experiment in the Optics Lab. 
 
Also nine students with physics education passed through the Optics Lab. 
Results from these students will not be reported here, except for the 
calculation of the reliability coefficients of the learning outcomes tests. 
 
Learning environment 
In the Optics Lab learning environment students can run experiments by 
manipulating light rays and lenses. Figure 4.1 depicts an example of an 
experiment in the Optics Lab. Manipulation can be done qualitatively by 
dragging objects and quantitatively by changing the input of numbers. The 
distances between objects and the angles of light rays can be measured. The 
Optics Lab consists of seven phases, gradually increasing in complexity and 
number of attributes. Therefore, one can speak of model progression (White & 
Frederiksen, 1990). What is learned in an earlier phase is a prerequisite for 
understanding phenomena in later phases. Phase 1 of the Optics Lab deals 
with refraction, phase 2 with the focal length of lenses, phase 3 with the 
forming of images, phase 4 with magnification of images by converging 
lenses, phase 5 with virtual images by diverging lenses, and phase 6 and 
phase 7 deal with image forming by a combination of converging and 
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diverging lenses. Each phase starts with the presentation of the prerequisite 
theory concerning that phase, after which the assignment automatically 
appears. In the assignments students are asked to infer rules about optics. For 
instance, in phase 1 the assignment is: Try to find out, by conducting experiments, 
what will happen when a light ray passes through a lens. Which principles can you 
infer? These assignments have a global character because students should 
regulate their learning process by themselves and, therefore, set their own 
explicit sub-goals. In the Optics Lab students can decide how much time they 
will spend on completing the assignment before going to the next phase and 
the next assignment. The Optics Lab also allows students to go back to an 
earlier phase. Notes about hypotheses and findings can be made using an 
electronic notebook. In every phase it is possible to infer qualitative rules (e.g. 
light rays are converging when entering a positive lens) and quantitative rules 
(e.g. magnification of the image equals the image distance divided by the 
object distance).  
The learning environment used in this study is more complex than the 
environments used in the experiments of Veenman (1993) in several ways: (1) 
the number of independent variables of the model is larger, (2) some variables 
are continuous instead of discreet, (3) learners have to identify the 
independent and dependent system variables by themselves (although that 
was also the case for the unsupported versions of the learning environments 
used by Veenman), and (4) some relations between variables are non-linear or 
non-causal. It must be emphasized that in this study the Optics Lab was 
designed for the purpose of investigating the learning process during initial 
inductive learning, rather than optimizing the learning process of beginners in 
the domain of optics. 
 
Procedure 
All participants were asked to pass through the Optics Lab in three sessions 
of two hours, with a delay of approximately one week between sessions. 
Three participants missed the third session because they had obligations 
elsewhere during the last session. The first session started with a standardized 
instruction to explain the options of the Optics Lab. Next, a pre-test of 48 
questions followed in order to assess both qualitative and quantitative prior 
conceptual knowledge concerning optics. Each session ended with a post-test, 
which was a parallel version of the pre-test. 
During their work in the simulation environment think-aloud protocols of 
all participants were tape-recorded. To assess metacognitive skills the think-
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aloud protocols of the first session were transcribed and time tagged. The 
computer also logged all participants’ actions in the Optics Lab in order to 
compare the actual learning behavior with metacognitive skillfulness. 
 
Measures 
Metacognitive skillfulness. The quality of metacognitive skills was assessed 
by judging the think-aloud protocols of the participants. Determination of 
metacognitive skillfulness was based on the first three phases of the first 
session. One judge, who received no prior information about the participant's 
scores of intellectual ability, judged the think-aloud protocols. Another judge 
rated six protocols in order to calculate an inter-rater reliability. The average 
of Cronbach's alpha for the four different subscales was .93, indicating that 
both judges analyzed the protocols the same way. 
Metacognitive skillfulness was scored on four subscales: orientation 
activities, systematic orderliness, evaluation, and elaboration activities, 
according to the criteria of Veenman and Elshout (e.g., Veenman, 1993; 
Veenman & Elshout, 1995; Veenman et al., 1997). Orientation activities 
concern the preparation for the task. These activities were judged on 
indications of analyzing the problem statement, identifying the independent 
and dependent system variables, building a mental model of the task, and 
generating hypotheses and predictions. Judgments of systematic orderliness 
were based on the quality of planning activities, the systematic execution of 
plans, completing an orderly sequence of actions, and the avoidance of 
unsystematic events (such as varying two variables at the same time). 
Evaluation activities concern the regulation and control of the learning 
process. They were judged on monitoring and checking, both on the local 
level (e.g. detecting errors and checking calculations) as well as on the global 
level of keeping track of progress being made (e.g. verifying whether the 
results obtained provide an answer to the problem statement). Finally, 
judgments of elaboration concern the intention of storing of findings and 
concepts in memory. They were based on indications of recapitulating, 
drawing conclusions, relating these conclusions to the subject matter, and 
generating explanations. Elaboration itself may be conceived as a cognitive 
activity, but it is assumed that the occurrence of such cognitive activity at an 
appropriate point in time results from metacognitive activity. 
The four subscales of metacognitive skillfulness were rated on a five-point 
scale, ranging from 0 to 4. Aspects of metacognitive skillfulness were judged 
on the quality of performing regulatory activities, not on the correctness of the 
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information these activities resulted in. For instance, incorrect predictions or 
incorrect conclusions may still result in high scores on orientation or 
elaboration. A sum score over the four subscales for each participant was 
computed to obtain a total score for metacognitive skillfulness. 
Actions in the Optics Lab. The frequency of actions in the Optics Lab, based 
on the first three phases of the first session, was taken as a measure for 
learning behavior. Four different categories of actions in the Optics Lab were 
distinguished: (1) orientation actions, consisting of frequencies of reviewing 
theory and reviewing assignments; (2) manipulation actions, i.e. frequencies 
of manipulating input variables in the Optics Lab like rotating the light beam 
or moving a lens; (3) measurement actions, consisting of measuring the angle 
of a light beam or the distance between a lens and a lamp; (4) frequency of 
note taking. The second and third categories resemble Shute and Glaser's 
(1990) category of learning indicators at a general activity level. Category four 
resembles their category of learning indicators concerning data management 
skills. 
In addition, the learner's coverage of the experiment space (Klahr & 
Dunbar, 1988) was assessed. In principle, the experiment space includes all 
possible experiments, which in the Optics Lab is indefinitely large. However, 
a more tractable experiment space consists of all experiments whereby a 
different independent continuous variable is varied for every available lens. 
For instance, in phase 1 it is possible to vary the distance between light and 
lens, to vary the height of the lens and to vary the angle of the light ray. With 
four lenses in phase one there are twelve possible ‘distinct’ experiments. For 
every learner all distinct experiments of the first three phases of the first 
session were summed. The Optics Log file Replayer, which can replay each 
learner’s log file, was used to determine the coverage of the practical 
experiment space. 
Learning outcomes. Prior qualitative knowledge and the acquisition of 
qualitative knowledge were assessed using a pre-test and post-test, each with 
thirty-six speed WHAT-IF multiple-choice items. These speed WHAT-IF items 
contain three parts: conditions, actions, and predictions. The conditions are 
defined by a depicted situation with some type of light ray and at least one 
lens. The action and predictions are presented in text. The learner is asked to 
decide as accurately and quickly as possible which of the three predicted 
states matches the conditions and the action. An example of a speed WHAT-
IF item follows: How will the light ray refract if we move the lens a little bit to 
 58
the left? (a) Refraction will increase. (b) Refraction will decrease. (c) Refraction 
stays the same.  
A second pre-test and post-test of twelve items assessed prior quantitative 
knowledge and the acquisition of quantitative knowledge. Learners could 
take as much time as they wanted to answer these test items. Here is an 
example of a quantitative item: What is the magnification of the image? (a) 2. 
(b) 0.5. (c) 1. (d) Don't know. 
To determine if the scores on the post-tests resembled the inferences and 
conclusions made by the learners during the execution of experiments in the 
Optics Lab, a learning outcomes measure based on the time-tagged think 
aloud protocols and the corresponding log file was assessed. For every unique 
correct conclusion about the relation between an independent and a 
dependent variable during experimenting a learner could earn 1–3 points, 
depending on the level of precision of the described relation (Van Joolingen, 
1995). One point per combination of an independent and a dependent variable 
was given for just stating that the two variables had a causal or non-causal 
relation, two points were given if the direction of the relation was specified, 
and three points were given if the relation was quantified. This measure 
differs from the score for elaboration, because in this case judgments were 
explicitly based on correctness of conclusions. 
 
Results 
Initial differences 
In session one all participants who were novices in the domain of physics 
passed through the first three phases of the Optics Lab and all but two 
through the first four phases. Only a few participants passed through phase 5 
or higher in session one. Analyses considering test scores were based on the 
summed test scores of the first four phases, to keep the sample as well as the 
reliability as large as possible. Two participants who were novices in the 
domain of physics and four advanced participants could not pass through the 
Optics Lab in the last session because they had obligations elsewhere. 
Cronbach's alphas of the qualitative and quantitative pre-tests were .29 and 
.21 respectively (N = 32). The means and standard deviations of pre-test scores 
for participants with relatively low vs. high intellectual ability as well as the 
total sample of novices are depicted in Table 4.1. No significant differences 
between low and high intellectual ability participants were found for scores 
on the qualitative pre-test, t(21) = .60, p = .56, the quantitative pre-test, t(21) = 
1.80, p = .09, and for metacognitive skillfulness, t(21) = .22, p = .83. 
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Actions in the Optics Lab. 
The majority of the actions in the Optics Lab concerned manipulation 
actions (73 %, M = 97.43, SD = 46.40). Thirteen percent of the actions were 
aimed at measurement (M = 17.61, SD = 17.22), 11 % at orientation (M = 14.52, 
SD = 4.84), and 3 % at note taking (M = 3.35, SD = 4.04). 
Correlations between metacognitive skillfulness, intellectual ability, 
categories of actions in the Optics Lab, and coverage of experiment space are 
depicted in Table 4.2. As expected, metacognitive skillfulness and categories 
of actions in the Optics Lab were substantially correlated, except for A-or 
(Table 4.2). This means that the quality of metacognitive skillfulness, assessed 
by judging the think-aloud protocols, is related to the quantity of actions in 
the Optics Lab. Moreover, neither metacognitive skillfulness nor actions in the 
Optics Lab (with the exception of Act-or) correlated significantly with 
intellectual ability. No substantial change was found for correlations in 
relation with intellectual ability after correction for selection of extreme 
groups (Gulliksen, 1961). 
 
Table 4.1 
Means and standard deviations (in parentheses) of test scores for the sample of novices  
 Qualitative Quantitative n 
Pre-test      
 Low IA 5.81 (1.80) 1.88 (1.31) 16 
 High IA 5.29 (2.29) 0.86 (1.07) 7 
 Total 5.65 (1.92) 1.57 (1.31) 23 
      
Post-test session 2      
 Low IA 8.25 (2.05) 1.63 (0.89) 16 
 High IA 7.29 (2.14) 3.00 (1.29) 7 
 Total 7.96 (2.08) 2.04 (1.19) 23 
      
Post-test session 3      
 Low IA 8.46 (2.02) 2.85 (1.46) 13 
 High IA 7.86 (3.34) 3.57 (1.72) 7 
 Total 8.25 (2.49) 3.10 (1.55) 20 
Note. IA = Intellectual ability 
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Learning outcomes 
Cronbach's alphas of the three post-tests and the summed post-tests were 
respectively –.26, .16, .47, and .57 for the qualitative knowledge test (14 items), 
and –.07, .38, .58, and .73 for the quantitative knowledge test (7 items). Their 
associated sample sizes were 32, 30, 32, 27, and 26. No correlation was found 
between scores on qualitative knowledge tests and quantitative knowledge 
tests (r = .12, p = .63). The score for learning outcomes based on think-aloud 
protocols correlated significantly with the summed scores of qualitative 
knowledge tests (r = .60, p < .01), but not with summed scores of quantitative 
knowledge tests (r = .16, p = .52). 
Within-subjects analyses and between-subjects analyses were done 
separately, again in order to keep the sample as large as possible. Results of 
learning outcomes in session one were excluded because of low reliability. 
The means and standard deviations of post-test scores for the total sample of 
novices are depicted in Table 4.1. MANOVA repeated measures analyses 
indicated that domain knowledge increased with time spent in the Optics Lab 
on the qualitative knowledge tests, F(2, 18) = 9.27, p < .05, and on the 
quantitative knowledge tests, F(2, 18) = 12.17, p < .05. For the qualitative 
knowledge tests significant differences were found between pre-test and post-
test scores for session 2, t(22) = 4.37, p < .01, and for session 3, t(19) = 4.28, p < 
.01. A significant difference was found between pre-test and post-test scores 
on the quantitative knowledge tests of session 3, t(19) = 4.64, p < .01. 
Table 4.2 
Correlations between metacognition (MC), intellectual ability (IA), frequency of orientation 
actions (A-or), frequency of manipulation actions (A-man), frequency of measurement actions 
(A-mea), frequency of note-taking actions (A-nt), coverage of experiment space (E-space) 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. MC — .04 .13 .74** .44* .44* .39* 
2. IA  — –.40* –.04 .33 .09 –.03 
3. A-or   — .06 .05 .38* –.06 
4. A-man    — .33 .20 .65** 
5. A-mea     — .47* –.03 
6. A-nt      — .08 
7. E-space       — 
Note. n = 23 
* p < .05, one-tailed. ** p < .01, one-tailed. 
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Determinants of learning 
The means and standard deviations of post-tests scores for participants 
with relatively low vs. high intellectual ability are depicted in Table 4.2. T-
tests were used to determine whether participants with high intellectual 
ability performed better on the learning outcomes tests than participants with 
low intellectual ability. No significant differences for the post-tests were 
found except for the scores on the quantitative knowledge test of session 2, 
t(21) = 2.98; p < .01. On this test participants with high intellectual ability 
scored higher than participants with low intellectual ability. 
Table 4.3 depicts the correlations between the summed post-tests and 
learning outcomes based on the think-aloud protocols on the one hand and its 
possible predictors on the other. When correlations between tests and 
predictors are considered separately per session, only frequency of 
measurement actions and frequency of orientation actions correlated 
significantly with the quantitative post-test of session 2 (r = .42, p < .05 and r = 
–.38, p < .05, respectively).  
 
Discussion 
The purpose of this study was to examine the influence of metacognitive 
skillfulness and intellectual ability on learning behavior and learning 
Table 4.3 
Correlations between post-test scores and its predictors 
 Qualitative (n = 19) Quantitative (n = 18) Based on TA (n = 23) 
MC .54** –.05 .58** 
IA –. 10 .46* –.02 
A-or .01 –.30 –.20 
A-man .44* .16 .64 
A-mea .09 .25 .03 
A-nt .11 –.17 .03 
A-sum .43* .21 .52** 
E-space .43* .14 .51** 
Note. TA = think-aloud protocols; MC = metacognitive skillfulness; IA = intellectual ability; 
A-or = frequency of orientation actions; A-man = frequency of manipulation actions; A-mea = 
frequency of measurement actions; A-nt = frequency of note-taking actions; A-sum = summed 
actions; E-space = coverage of experiment space. 
* p < .05, one-tailed. ** p < .01, one-tailed. 
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outcomes during the initial phase of inductive learning. It was hypothesized 
that metacognitive skillfulness would predict learning behavior and, 
consequently, learning outcomes. The impact of intellectual ability was 
expected to be rather moderate, according to the theories proposed by 
Elshout (1987) and Raaheim (1988, 1991). 
The pattern of correlations found in this study shows that metacognitive 
skillfulness had a predictive value for the acquisition of qualitative conceptual 
knowledge whereas intellectual ability only moderately predicted the 
acquisition of quantitative knowledge. Metacognitive skillfulness and 
intellectual ability did not correlate. This pattern of correlations is somewhat 
different than the patterns found in earlier studies by Veenman (1993; 
Veenman & Elshout, 1995; Veenman et al., 1997), where less complex learning 
environments were used. In those studies, with participants selected on the 
same criteria as in this study, the correlation between metacognitive 
skillfulness and intellectual ability was substantially higher, while both 
determinants had a partly independent influence on learning outcomes. 
Apparently, the impact of metacognitive skillfulness and intellectual ability 
on learning outcomes is dependent on the level of task complexity (cf. 
Veenman & Elshout, 1999). When learners are confronted with a task that is 
positioned far below or far above their threshold of problematicity, the role of 
intellectual ability is relatively small. 
Results also showed that learners with a high quality of metacognitive 
skillfulness performed more actions in the Optics Lab. It is, indeed, likely that 
systematic behavior and good planning leads to better coverage of the 
experiment space, and thus will lead to more actions. In addition, checking 
regularly whether the assignment is fulfilled will probably lead to 
experiments continuing to be conducted as long as the assignment is not 
fulfilled, and again to more actions in the Optics Lab. Intellectual ability and 
frequency of actions were not related. Input variables of the Optics Lab could 
also be manipulated in a qualitative way, in contrast to earlier studies of 
Veenman (1993; Veenman & Elshout, 1995; Veenman et al., 1997) where the 
input variables of the learning environments had to be manipulated 
quantitatively by input of numbers. It is presumed that if a novice learner has 
the opportunity to navigate on a qualitative level, the learner needs to draw 
less on the cognitive skills assessed by the intellectual ability tests. 
The majority of all actions appeared to be manipulation actions. This 
suggests that during initial inductive learning learners are particularly busy 
manipulating the input variables in a qualitative way, thereby creating 
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examples of situations that can be used to induce qualitative rules. Given their 
lack of prior knowledge, and, therefore, a lack of theory, novice learners are 
initially forced to be data-driven experimenters (Klahr & Dunbar, 1988). The 
generation of examples, however, can lead to the identification of 
independent and dependent variables. Once the variables of the model are 
identified, learners are able to generate hypotheses and develop theories 
about relations between variables. Hypothesis testing might then become 
more important than just creating examples of idiosyncratic situations. At a 
later stage, hypotheses and conclusions will reach a higher level of precision 
(Van Joolingen, 1995) and the proportion of measurement actions may 
increase, drawing more heavily on the learner’s cognitive skills. If it is 
assumed that these cognitive skills have to be regulated by metacognitive 
skills, correlations between intellectual ability and metacognitive skillfulness 
will rise eventually. This model of the interplay between metacognitive 
skillfulness, intellectual ability and inductive-learning behavior fitted the data 
of the present study. Further research with advanced learners should indicate 
whether the model holds for advanced knowledge acquisition. 
Test reliabilities were low to moderate. The complexity of the task and of 
the test items could well be the reason for these low reliabilities. When 
learners only find a limited number of rules, or when misconceptions are 
developed, inter-item correlations and, therefore, reliability will decrease. 
Indeed, mean scores of the post-tests indicated that novice learners acquired a 
limited amount of conceptual knowledge. Despite these low reliabilities, 
several significant effects concerning post-test scores were found in this study. 
Although learners acquire a limited amount of knowledge, they do learn. 
Learners with a high quality of metacognitive skillfulness in particular gain 
qualitative knowledge. It is probable that these learners can handle this 
complex learning environment better because of their metacognitive skills. In 
terms of Elshout (1987), these learners may have a stretched zone of tolerable 
problematicity. In addition, they generate more examples through more 
extensive experimentation, which creates an opportunity for qualitative rule 
induction. Quantitative knowledge, on the other hand, is particularly gained 
by learners with a high intellectual ability. Apparently, cognitive skills are 
needed to operate on a quantitative level. Thus, the findings of this study 
indicate that during initial inductive learning, type of skill is related to type of 
acquired knowledge. 
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Conclusion 
The results of this study show that during initial inductive learning with a 
complex computer simulation learners draw heavily on their metacognitive 
skillfulness. This is consistent with findings of, for instance, Anzai (1991), who 
concluded that novices in the domain of physics try to solve problems using 
relatively domain-independent weak methods. High metacognitive 
skillfulness of novice learners during inductive learning results mainly in 
numerous experiments being conducted, and in the acquisition of qualitative 
knowledge. As predicted by the theories of Elshout (1987) and Raaheim (1988, 
1991), the impact of intellectual ability on learning outcomes was moderate 
during initial inductive learning. Intellectual ability and the acquisition of 
quantitative knowledge may become more important in a later stage of 
inductive learning.  
Several researchers have called for complex learner-centered environments 
to make learning a more realistic and meaningful process (e.g. Jonassen, 1991, 
1992; Land & Hannafin, 2000; Reigeluth, 1999; Spiro, Feltovitch, Jacobson & 
Coulson, 1995). According to Jonassen (1992) and Spiro et al. (1995), these 
learning environments are most effective for the stage of advanced 
knowledge acquisition. The results of this study indicated that complex 
computer-simulated learning environments may also adequately initiate 
learning in novice learners with metacognitive skills at their disposal. Further 
research should indicate whether insufficient quality of metacognitive skills 
could be compensated for by instructional support aimed at the regulation of 
initial inductive-learning behavior (cf. Veenman, Elshout & Busato, 1994). 
Furthermore, research should demonstrate to what extent metacognitive 
skillfulness, intellectual ability, prior domain knowledge, or a combination of 
these determinants predicts advanced knowledge acquisition. 
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5 
NOVICES VERSUS ADVANCED LEARNERS 
 
 
The results of the previous study gave some insight in the roles of 
metacognitive skillfulness and intellectual ability during initial inductive 
learning in a complex learning environment. We found that metacognitive 
skillfulness rather than intellectual ability was an important determinant for 
the acquisition of qualitative knowledge and that intellectual ability is 
positively related with the acquisition of quantitative knowledge. 
Furthermore, during initial inductive learning in a complex learning 
environment, the quality of novice learners’ metacognitive skills manifests 
itself in the number of conducted experiments. The modest relation between 
intellectual ability and learning outcomes corroborated theories proposed by 
Elshout (1987) and Raaheim (1988, 1991) on the varying impact of intellectual 
ability on learning outcomes due to the experienced task complexity. 
Moreover, when intellectual ability hardly has any impact on learning 
outcomes, metacognitive skillfulness may be decisive for learning. 
In the present study, both novice learners and advanced learners in the 
domain of physics will pass through the Optics Lab. It is assumed that more 
advanced learners experience this particular inductive-learning task as less 
complex than novice learners do. Speaking in terms of the aforementioned 
theory of Elshout (1987), the threshold of problematicity of advanced learners 
will be positioned at a higher level of complexity. In Figure 3.2 (see Chapter 3) 
the hypothetical curves of novice and advanced learners are depicted. The 
patterns of correlations between metacognitive skillfulness, intellectual 
ability, actions in the environment, and learning outcomes will be examined 
for novices and advanced learners. 
It is, of course, not known precisely how far away from each other the two 
curves will be positioned. Therefore, in this study the Optics Lab also contains 
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different phases representing various levels of complexity. This way, the 
gradual increase and decrease of the impact of intellectual ability on learning 
outcomes for both groups can be observed. In order to prevent the inductive-
learning task from lying too far beyond the problematicity threshold for 
novices, the version of the Optics Lab used in the present study will be less 
extensive than the one in the previous study. In the current version of the 
Optics Lab there are four instead of seven phases. Furthermore, in the 
assignments of the Optics Lab the dependent variable of the relations that 
have to be inferred are explicitly given to the learners. Consequently, in the 
present study learners do not have to identify this dependent variable. Due to 
a smaller number of phases both pre-tests and post-tests can contain more 
questions per phase, which will probably increase the reliability of the tests. 
It is hypothesized for novice learners that intellectual ability has limited 
impact on learning outcomes, as was found in the previous study. Some 
impact of intellectual ability may only be expected in the relative easy phase 
of the Optics Lab. Metacognitive skillfulness will likely be the main 
determinant for learning outcomes of novice learners in all phases, because 
novice learners have to draw heavily on domain-independent weak methods 
(Anzai, 1991). In contrast, for advanced learners it is hypothesized that, in the 
easy phase, prior knowledge is presumed to be an important determinant of 
learning outcomes because advanced learners may retrieve knowledge that is 
necessary to complete the post-test directly from memory. Furthermore, it is 
expected that metacognitive skillfulness and intellectual ability will have 
substantial impact on learning outcomes in the intermediate and complex 
phase. The impact of intellectual ability on learning outcomes in the very 
complex phase is expected to be, at most, moderate for advanced learners, 
because in this phase advanced learners are supposed to have reached their 
boundary of knowledge. Consequently, in this phase advanced learners have 
to draw on domain-independent weak methods for successful inductive 
learning. Metacognitive skillfulness will probably be the main determinant in 
the very complex phase of the Optics Lab. As a matter of fact, it is expected 
that the pattern of correlations between metacognitive skillfulness, intellectual 
ability, and learning outcomes of novice learners in the easy phase will be 
similar to the pattern of correlations of advanced learners in the more 
complex phases. The patterns of correlations will be examined for qualitative 
as well as quantitative leaning outcomes. 
Another important aim of this study is to examine whether the 
hypothesized changing roles of metacognitive skillfulness and intellectual 
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ability during inductive learning in a complex environment will cause 
differences between novice and advanced learners regarding actions in the 
learning environment. Novice learners are assumed to start out qualitatively 
(Plötzner & Spada, 1992), to use weak methods (Anzai, 1991; Klahr, 2000), and 
to still have to identify relevant independent variables before hypotheses can 
be generated (Van Joolingen & De Jong, 1997). Consequently, they are 
expected to conduct more qualitative oriented experiments during inductive 
learning, they will likely need more time in the phases of the Optics Lab, and 
they will probably show fewer measurement activities than advanced 
learners. In addition, for novice learners a positive correlation between the 
number of conducted experiments and the quality of metacognitive 
skillfulness is expected, as was found in the previous study, described in 
Chapter 4.  
The third and last aim of this study is to investigate whether there are 
differences in test-taking behavior between novice and advanced learners. As 
has been suggested in Chapter 2, novices’ answers on post-test questions 
could well be instance-based rather than rule-based, because novices may take 
more time to infer explicit rules. Knowledge that is based on instances could 
be the knowledge that Swaak and De Jong (1996; De Jong & Van Joolingen, 
1998) labeled intuitive knowledge. Advanced learners, in contrast, may have 
been able to discover rules during the inductive-learning task, and they may 
use these explicit rules for answering post-test questions. To examine whether 
the answers of novice learners on post-test questions are mainly instance-
based and the answers of advanced learners are mainly rule-based, learners 
will be asked to think aloud during completion of the post-test. In the present 
study the speed instruction for completion of the pre-tests and post-tests has 
been removed, in order to give learners the possibility of using explicit rules 
during completion of the post-tests. It is expected that advanced learners, 
relative to novices, will mention explicit rules more often during completion 
of the post-tests. It is also expected that using correct explicit rules during 
post-test completion will have a positive impact on learning outcomes. 
 
Method 
Participants 
Some months prior to this study the intellectual ability of 496 first year 
psychology students was assessed by a series of ability tests, representing five 
primary intelligence factors (Inductive reasoning, Quantitative reasoning, 
Verbal ability, Closure flexibility, and Sequential reasoning) in Carroll’s re-
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analyses of factor-analytic studies (Carroll, 1993). The test battery included 
tests for Vocabulary, Verbal Analogies, Linear Syllogisms, Number Series, 
Number Speed, and Embedded Figures. The unweighted mean of the scores 
on these six tests may be regarded as a measure of intellectual ability or an IQ 
equivalent (Veenman & Elshout, 1999). Those students, whose intellectual 
ability scores deviated at least 0.80 standard deviation from the mean, were 
classified as either being of high or relatively low intellectual ability. If 
participants had received three years or less physics education they were 
classified as novice learners, whereas they were classified as advanced 
learners if they had received four years or more physics education. 
Participants in this study were 44 first-year psychology students (10 relatively 
low intellectual ability novices, 12 high intellectual ability novices, 13 
relatively low intellectual ability advanced learners, and 9 high intellectual 
ability advanced learners). 
 
Learning environment 
In the present study again the Optics Lab was used as the learning 
environment, with some modifications. First, light rays were not visible 
during the movement of an objects, so each situation after a movement of an 
object could be considered as an observation, and therefore, as an experiment. 
Second, in this study the Optics Lab consisted of four phases. Phase 1 dealt 
with refraction. In this phase participants could run experiments with four 
differently shaped lenses and one light source, which had one light ray and 
could only be moved horizontally. Phase 2 dealt with focal distances of lenses. 
In this phase three thin lenses were available as well as one light source of 
three parallel light rays that could be moved horizontally and vertically. 
Phase 3 dealt with images and magnification. In this phase one light source of 
three divergent light rays could be moved horizontally and vertically, and the 
same three thin lenses of phase 2 were available. In phase 1 to 3, experiments 
could only be run with one lens at a time. Phase 4 dealt with combinations of 
lenses. In this phase the light source with divergent light rays of phase 3 was 
available, as well as lenses with an adjustable focal distance. In phase 4 it was 
possible to run experiments with more lenses being used simultaneously. 
In each phase learners were asked to infer rules about optics. For instance, 
the assignment in phase 1 was: Try to find out, by conducting experiments, what 
will happen when a light ray passes through a lens. When does the emerging light ray 
intersect with the axis and what determines the place of this intersection point? What 
are the differences between the four lenses? Learners could decide how much time 
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they would spent working on this assignment before going to the next phase 
and the next assignment. Each phase started with the presentation of 
prerequisite theory concerning that phase. In phase 2 to 4 the rules that could 
have been inferred in the previous phase were added to the theory, in order to 
reduce differences in prior knowledge associated with earlier phases.  
The rules that could be inferred in phase 2 were relatively easy. The 
relations between variables were linear, and half of the independent variables 
had no effect on the dependent variable. Phase 1 and 3 were more complex 
because of the more complex relations between system variables. These 
relations were non-linear and contained constraints. An example of such a 
relation is: If the light source is positioned very closely to a positive lens, the 
emerging light ray will not intersect with the optical axis. Phase 3 was 
assumed to be more complex than phase 1, because in phase 3 there were 
more independent system variables and, therefore, more rules to be inferred. 
Rules that could be inferred in phase 4, concerning combinations of positive 
and negative lenses, were the most complex. Although phase 1 is considered 
to be more complex than phase 2, learners started with phase 1 because 
refraction and positive and negative lenses are prerequisite concepts for 
understanding focal distance. In the results section, phase 1, phase 2, phase 3, 
and phase 4 will be labeled respectively as the intermediate, the easy, the 
complex, and the very complex phase of the Optics Lab. 
 
Procedure 
All participants passed through the Optics Lab in one individual session. 
The session started with a standardized twenty-minute instruction on how to 
operate in the Optics Lab. Participants could familiarize themselves with the 
Optics Lab by executing a set of prescribed actions (e.g. moving a lens in a 
prescribed way). After the instruction participants completed an optics pre-
test, covering phase 1–3. The next one and a half hour they worked in the 
Optics Lab, running experiments. Note taking was possible, using paper and 
pencil. Each phase of the Optics Lab ended with a post-test, which was a 
parallel version of the pre-test. Notes could not be consulted during 
completion of the tests. After the time limit of one and a half hours, 
participants had to stop experimenting, but they were allowed to finish the 
post-test of the Optics Lab phase they were working in. 
Participants were asked to think aloud during working in Optics Lab and 
during completion of the post-tests. Thinking aloud protocols were tape-
recorded, transcribed, time tagged and analyzed, in order to assess 
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metacognitive skills and to examine test-taking behavior. The computer 
logged also all participants’ actions in the Optics Lab in order to compare 
metacognitive skillfulness with actual discovery behavior.  
 
Measures 
Metacognitive skillfulness. The quality of metacognitive skills was assessed 
by judging the think-aloud protocols of the participants according to the 
criteria of Veenman and Elshout (Veenman, 1993; Veenman & Elshout, 1995; 
Veenman, Elshout, & Meijer, 1997), which were identical to the criteria used in 
the previous study. Metacognitive skillfulness was scored on four subscales: 
orientation activities, systematic orderliness, evaluation, and elaboration 
activities. The four subscales of metacognitive skillfulness were rated on a 
five-point scale, ranging from 0 to 4. For each participant a sum score over the 
four subscales for the easy, the intermediate, and the complex phase was 
computed, to obtain three scores for metacognitive skillfulness. One judge 
rated all protocols. In the studies described in Chapters 4 and 6, with very 
similar phases of the Optics Lab, inter-rater reliabilities were adequate. 
Average Cronbach’s alpha over the four different subscales of .93 and .89 
were established.  
Actions in the Optics Lab. Five categories concerning actions in the Optics 
Lab could be distinguished: (1) orientation time, representing the total time 
spent on reading and re-reading the theory and assignments; (2) qualitative 
manipulation actions, representing the frequency of moving lights and lenses, 
and rotating light rays by dragging; (3) quantitative manipulation actions, 
representing the frequency of moving lights and lenses, and rotating light 
rays by the input of numbers; (4) measurement actions, representing the 
number of measurements of distances and angles; (5) time on task per phase. 
The second, third and fourth categories resemble Shute and Glaser’s (1990) 
categories of learning indicators at a general activity level. 
Test-taking behavior. Test-taking behavior scores were based on think-aloud 
protocols of phase 1 and phase 2. Some learners completed the post-test of 
phase 3 after the time limit, and those tapes were not transcribed. For each 
qualitative post-test it was determined how many times a learner (1) 
paraphrased a question, (2) mentioned a correct rule, and (3) mentioned an 
incorrect rule during completion of the post-test. Log files were used to 
determine the mean reaction time on qualitative post-tests per phase. 
Learning outcomes. Pre-tests and post-tests consisted of three types of 
questions: (1) qualitative WHAT-IF questions, (2) qualitative reasoning 
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questions, and (3) quantitative questions. WHAT-IF questions contained three 
parts: conditions, action, and predictions. The conditions were defined by a 
depicted situation with a light source, light rays and a lens. Actions and 
predictions were presented in text. Actions referred to a change in value of an 
independent system variable, while predictions referred to the changed value 
of a dependent system variable. The learner was asked to decide which of the 
three predicted states would match the conditions and the action. All 
independent system variables were systematically questioned with the 
WHAT-IF items. An example of a WHAT-IF question: The light source is moved 
a bit to the right. Where will the emerging light ray intersect? (1) Closer to the lens, 
(2) At the same distance from the lens, or (3) Further away from the lens. Qualitative 
reasoning questions were reversed WHAT-IF questions: A prediction was 
presented and learners had to choose which of the three actions would match 
the conditions and the prediction. An example of a qualitative reasoning 
question: When will the emerging light rays intersect above the optical axe? (1) If 
you rotate the light rays upwards, (2) If you move the light source a bit downwards, 
(3) If you move the lens a bit to the right. Quantitative questions also contained 
depicted situations, but in this case the answer categories concerned numbers. 
In the easy phase the quantitative questions of the post-test dealt with the 
focal distance of the available lenses, which made them inappropriate for 
inclusion in a pre-test. In the complex phase the quantitative questions 
concerned magnification and the quantitative relation between object distance 
and image distance. In the very complex phase the quantitative questions 
related to combinations of thin lenses. 
The pre-test contained, in random order, 14 questions concerning the easy 
phase (10 WHAT-IF and 4 qualitative reasoning), 15 questions concerning the 
intermediate phase (10 WHAT-IF and 5 qualitative reasoning), and 28 
questions concerning the complex phase (18 WHAT-IF, 3 qualitative 
reasoning, and 7 quantitative questions). The post-test questions were parallel 
versions of the pre-test questions, completed with 3 quantitative questions 
concerning the easy phase and 22 questions concerning the very complex 
phase (12 WHAT-IF, 4 qualitative reasoning, and 6 quantitative questions). 
 
Results 
Initial differences 
No difference between novice and advanced learners was found for 
intellectual ability scores (Mnov = 0.03, SDnov = 0.95; Madv = – 0.06, SDadv = 1.00, 
respectively). Table 5.1 depicts the means and standard deviations of the 
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Optics Lab pre-test scores for relatively low and high intellectual ability 
novice and advanced learners. Pre-test scores are presented for each phase 
separately and for the total test. Cronbach’s alphas of the qualitative pre-test 
of the easy, the intermediate, the complex phase and the total test were 
respectively .65 (14 items), .04 (15 items), .30 (21 items) and .55 (50 items). 
Cronbach’s alpha of the quantitative pre-test of the complex phase was .01 (7 
items). 
Advanced learners outperformed novices on the Optics Lab qualitative 
pre-test of the easy phase, t(42) = 2.36, p < .05, the complex phase, t(42) = 3.11, 
p < .01, and the total pre-test, t(42) = 3.70, p < .01. There were no differences 
between relatively low and high intellectual ability learners on pre-test scores. 
A MANOVA revealed no interaction effect between level of expertise and 
intellectual ability for pre-test scores, F(4, 37) = 0.59, p = .68. 
 
Metacognitive skillfulness and the relation with intellectual ability 
The quality of metacognitive skills was assessed for each phase separately. 
The correlations between scores of the easy phase and the intermediate phase 
(phase 2 and 1), between scores of the intermediate phase and the complex 
phase (phase 1 and 3), and between the easy phase and the complex phase 
Table 5.1 
Means and standard deviations of pre-test scores in the different phases of the Optics Lab for 
novice and advanced learners with relatively low and high intellectual ability (IA) 
PRE-TEST Low IA High IA Total 
 M SD n M SD n M SD n 
Novice 
Qualitative easy 6.50 2.01 10 7.23 2.62 13 6.91 2.35 23 
Qualitative intermediate 5.00 1.76 10 5.46 2.22 13 5.26 2.00 23 
Qualitative complex 6.80 1.55 10 8.85 2.34 13 7.96 2.25 23 
Qualitative total 18.30 3.40 10 21.54 3.84 13 20.13 3.93 23 
Quantitative complex 2.30 1.06 10 2.08 1.26 13 2.17 1.15 23 
Advanced 
Qualitative easy 8.92 3.03 12 8.67 3.04 9 8.81 2.96 21 
Qualitative intermediate 5.67 1.78 12 6.33 1.22 9 5.95 1.56 21 
Qualitative complex 9.92 2.15 12 10.33 2.65 9 10.10 2.32 21 
Qualitative total 24.50 4.98 12 25.33 4.09 9 24.86 4.53 21 
Quantitative complex 2.33 1.07 12 1.78 1.09 9 2.10 1.09 21 
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(phase 2 and 3) were respectively .40 (p < .01), .19 (p = .12), and .54 (p < .01). 
This pattern resembles the familiar simplex pattern: tests that are near to each 
other in time have the highest correlations. A principal component analysis 
extracted one component with an eigenvalue greater than 1.0. This 
component had an eigenvalue of 1.76, with 58.8% of the variance accounted 
for. The eigenvalue of the second component was 0.83, representing 27.5% of 
the variance. In Table 5.2 the unrotated component matrix is depicted. As all 
scores loaded fairly high and positive on the first component, the summed 
scores of metacognitive skillfulness of the three phases of the Optics Lab were 
used for further analyses. Novice and advanced learners did not differ on 
metacognitive skillfulness (Mnov = 23.77, SDnov = 9.73; Madv = 19.89, SDadv = 
10.03), t(39) = 1.26, p = .22. 
Correlations between metacognitive skillfulness and intellectual ability for 
the easy, the intermediate, and the complex phase were respectively .56 (p < 
.01), .24 (p = .29), and .45 (p < .05) for novice learners (n=22), and .53 (p < .01), 
.38 (p = .11), and .43 (p = .06) for advanced learners (n=19). The correlation 
between the summed score for metacognitive skillfulness and intellectual 
ability was .54 (p < .01) for novice learners, and .60 (p < .01) for advanced 
learners. After correction for selection of extreme groups on intellectual ability 
(Gulliksen, 1961), these correlations became .39 and .44 respectively. 
 
Actions in the Optics Lab 
Unfortunately, 3 of the 44 log files were incomplete and could not be used 
for retrieving information about actions in the Optics Lab. The average time 
learners spent on reading and re-reading the theory and assignments of the 
three phases of the Optics Lab was nearly 20 minutes (M = 1155 s, SD = 312 s). 
The majority of the actions consisted of qualitative manipulation of the objects 
(M = 222.26, SD = 130.12). Almost 10 % of actions were spent on measuring (M 
Table 5.2 
Unrotated component matrix for measures of metacognitive skillfulness for three different 
phases of the Optics Lab 
 Component 1 Component 2 
Easy phase .87 –.09 
Intermediate phase .64 .74 
Complex phase .77 –.51 
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= 24.37, SD = 18.79) and less than 5 % of the actions consisted of quantitative 
manipulations of the objects in the Optics Lab (M = 11.66, SD = 18.66). 
A MANOVA was executed with level of expertise and intellectual ability as 
independent variables and frequencies of actions in each phase of the Optics 
Lab as dependent variables. In the easy phase there were three main effects 
for level of expertise. Novice learners executed more qualitative 
manipulations (Mnov = 74.90, SDnov = 48.04, n = 20; Madv = 46.81, SDadv = 32.69, n = 
21), F(1, 37) = 5.26, p < .05, spent more time on orientation activities (Mnov = 465 
s, SDnov = 139 s, n = 20; Madv = 379 s, SDadv = 155 s, n = 21), F(1, 37) = 5.93, p < .05, 
and spent more time on experimenting in the easy phase (Mnov = 1611 s, SDnov 
= 369 s, n = 20; Madv = 1363 s, SDadv = 393 s, n = 21), F(1, 37) = 8.08, p < .01. No 
main effects for level of expertise were found in the other two phases. When 
actions in the Optics Lab were summed over the three phases of the Optics 
Lab, novice learners performed significantly more qualitative manipulations 
of objects in the Optics Lab than advanced learners did (Mnov = 269.21, SDnov = 
141.96, n = 19; Madv = 175.32, SDadv = 99.98, n = 19), F(1, 34) = 5.54, p < .05, and 
they performed fewer measurement actions than advanced learners did (Mnov 
= 18.21, SDnov = 12.73; Madv = 30.53, SDadv = 21.99), F(1, 34) = 5.30, p < .05. 
There were some main effects for intellectual ability. Low intellectual 
ability learners spent more time on orientation activities than high intellectual 
ability learners in the easy phase (Mlow = 483 s, SDlow = 150 s, n = 22; Mhigh = 350 
s, SDhigh = 123 s, n = 19), F(1, 37) = 11.52, p < .01, and low intellectual ability 
learners spent more time on experimenting in the easy phase than high 
intellectual ability learners (Mlow = 1657 s, SDlow = 344 s, n = 22; Mhigh = 1284 s, 
SDhigh = 366 s, n = 19), F(1, 34) = 14.79, p < .01. In the intermediate phase 
relatively low intellectual ability learners spent more time on orientation 
activities (Mlow = 261 s, SDlow = 102 s, n = 22; Mhigh = 172 s, SDhigh = 55 s, n = 19), 
F(1, 37) = 9.69, p < .01. In the complex phase high intellectual ability learners 
executed more measurement activities (Mlow = 6.11, SDlow = 5.61, n = 19; Mhigh = 
12.63, SDhigh = 10.53, n = 19), F(1, 34) = 6.46, p < .05. When actions in the Optics 
Lab were summed over the three phases of the Optics Lab, main effects were 
found for intellectual ability on frequency of measurement actions and 
orientation activities. More measurement actions were executed by high 
intellectual ability learners relative to low intellectual ability learners (Mlow = 
18.95, SDlow = 12.37, n = 19; Mhigh = 29.79, SDhigh = 22.60, n = 19), F(1, 34) = 5.44, p 
< .05, whereas low intellectual ability learners spent more time on orientation 
activities than high intellectual ability learners (Mlow = 1260 s, SDlow = 326 s, n = 
19; Mhigh = 1050 s, SDhigh = 265 s, n = 19), F(1, 34) = 4.21, p < .05. 
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Metacognitive skillfulness of novice learners correlated significantly with 
frequency of measurement actions (r = .46, p < .05) and marginally 
significantly with frequency of qualitative manipulation actions (r = .45, p = 
.053). For the advanced learners no significant correlations between 
metacognitive skillfulness and actions in the Optics Lab were found. 
 
 Learning outcomes 
Cronbach’s alphas of the qualitative post-test of the easy, the intermediate, 
the complex phase, and the total test were .48 (14 items), .59 (15 items), .53 (21 
items) and .62 (50 items), respectively. Cronbach’s alphas of the quantitative 
post-test of the easy phase and the complex phase were respectively .24 (3 
items) and .21 (7 items). Post-test scores of phase 4 were not taken into 
account because only a few participants passed through this phase. 
Table 5.3 depicts the means and standard deviations of the Optics Lab post-
test scores for relatively low and high intellectual ability novice and advanced 
Table 5.3 
Means and standard deviations of post-test scores in the different phases of the Optics Lab for 
novice and advanced learners with relatively low and high intellectual ability (IA) 
POST-TEST Low IA High IA Total 
 M SD n M SD n M SD n 
Novice 
Qualitative easy 9.80 1.62 10 11.38 2.29 13 10.70 2.14 23 
Qualitative intermediate 6.40 2.07 10 8.46 3.15 13 7.57 2.87 23 
Qualitative complex 10.44 3.32 9 10.92 4.03 13 10.73 3.68 22 
Qualitative total 26.89 3.98 9 30.77 6.66 13 29.18 5.93 22 
Quantitative easy 2.20 0.63 10 2.31 0.95 13 2.26 0.81 23 
Quantitative complex 2.22 1.20 9 2.46 1.27 13 2.36 1.22 22 
Quantitative total 4.44 1.33 9 4.77 1.54 13 4.64 1.43 22 
Advanced 
Qualitative easy 11.63 1.30 12 11.22 1.48 9 11.48 1.36 21 
Qualitative intermediate 6.33 2.19 12 8.67 2.45 9 7.33 2.54 21 
Qualitative complex 10.20 1.48 10 11.89 2.37 9 11.00 2.08 19 
Qualitative total 28.50 3.44 10 31.78 3.23 9 30.05 3.66 19 
Quantitative easy 2.08 0.79 12 2.78 0.44 9 2.38 0.74 21 
Quantitative complex 2.20 1.03 10 2.33 1.87 9 2.26 1.45 19 
Quantitative total 4.30 1.34 10 5.11 2.15 9 4.68 1.77 19 
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learners. Post-test scores are presented for each phase separately and for the 
total test. One-tailed t-tests showed that novice learners gained qualitative 
knowledge in the easy phase, t(22) = 6.05, p < .01, the intermediate phase, t(22) 
= 4.31, p < .01, and in the complex phase, t(21) = 2.73, p < .01. Consequently, 
their total qualitative post-test score was significantly higher than their pre-
test score, t(21) = 6.31, p < .01. No improvement was shown on the quantitative 
test of the complex phase, t(21) = 0.45, p = .65. Also, the advanced learners 
gained qualitative knowledge in the easy phase, t(20) = 4.90, p < .01], the 
intermediate phase, t(20) = 2.35, p < .05, and the complex phase, t(18) = 1.77, p < 
.05. Their total qualitative post-test score was significantly higher than their 
pre-test score, t(18) = 5.02, p < .01. No improvement was shown on the 
quantitative test of the complex phase, t(18) = 0.58, p = .56. 
A MANOVA with repeated measures indicated that the knowledge gain 
on the total qualitative test was significantly higher for novice learners than 
for advanced learners, F(1, 39) = 4.43, p < .05. The two groups differed on the 
pre-test, but not anymore on the post-test. Furthermore, this MANOVA 
showed that the knowledge gain for high intellectual ability learners in the 
intermediate phase was larger than the knowledge gain for relatively low 
intellectual ability learners (Mlowpre = 5.36, SDlowpre = 1.76; Mhighpre = 5.82, SDhighpre 
= 1.89; Mlowpost = 6.36, SDlowpost = 2.08; Mhighpost = 8.55, SDhighpost = 2.82), F(1, 42) = 
5.18, p < .05. 
 
Determinants of learning 
The pre-test and post-test scores of the easy phase correlated significantly 
for advanced learners (r = .54, p < .05, n = 21) but not for novice learners (r = 
.11, p = .61, n = 23). The pre-test and post-test scores of the intermediate phase 
correlated significantly for novice learners (r = .49, p < .05) but not for 
advanced learners (r = .21, p = .37). Other correlations between pre-test and 
post-test scores were not significant. 
 Table 5.4 shows the correlations between intellectual ability and 
metacognitive skillfulness on the one hand, and learning outcomes on the 
other. Correlations are presented for novice and advanced learners separately 
for qualitative and quantitative post-tests of each phase and for the total tests. 
For actions in the Optics Lab, a marginal positive correlation between 
measurement actions time and the total quantitative post-test score was found 
for novice learners (r = .41, p < .08). For advanced learners a negative 
correlation between orientation time and the qualitative post-test score was 
found (r = –.47, p < .05) as well as a positive correlation between frequency of 
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quantitative manipulations and the quantitative post-test score (r = .51, p < 
.05). No other significant correlations between actions in the Optics Lab and 
post-test scores were obtained (–.25 ≤ r ≤ .24). 
 
Test-taking behavior 
For all test-taking behavior categories, the scores of the easy phase and the 
intermediate phase correlated positively, indicating that test-taking behavior 
was stable over the two phases. Correlations between scores of the easy phase 
and the intermediate phase for paraphrasing a question, mentioning a correct 
rule, mentioning an incorrect rule, and reaction time were .49 (p < .01), .75 (p < 
.01), .33 (p < .05), and .77 (p < .01), respectively (n = 44). Correlations between 
paraphrasing and mentioning a correct rule was .67 (p < .01), between 
paraphrasing and mentioning an incorrect rule .75 (p < .01), and between 
Table 5.4 
Correlations between intellectual ability (IA), metacognitive skillfulness (MS) and post-test 
scores in the different phases of the Optics Lab for novice and advanced learners 
 Uncorrected Corrected 
 IA MS MSsemi IA MS MSsemi 
Novice (n = 22) 
Qualitative easy .36 .49* .36* .24 .43 .37 
Qualitative intermediate .36 .37 .20 .25 .29 .21 
Qualitative complex .08 .15 .12 .05 .13 .12 
Qualitative total .35 .45* .30 .24 .38 .32 
Quantitative easy .12 .42* .42* .08 .42 .43 
Quantitative complex .11 .10 .06 .07 .08 .06 
Quantitative total .16 .33 .29 .11 .31 .29 
Advanced (n = 19) 
Qualitative easy –.17 .11 .26 –.11 .19 .27 
Qualitative intermediate .49* .72** .54** .34 .67 .58 
Qualitative complex .45* .26 –.01 .31 .13 –.01 
Qualitative total .52* .68** .46* .37 .61 .50 
Quantitative easy .55** .40* .10 .39 .26 –.11 
Quantitative complex .09 –.05 –.13 .06 –.09 .13 
Quantitative total .31 .14 –.06 .21 .03 –.06 
 Note. Corrected = corrected for selection of extreme groups of intellectual ability. 
 * p < .05. ** p < .01. 
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mentioning a correct rule and mentioning an incorrect rule .46 (p < .01). 
Reaction time was not related to any of the other test-taking behavior scores.  
A MANOVA was executed with level of expertise and intellectual ability as 
independent variables and measures of test-taking behavior, summed over 
the easy phase and the intermediate phase, as dependent variables. Main 
effects were found for intellectual ability. During completion of the test high 
intellectual ability learners, more often than relatively low intellectual ability 
learners, paraphrased the questions (Mlow = 4.23, SDlow = 2.71, n = 22; Mhigh = 
6.82, SDhigh = 4.88, n = 22), F(1, 40) = 4.85, p < .05, mentioned correct rules 
during completion of the test (Mlow = 4.23, SDlow = 3.75; Mhigh = 9.36, SDhigh 
=7.03), F(1, 40) = 10.31, p < .01, mentioned incorrect rules (Mlow = 1.59, SDlow = 
1.85; Mhigh = 4.00, SDhigh = 3.35), F(1, 40) = 8.51, p < .01, and mentioned rules in 
general (Mlow = 5.82, SDlow = 4.71; Mhigh = 13.36, SDhigh = 8.88), F(1, 40) = 13.96, p 
< .01. High intellectual ability learners also spent less time on answering the 
questions than relatively low intellectual ability learners (Mlow = 30.76, SDlow = 
6.54; Mhigh = 24.35, SDhigh = 8.94), F(1, 40) = 7.24, p < .05. No main effects for 
level of expertise and no interaction effects were found. 
For novice learners, metacognitive skillfulness correlated negatively with 
post-test reaction time of the easy phase (r = –.45, p < .05, n = 22) and with 
post-test reaction time of the intermediate phase (r = –.51, p < .05). For 
advanced learners, metacognitive skillfulness correlated positively with the 
number of correct rules mentioned during completion of the post-test of the 
intermediate phase (r = .45, p = .05, n = 19). Post-test reaction time also 
correlated with time spent on experimenting in the easy phase for novices (r = 
.59, p < .01) and in the easy and intermediate phase for advanced learners (r = 
.61, p < .01; r = .48, p < .05, respectively).  
Some of the post-test scores were related to the number of correct rules 
mentioned during completion of that particular post-test. For novices (n = 22) 
the correlations in the easy phase, the intermediate phase and total test score 
were .17 (p = .45), .42 (p = .05), and .16 (p = .47), respectively. For advanced 
learners (n = 19) the correlations were .41 (p = .08), .66 (p < .01), and .74 (p < 
.01), respectively. Of all other test-taking behavior measures, only novices’ 
post-test reaction time in the easy phase correlated significantly with post-test 
score (r = –.43, p < .05). 
 
Discussion 
In the present study three connected ideas were investigated. First, according 
to the theory of the threshold of problematicity (Elshout, 1987), it was 
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hypothesized that the pattern of correlations between metacognitive 
skillfulness, intellectual ability and learning outcomes would differ for novice 
and advanced learners. The pattern for novice learners in the relatively easy 
phase of the Optics Lab was expected to be similar to the pattern for advanced 
learners in the intermediate or complex phase. Second, it was hypothesized 
that novice and advanced learners would show differences concerning actions 
in the Optics Lab. Because of their insufficient prior knowledge, novice 
learners were expected to execute more qualitative oriented experiments and 
less measurement activities, relative to advanced learners, in order to identify 
variables and generate hypotheses. Third, it was hypothesized that novices’ 
answers on post-test questions would be mainly instance-based, whereas the 
answers of advanced learners would be mainly rule-based. The first two 
hypotheses were confirmed, the third not. 
As was expected, the pattern of correlations for novice and advanced learners 
differed substantially. For the novice learners, in the easy phase the mixed 
model (Veenman, 1993) was found. Metacognitive skillfulness and intellectual 
ability were related, while they both had an independent impact on 
qualitative learning outcomes. In addition, metacognitive skillfulness was the 
main determinant for learning outcomes. In the intermediate and complex 
phase, the impact of metacognitive skillfulness and intellectual ability on 
learning outcomes fell considerably. For advanced learners, in contrast, only 
prior knowledge had an impact on learning outcomes in the easy phase. The 
pattern of correlations in the intermediate phase resembled the pattern of 
correlations found for novice learners in the easy phase: A mixed model, with 
metacognitive skillfulness as main determinant. In the complex phase, a 
marginal significant correlation between intellectual ability and learning 
outcomes was found. These results are in accordance with the findings of 
Veenman and Elshout (1999). The varying impact of intellectual ability on 
learning outcomes found in the present study is in accordance with the theory 
of Elshout (1987), which states that the threshold of problematicity of 
advanced learners is positioned at a higher level of the objective task 
complexity than the threshold of problematicity of novice learners. 
Considering the relatively low impact of intellectual ability on learning 
outcomes for novice learners, even the easy phase of the Optics Lab may have 
been be positioned beyond their threshold of problematicity. This does not 
mean that novice learners were not able to acquire knowledge in these phases. 
In fact, the knowledge gain of novice learners was larger than the knowledge 
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gain of the advanced learners, even large enough to let initial differences on 
the pre-tests disappear on the post-tests. 
In the present study metacognitive skillfulness and intellectual ability 
correlated substantially for novice learners. This result deviates from the 
results of the previous study (Chapter 4), where no significant correlation was 
found between metacognitive skillfulness and intellectual ability. Presumably, 
this difference is due to differences in the objective task complexity. In the 
previous study, the novice learners had to pass through a far more extensive, 
complex learning environment than the one used in this study. For instance, 
in the previous study, the Optics Lab contained seven phases and the 
dependent variable in the Optics Lab had to be identified, whereas in the 
present study the Optics Lab contained four phases and the dependent 
variable was provided for in the assignments. It probably took the majority of 
the novice learners of the previous study too much time to change from a 
data-driven into a theorist approach. As was argued in Chapter 4, it is only 
when novice learners gradually become theorists that metacognitive 
skillfulness and intellectual ability will gradually intertwine. Also for 
advanced learners substantial correlations between metacognitive skillfulness 
and intellectual ability were found in the present study, the reverse of results 
in studies by Veenman and Elshout (1999; Veenman, Elshout, & Hoeks, 1994). 
Veenman and Elshout found no significant correlation between metacognitive 
skillfulness and intellectual ability for advanced learners. They argued that 
metacognitive skillfulness of the advanced learners in their studies was likely 
to be domain-specific, leading to routine problem-solving behavior. The 
quality of routine behavior, in turn, is supposed to be unrelated to intellectual 
ability (Ericsson & Smith, 1991; Ericsson & Lehman, 1996). However, the 
thermodynamics problems used in the study of Veenman and Elshout may be 
less ill defined than inductive-learning tasks in the Optics Lab. Likely, the 
high task complexity of the Optics Lab kept the advanced learners in the 
present study from reaching that routine stage. 
Differences between novice and advanced learners regarding the above-
mentioned patterns of correlations are even more interesting as they are 
accompanied by differences in behavior. Results showed that novice and 
advanced learners also differed from each other considering the frequency of 
actions in the Optics Lab. As was hypothesized, novices executed more 
manipulation actions and less measurement actions during experimenting 
than advanced learners did. For novice learners the frequency of 
manipulation and measurement actions in the Optics Lab was related to 
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metacognitive skillfulness, although not as strongly as in the previous 
experiment. No significant correlation between metacognitive skillfulness and 
actions in the Optics Lab was found for advanced learners. Apparently, 
during initial inductive learning a high quality of metacognitive skills may 
manifest itself in a high frequency of manipulation actions in the Optics Lab. 
However, when learners have gained a certain level of expertise, ‘more is 
better’ does not hold anymore. Intellectual ability also affected frequencies of 
actions in the Optics Lab. High intellectual ability learners showed more 
measurement activities and needed less time for orientation, compared to low 
intellectual ability learners. Nevertheless, these differences in frequencies of 
actions in the Optics Lab did not lead to differences in learning outcomes. 
Apparently, there are more roads to learning.  
Unexpectedly, novice and advanced learners did not differ on test-taking 
behavior. Both groups equally often used explicit correct (and incorrect) rules 
while thinking aloud during completion of the post-test. Intellectual ability, 
on the other hand, affected the frequency of explicit rules. High intellectual 
ability learners, irrespective of their level of expertise, more often mentioned 
explicit rules during the post-test administrations. Thus, it may not be the 
advanced learner but rather the high intellectual ability learner who uses 
explicit rules during the tests. 
Test-taking behavior appeared to be related to good learning outcomes. 
This suggests that there is an indirect impact of intellectual ability on learning 
via the use of explicit rules during post-test completion. Especially for 
advanced learners high positive significant correlations between the number 
of explicit rules and post-test scores were found. Apparently, for advanced 
learners it is necessary to use explicit rules in order to perform well on the 
test. For novice learners this was less clear. The post-test score was related to 
the number of explicit rules only in the intermediate phase. Novice learners, 
more likely than advanced learners, may attain good learning outcomes in 
another way, that is, by answering post-test questions intuitively or instance-
based instead of rule-based. Moreover, results showed that instance-based 
answers, relative to rule-based answers, do not lead to faster reaction times. 
This allows learners in the studies conducted by Swaak (Swaak & De Jong, 
1996; Swaak, 1999) to base their answers to post-test items on explicit rules 
and not solely on their intuitive knowledge, as Swaak suggested. 
All above-mentioned effects concern the quantitative tests. Unfortunately, 
we could not examine whether there were any differences between effects for 
qualitative and quantitative knowledge acquisition, because reliability scores 
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of quantitative pre-tests and post-tests were inadequate. This was probably 
due to the complexity of the questions (learners scored below chance), to the 
limited size of the tests, and to the fact that questions were multiple-choice 
items. Cronbach’s alphas for the qualitative tests were sufficient. 
 
Conclusion 
Again it appears that metacognitive skillfulness is a booster for inductive 
learning when learners operate at the boundary of their knowledge. A good 
quality of metacognitive skills leads to the execution of many experiments 
and to a systematic search of the experiment space, that is, to adequate 
evidence generation. All these experiments may be used for successful instance-
based answering of post-test questions. At a later stage relatively high 
intellectual ability is necessary in order to infer rules in a complex 
environment, that is, for evidence interpretation. Consequently, it is mainly the 
high intellectual ability learner who will be engaged in rule-based answering 
of post-test questions. The varying impact of intellectual ability on learning 
outcomes found in the present study is in accordance with Elshout’s (1987) 
theory of the threshold of problematicity.  
Decomposition of the skills that are involved in the various stages of 
inductive learning, including the stage of retrieving the acquired knowledge 
during the post-test, is essential when adequate instructional support has to 
be provided to improve the inductive-learning process in a subsequent 
transfer task. For further research, it would be a challenge to try to move the 
threshold of problematicity of novice learners upwards by providing specific 
instructional support aimed at evidence generation. Good examples of this 
kind of support are structuring the environment by providing sub-
assignments and the so-called telling experiments (Veenman and Elshout, 
1995). This kind of support will probably allow novice learners to be more 
engaged in evidence interpretation. It is likely that the impact of 
metacognitive skillfulness on learning outcomes will decrease and the impact 
intellectual ability will probably increase.  
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6 
DOMAIN-INDEPENDENCY OF NOVICES’ 
METACOGNITIVE SKILLFULNESS 
 
There is evidence that metacognitive skillfulness mainly has a domain-
independent impact on novice inductive learning (Veenman, Elshout, & 
Meijer, 1997; Veenman & Verheij, 2001). The learning environments used in 
the Veenman et al. studies, however, required “a substantial amount of 
quantitative reasoning, drawing heavily on mathematical skills” (Veenman et 
al., 1997, p. 205). In fact, the variables of these simulation environments could 
be manipulated mainly by the input of numbers, which incites learners to 
reason on a quantitative level. The Optics Lab, in contrast, allows for 
operating at both a quantitative and a qualitative level, that is, in the Optics 
Lab variables can be manipulated in a quantitative way by the input of 
numbers and in a qualitative way by dragging objects. More importantly, the 
effects of varying the independent variables of the simulation environments in 
the Veenman et al. studies were predominantly quantitative whereas in the 
Optics Lab qualitative effects of independent variables could be observed. The 
option of operating and reasoning on a qualitative level seems important for 
novice learners in inductive-learning environments. According to Plötzner 
and Spada (1992), novice learners will most likely start reasoning on the 
qualitative-relational level. This was corroborated by the results of the two 
previous studies, which showed that more than 73% of novices’ actions in the 
Optics Lab were qualitative manipulation actions, while the option of 
quantitative manipulation was available. 
In the present study we examined whether novice learners’ actions in a 
simulation environment, which allows for qualitative manipulation of 
variables, have the same underlying sources as the actions in a different 
simulation environment, which mainly allows for quantitative manipulation 
of variables. In other words, we investigated whether the domain-
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independency of metacognitive skillfulness found by Veenman et al. (1997) 
only applies to learning environments in which learners are restricted to 
manipulate variables quantitatively. Therefore, in the present study novice 
learners will pass through the Optics Lab, which has the option of qualitative 
manipulation, and through the Heat Lab (Elshout & Veenman, 1992; 
Veenman et al., 1997), which more or less restricts learners to quantitative 
manipulation. Metacognitive skillfulness will be assessed in both inductive-
learning environments and whether these measures are related will be 
examined. It is expected that for novice learners their metacognitive 
skillfulness will be domain-independent, irrespective of the various options to 
change variables in the simulation environment. In any simulation 
environment, novice learners have to base their initial inductive-learning 
behavior on domain-independent heuristics or weak methods (Klahr & 
Simon, 1999), which will likely be of a qualitative kind. When no qualitative 
manipulations of variables are possible in the environment, a large part of the 
quantitative manipulations will likely be conceived and used by novice 
learners as qualitative manipulations in order to infer relations between 
system variables at a qualitative-relational level. Only a small portion of the 
quantitative manipulations will be used in order to infer relations at a 
quantitative-relational and a quantitative-numerical level.  
It is of practical importance that for novice learners the domain-
independency of metacognitive skillfulness applies both to simulation 
environments in which variables could be manipulated quantitatively as well 
as to environments that allow for qualitative manipulation. In the subsequent 
study, described in Chapter 7, instructional support will be embedded in the 
Optics Lab. Instructional support could interfere with the assessment of 
metacognitive skillfulness. Therefore, in the subsequent study metacognitive 
skillfulness will be assessed in a different learning environment. Only 
learning environments in which variables could be manipulated mainly in a 
quantitative way were available to that purpose. 
The various ways of manipulating variables in a learning environment 
could also affect the pattern of correlations between metacognitive 
skillfulness, intellectual ability, actions in the learning environment, and 
learning outcomes. However, this is not expected in the present study. In a 
similar way to the results of the previous study for novices in the easy phase 
of the Optics Lab that was described in Chapter 5, the mixed model is 
predicted: metacognitive skillfulness and intellectual ability will be related 
and they both will make an independent contribution to learning outcomes. 
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For the more complex phases of the Optics Lab it is hypothesized that the 
impact of intellectual ability will decrease substantially, and that 
metacognitive skillfulness is a more important determinant for learning 
outcomes than intellectual ability. Also for the Heat Lab the mixed model is 
expected to emerge from the data, as was found by Veenman (1993; Veenman 
et al., 1997). Finally, the domain independency of actions in the learning 
environment as well as the acquired knowledge in the two environments will 
be examined, although in an exploratory way. 
 
Method 
Participants 
Participants in this study were 15 social science students, 10 women and 5 
men, with a mean age of 22 years and 9 months. All students were novices in 
the domain of physics, that is, they had not received any physics education for 
at least the past three years and they had had less than three years of physics 
education. 
 
Learning environments 
The Optics Lab. In this study the Optics Lab consisted of three phases. These 
phases, including the theory and assignments, were equal to the first three 
phases of the Optics Lab of the study described in Chapter 5. That means that 
different levels of complexity were also distinguished in this study : a relative 
easy, an intermediate and a complex phase. Objects could be manipulated in a 
qualitative way by dragging them and in a quantitative way by the input of 
numbers. The output was mainly qualitative but could also be quantitative 
when learners made use of the measurement instruments. The Optics Lab was 
implemented in Authorware Professional, an advanced authoring language 
for personal computers. 
The Heat Lab. The computer-simulated Heat Lab, a learning environment 
about calorimetry, was adapted from Veenman et al. (1997). In the Heat Lab 
learners were asked to conduct experiments with objects of different mass 
(100, 200, and 1000 g) and material (gold, copper, and glass). These objects 
could be heated on a burner. The amount of heat to be transferred to an 
object, i.e. the amount of time that the burner would be active, could be set by 
the input of numbers. A joule meter displayed the transferred heat to an 
object. Thermometers, when attached to an object, could measure 
temperature. The theory presented in the Heat Lab consisted of a short 
explanation of the concepts of heat and temperature. Learners received six 
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general assignments. For instance, assignment number 4 was: Try to find out in 
the Heat Lab what is the impact of mass on the temperature of an object after 
transference of heat. By conducting experiments in the Heat Lab, the linear 
relations between heat, change of temperature, mass, and material could be 
inferred. After finishing their work on a particular assignment, learners 
received a short description of the relation that was to be inferred. 
 
Procedure 
In the first session, the intellectual ability of all fifteen participants was 
assessed by a series of six paper and pencil ability tests. In the second session 
participants passed individually through the Optics learning environment 
and, with a delay of about a week, in the third session they passed 
individually through the Heat Lab learning environment. Before entering one 
of the environments, the participants received a standardized instruction on 
how to operate the environment. Subsequently, a pre-test was administered. 
Participants could spend as much time as they wanted in the learning 
environments. While working in the two learning environments participants 
were asked to think aloud. Think-aloud protocols were tape-recorded and 
transcribed. Post-tests were administered to measure the acquired knowledge. 
 
Measures 
Intellectual ability. The intellectual ability of the 15 participants was assessed 
in a series of tests including five primary intelligence factors: inductive 
reasoning, quantitative reasoning, verbal ability, closure flexibility, and 
sequential reasoning (Carroll, 1993). The test battery included tests for 
vocabulary, verbal analogies, linear syllogisms, number series, number speed, 
and embedded figures. The unweighted mean of the scores on these six tests 
may be regarded as a measure of intellectual ability or IQ equivalent 
(Veenman & Elshout, 1999). 
Metacognitive skillfulness. The quality of learners’ metacognitive skills was 
assessed in the Optics Lab as well as in the Heat Lab, according to the criteria 
of Veenman and Elshout (Veenman, 1993; Veenman & Elshout, 1995; 
Veenman, Elshout, & Meijer, 1997). These criteria were identical to those used 
in the previous studies, described in Chapters 4 and 5. Metacognitive 
skillfulness was scored on four subscales: orientation activities, systematic 
orderliness, evaluation, and elaboration activities. The four subscales of 
metacognitive skillfulness were rated on a five-point scale, ranging from 0 to 
4. In the Optics Lab for each participant a sum score over the four subscales 
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for the easy, the intermediate, and the complex phase was computed in order 
to obtain three scores for metacognitive skillfulness. In the Heat Lab, scores 
for metacognitive skillfulness were obtained for two segments: assignments 1 
– 3, and assignments 4 – 6. Segments of the think-aloud protocols of the 
Optics Lab and the Heat Lab were scored alternately and anonymously. Five 
protocols from the Optics Lab and five from the Heat Lab were scored by two 
judges. Correlations between scores for metacognitive skillfulness of the two 
judges, representing a measure for the inter-rater reliability, were .93 for the 
Optics Lab and .94 for the Heat Lab. 
Actions in the learning environments. Four categories concerning actions in 
the Optics Lab were distinguished: (1) qualitative manipulation of variables, 
i.e., varying the position of lenses and lights, and varying the angle of 
incidence, all by dragging objects (2) quantitative manipulation of variables, 
i.e., varying the position of lenses and lights, and varying the angle of 
incidence by the input of numbers, (3) measurement actions, i.e., measuring 
distances between objects and angles of light rays, and (4) time on task. Three 
categories of actions in the Heat Lab were distinguished: (1) number of 
experiments, (2) number of complete experiments, i.e., experiments where 
learners measured the initial and final temperature of the heated object, (3) 
number of incomplete experiments, i.e., experiments where learners failed to 
measure the initial temperature, the final temperature, or both, and (4) time 
on task. These categories were adapted from Veenman, Elshout, and Groen 
(1993) with some small modifications. Veenman et al. distinguished the total 
number of experiments, the number of times a learner failed to measure the 
initial temperature, and the number of times a learner failed to measure the 
final temperature. Thus, there were two variables that could be regarded as 
an indication of a poor systematical orderliness, but no variable that could be 
regarded as an indication of good systematical orderliness. Therefore, in the 
present study also the number of complete experiments was distinguished. 
Learning outcomes. The Optics Lab pre-tests and post-tests consisted of the 
same three types of questions as in the study described in Chapter 5. The pre-
test contained, in random order, 14 questions concerning the easy phase (10 
WHAT-If and 4 qualitative reasoning questions), 15 questions concerning the 
intermediate phase (10 WHAT-If and 5 qualitative reasoning questions), and 
28 questions concerning the complex phase (18 WHAT-IF, 3 qualitative 
reasoning, and 7 quantitative questions). The post-test questions were parallel 
versions of the pre-test questions, completed with 3 quantitative questions 
concerning the easy phase. 
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The Heat Lab pre-test and post-tests were obtained from studies of 
Veenman (1993; Veenman, Elshout & Meijer, 1997). The Heat Lab pre-test 
assessed learner’s declarative qualitative knowledge of heat theory and 
consisted of 38 statements that had to be evaluated as either right or wrong. 
Only when learners really had no idea what the correct answer was, were 
they allowed to choose the option I don’t know. All correct answers were 
summed. An example of a statement is: The amount of heat necessary for a 
temperature rise of 5 °C is the same for every material. The Heat Lab post-test was 
a reshuffled version of the pre-test. Subsequently, learners had to solve three 
problems while thinking aloud. The think-aloud protocols were used to assess 
the correctness of quantitative reasoning concerning heat theory. Answers 
were rated on a five-point scale, ranging from 0 to 5. Scores of the three 
problems were summed. An example of a problem is: Two blocks of the same 
material but of different mass both have a temperature of 20 °C. The small block is 
heated for 30 seconds until it has a temperature of 50 °C. The large block is heated for 
2 minutes until it has a temperature of 80 °C. What is the exact ratio of the masses of 
the two blocks? You may assume that there is no exchange of heat with the 
environment. 
 
Results 
Metacognitive skillfulness 
Correlations amongst segments. In Table 6.1 the correlations amongst the 
scores for metacognitive skillfulness per segment of the Optics Lab and the 
Heat Lab are depicted. All segments correlated significantly. Correlations 
between segment scores and intellectual ability ranged from .44 to .52, except 
for the intermediate phase (phase 1) of the Optics Lab. This correlation was 
.01. When intellectual ability was partialed out, the correlations amongst 
measures of metacognitive skillfulness remained high (see Table 6.1). 
Principal components analysis on measures of metacognitive skillfulness. A 
principle components analysis was performed on measures of metacognitive 
skillfulness. One component with an eigenvalue greater than 1.0 was 
extracted. This component had an eigenvalue of 4.02, with 80.3% of the 
variance accounted for, and may be regarded to represent the domain-
independent part of metacognitive skillfulness. The eigenvalue of the second 
component was 0.47, representing 9.3% of the variance. Although not 
unequivocally, this latter component may contrast metacognitive skillfulness 
of the Optics Lab with the Heat Lab. In Table 6.2 the unrotated component 
matrix is depicted. The hypothesis that metacognitive skillfulness is a general 
89
rather than a domain-specific characteristic was supported by the results of 
the principal components analysis. 
 
Actions in the learning environments 
On the average, participants spent approximately one hour (M = 59 min, 
SD = 36 min) in the Optics Lab. Almost 50% of the actions were qualitative 
moves of lenses, lights, and light rays (M = 68.27, SD = 49.76), 30% of the 
Table 6.1 
Correlations between measures of metacognitive skillfulness per segment of the Optics Lab 
and the Heat Lab 
 1 2 3 4 5 
 Uncorrected correlations 
1. Optics Lab easy — .62* .89** .65** .71** 
2. Optics Lab intermediate  — .76** .67** .77** 
3. Optics Lab complex   — .76** .80** 
4. Heat Lab 1    — .92** 
5. Heat Lab 2     — 
 Partial correlations 
1. Optics Lab easy — .70** .86** .55* .61* 
2. Optics Lab intermediate  — .84** .75** .89** 
3. Optics Lab complex   — .70** .74** 
4. Heat Lab 1    — .89** 
5. Heat Lab 2     — 
Note. N = 15 
* p < .05. ** p < .01. 
 
 
Table 6.2 
Unrotated component matrix for measures of metacognitive skillfulness for the Optics Lab 
and the Heat Lab 
 Component 1 Component 2 
Optics Lab easy .86 .46 
Optics Lab intermediate .85 –.11 
Optics Lab complex .94 .25 
Heat Lab 1 .89 –.33 
Heat Lab 2 .94 –.26 
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actions were quantitative moves (M = 42.53, SD = 39.99), and 20% of the 
actions were related to measurement activities. 
On the average, participants spent more than half an hour in the Heat Lab 
(M = 31 min, SD = 11min). The average number of conducted complete 
experiments, that is, with measurements of both initial and final temperature, 
was 15.07 (SD = 9.39). The average number of conducted incomplete 
experiments, that is, without measurement of the initial or final temperature 
or both, was 7.33 (SD = 12.48). 
Table 6.3 depicts the correlations amongst the different measures of actions 
in the Optics Lab and the Heat Lab. No principle components analysis was 
performed on measures of actions because the measures of actions in both 
learning environments were of a different nature. In the Optics Lab 
qualitative and quantitative manipulations were distinguished whereas in the 
Heat Lab a distinction was made between complete and incomplete 
experiments. Table 6.3 shows that the majority of the correlations concerning 
measures of both learning environment were low. 
 
Learning outcomes 
Reliability of tests. Cronbach’s alphas for the qualitative pre-test and post-
test and for the quantitative post-test concerning the relative easy phase of the 
Optics Lab were respectively .62 (14 items), .68 (14 items), and .80 (3 items). 
Reliability coefficients for the pre-tests and post-test of the intermediate and 
complex phase of the Optics Lab were below .18. For the total qualitative and 
quantitative Optics Lab pre-test, that is, the summed tests of the three phases, 
Table 6.3 
Correlations between measures of actions in the Optics Lab and the Heat Lab 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Optics Lab qual. moves — –.29 –.16 –.08 .21 .08 .12 –.10 
2. Optics Lab quant. moves  — .68** .68** .10 .14 .05 .29 
3. Optics Lab measurement   — .73** .12 .39 –.16 .55* 
4. Optics Lab time on task    — .02 .11 –.06 .34 
5. Heat Lab total experiments     — .41 .73** .74** 
6. Heat Lab complete exp.      — –.31 .50* 
7. Heat Lab incomplete exp.       — .41 
8. Heat Lab time on task        — 
* p < .05, one tailed. ** p < .01, one tailed. 
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Cronbach’s alphas were respectively .45 (50 items) and –.25 (7 items). 
Reliability coefficients for the total qualitative and quantitative post-test were 
respectively .57 (50 items) and .61 (10 items). Further analyses regarding post-
test scores will predominantly be reported for the easy phase of the Optics 
Lab because of the low reliability coefficients of the other phases and the 
moderate reliability coefficients of the total tests. Only when results regarding 
test scores of the easy phase deviate substantially from the results regarding 
total test scores, the latter will be reported as well. Cronbach’s alphas of the 
Heat Lab multiple-choice knowledge pre-test and post-test, and of the Heat 
Lab problems test were .51 (38 items), .66 (38 items), and .73 (3 problems), 
respectively. 
Knowledge acquisition. For the easy phase of the Optics Lab the difference 
between scores on the qualitative pre-test and post-test were marginally 
significant (Mpre = 6.80, SDpre = 2.60; Mpost = 8.20, SDpost = 2.83), t(14) = 1.70, p = 
.05, indicating a modest knowledge acquisition in the relative easy phase. 
Learners scored significantly better on the total qualitative post-test than on 
the pre-test (Mpre = 19.93, SDpre = 4.35; Mpost = 25.07, SDpost = 5.02), t(14) = 3.33, p 
< .01. No significant improvement was shown on the quantitative test (Mpre = 
2.20, SDpre = 1.08; Mpost = 2.80, SDpost = 1.32), t(14) = 1.46, p = .17. Also in Heat 
Lab learners scored significantly better on the post-test than on the pre-test 
(Mpre = 17.47, SDpre = 3.56; Mpost = 23.33, SDpost = 4.20), t(14) = 6.05, p < .01. The 
mean score on the Heat Lab problems test was 4.07 (SD = 3.47). 
Principal components analysis on measures of learning outcomes. In Table 6.4 
correlations between measures of learning outcomes in the easy phase of the 
Optics Lab and measures of learning outcomes of the Heat Lab are depicted. 
A principle components analysis was performed on these measures of 
learning outcomes. One component with an eigenvalue greater than 1.0 was 
extracted. This component had an eigenvalue of 2.73, with 68.1% of the 
variance accounted for, and may be regarded as representing the domain-
independent part of learning outcomes. The eigenvalue of the second 
component was 0.71, representing 17.8% of the variance. This latter 
component may contrast the learning outcomes of the Optics Lab with the 
Heat Lab. In Table 6.5 the unrotated component matrix is depicted. The 
correlation matrix and the results of the principal components analysis for test 
scores concerning the total tests of the Optics Lab were very similar to the 
aforementioned results. 
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Pattern of correlations 
The Optics Lab. In Table 6.6 the pattern of correlations between intellectual 
ability, metacognitive skillfulness in the easy phase of the Optics Lab, actions, 
and learning outcomes in the easy phase are depicted. The pattern shows no 
positive correlation between metacognitive skillfulness and qualitative 
manipulations for the easy phase. This was also the case for the intermediate 
phase (r = .06, p = .83) and the complex phase (r = –.06, p = .14). In contrast, for 
the easy phase substantial relations were found between intellectual ability, 
metacognitive skillfulness on the one hand, and quantitative moves and 
measurement actions on the other (see Table 6.6). For the two other phases 
these correlations ranged from .32 to .70. 
The pattern of correlations in Table 6.6 corroborates the mixed model as 
described by Veenman (1993). Regression analysis was used to determine 
which part of the variance in the post-test scores of the easy phase of the 
Optics Lab was accounted for uniquely by intellectual ability, which part of 
the variance was accounted for uniquely by metacognitive skillfulness, and 
which part of the variance was shared by intellectual ability and 
Table 6.4 
Correlations between measures of learning outcomes of the easy phase of the Optics Lab and 
learning outcomes of the Heat Lab 
 1 2 3 4 
1. Optics Lab qualitative post-test — .67** .47* .38 
2. Optics Lab quantitative post-test  — .76** .47* 
3. Heat Lab multiple choice post-test   — .68** 
4. Heat Lab problems post-test    — 
* p < .05, one tailed. ** p < .01, one tailed. 
 
 
Table 6.5 
Unrotated component matrix for measures of learning outcomes in the Optics Lab (OL) and 
the Heat Lab (HL) 
 Component 1 Component 2 
Optics Lab qualitative post-test .75 .55 
Optics Lab quantitative post-test .89 .23 
Heat Lab multiple choice post-test .89 –.24 
Heat Lab problems post-test .76 –.54 
 
 
93
metacognitive skillfulness (Veenman, 1993; Veenman & Verheij, 2001). For 
instance, for the qualitative post-test, intellectual ability and metacognitive 
skillfulness accounted for 42.8% of the variance. The semipartial correlation 
between intellectual ability and the post-test score with metacognitive 
skillfulness partialed from intellectual ability was .22, indicating that 4.6% of 
the variance in qualitative post-test scores was accounted for uniquely by 
intellectual ability. The semipartial correlation between metacognitive 
skillfulness and the post-test score with intellectual ability partialed from 
metacognitive skillfulness was .44, indicating that 19.3% was accounted for 
uniquely by metacognitive skillfulness. Consequently, the two predictors 
shared 18.9 % of the variance. For the quantitative post-test, intellectual ability 
and metacognitive skillfulness accounted for 48.4% of the variance. The 
results concerning the distribution of the variance in the qualitative and 
quantitative post-test score of the easy phase of the Optics Lab are depicted in 
Table 6.8. No separate correlational analyses and regression analyses for the 
intermediate and complex phase were executed because of the low reliability 
coefficient of the tests for these phases. 
When the pattern of correlations was considered for measures regarding 
the total scores for metacognitive skills and total post-test scores, a somewhat 
different pattern of correlations was found relating to the impact of 
metacognitive skillfulness and intellectual ability on learning outcomes. The 
correlation between intellectual ability and metacognitive skillfulness was .34 
(p = .11, , one-tailed). Metacognitive skillfulness correlated .29 (p = .15, one-
Table 6.6 
Correlations between intellectual ability, metacognitive skillfulness, actions, and the two 
post-tests of the Optics Lab 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Intellectual ability — .48* –.14 .41 .45* .28 .48* .56* 
2. Metacognitive skills  — –.08 .69** .31 .48* .62** .63** 
3. Qualitative moves   — –.18 –.35 –.04 .15 –.47* 
4. Quantitative moves    — .48* .58* .48* .55* 
5. Measurement actions     — .69** .10 .31 
6. Time on task      — .23 .25 
7. Qualitative post-test       — .67** 
8. Quantitative post-test        — 
* p < .05, one tailed. ** p < .01, one tailed. 
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tailed) with the total qualitative post-test and .33 (p = .11, one-tailed) with the 
total quantitative post-test. The correlations between intellectual ability and 
these two post-tests were .61 (p < .05, one-tailed) and .79 (p < .01, one-tailed), 
respectively. Not surprisingly, the correlation between intellectual ability and 
the post-test score of the complex phase was also high (r = .79, p < .01, one-
tailed), because of the substantial overlap (70%) between the total quantitative 
post-test and the quantitative post-test of the complex phase. 
The Heat Lab. Table 6.7 shows correlations between intellectual ability, 
metacognitive skillfulness in the Heat Lab, actions and the two post-test of the 
Heat Lab. Metacognition as well as intellectual ability were significantly 
related to the number of complete experiments conducted in the Heat Lab. 
Furthermore, metacognitive skillfulness and intellectual ability appeared to 
have only a very modest impact on learning outcomes. For the multiple-
choice post-test, intellectual ability and metacognitive skillfulness accounted 
for 22.2% of the variance, whereas for the Heat Lab problems the variance 
accounted for was 10.9%. The results concerning the distribution of the 
variance in the multiple-choice post-test and the Heat Lab problems are 
depicted in Table 6.8. 
 
Discussion 
The main purpose of this study was to examine whether the quality of 
metacognitive skillfulness of novice learners is domain-independent rather 
than domain-specific. We hypothesized that for novice learners metacognitive 
Table 6.7 
Correlations between intellectual ability, metacognitive skillfulness, actions, and the two 
post-tests of the Heat Lab 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Intellectual ability — .51* –.06 .50* –.42 .08 .40 .24 
2. Metacognitive skills  — .15 .55* –.20 .37 .42 .32 
3. Total experiments   — .41 .73** .74** –.30 –.06 
4. Complete exp.    — –.31 .50* .12 .23 
5. Incomplete exp.     — .41 –.38 –.25 
6. Time on task      — –.16 –.07 
7. Multiple choice post-test       — .68** 
8. Problems post-test        — 
* p < .05, one tailed. ** p < .01, one tailed. 
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skillfulness in a learning environment with the options of both qualitative and 
quantitative manipulation would be strongly related with metacognitive skills 
in an environment that is more restricted to quantitative manipulation of 
variables. That is to say, our theory was that in both environments novice 
learners had to draw heavily on weak problem-solving methods (Klahr & 
Simon, 1999) or general task schemas (Veenman, 1993). Correlations amongst 
measures of metacognitive skillfulness for the Optics Lab and the Heat Lab 
appeared to be high. A principal components analysis on these measures 
yielded one strong component, which may be regarded as representing the 
general, domain-independent part of metacognitive skillfulness. Thus, novice 
learners show consistency in metacognitive skills across inductive-learning 
environments, regardless of various manipulation options. The results of the 
present study are in line with ideas of Schraw, Dunkle, Bendixen, and 
DeBacker Roedel (1995), who concluded that metacognitive skills such as 
monitoring are domain-independent. They are also in line with the results of 
the Veenman studies (Veenman et al., 1997; Veenman & Verheij, 2001). In both 
of these studies a similar main domain-independent component was found. 
Moreover, the findings permit the assessment of the metacognitive 
skillfulness of novice learners in another inductive-learning environment than 
the Optics Lab, which will be done in the next study, and described in 
Chapter 7. The domain independency is as yet restricted to novice learners 
and is unlikely to be generalized to advanced learners or experts in the 
domain of physics. Experts may have domain-specific regulatory procedures 
at their disposal for problem solving in the domain of their expertise. Findings 
produced by Veenman, Elshout, and Hoeks (1993) indicted that the domain-
independent part of metacognitive skillfulness is smaller for advanced 
learners than for novices. 
 
Table 6.8 
Proportion of the variance accounted for in the post-test scores of the easy phase of the Optics 
Lab and post-test scores of the Heat Lab 
 IA unique MS unique IA and MS  Total 
1. Optics Lab qualitative post-test .05 .19 .19 .43 
2. Optics Lab quantitative post-test .09 .17 .23 .48 
3. Heat Lab multiple choice post-test .05 .06 .06 .22 
4. Heat Lab problems post-test .01 .05 .05 .11 
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The domain independency of metacognitive skillfulness did not lead to a 
strong domain-independent component for actions in the two learning 
environments. Moderate and low correlations were obtained amongst 
measures of actions in the Optics Lab and the Heat Lab. Glaser et al. (1992) 
also found that measures of learners’ behavior in three different inductive-
learning environments were hardly related. There is, however, one comment 
to be made. The measures of actions in both learning environments, adapted 
from earlier research with the Optics Lab (see the previous chapters) and the 
Heat Lab (Veenman, Elshout & Groen, 1993), were of a somewhat different 
nature. Although all measures of actions basically concerned the number of 
conducted experiments during learning, incomplete experiments in the Heat 
Lab, that is, experiments in which no initial or final temperature was 
measured, may be regarded as an indication of poor systematical orderliness 
(Veenman, Elshout & Groen, 1993). Incomplete experiments do not provide 
learners with useful information and are, thus, bad experiments. For the 
Optics Lab measures no distinction in actions could be made between bad and 
good experiments.  
In spite of the complexity of the Optics Lab and the Heat Lab, novice 
learners acquired knowledge in the inductive-learning environments, that is, 
their post-tests scores were higher than their pre-tests scores. Intercorrelations 
amongst post-test scores concerning the two learning environments were 
substantial. Consequently, a principal components analysis on the post-tests 
scores showed a strong domain-independent component and a moderate 
domain-specific component. Although a distinction was made between 
qualitative and quantitative items in the Optics Lab as well as in the Heat Lab, 
the principle components analysis did not extract two components 
accordingly. 
As was expected, the pattern of correlations between metacognitive 
skillfulness, intellectual ability and learning outcomes were similar for the 
easy phase of the Optics lab and for the Heat Lab. The two patterns 
corroborated the mixed model (Veenman, 1993): metacognitive skillfulness 
and intellectual ability were related and accounted uniquely for a part of the 
variance in learning outcomes. Moreover, metacognitive skillfulness was the 
main determinant of learning. For the Heat Lab the impact of metacognitive 
skillfulness and intellectual ability appeared to be substantially smaller than 
for the easy phase of the Optics Lab, although correlational differences were 
not significant (Fisher-z ratios ≤ 1.00; Guilford, 1965). Unexpectedly and 
inexplicable, when the total qualitative and quantitative post-test scores of the 
97
Optics Lab were considered, intellectual ability was the main determinant for 
learning outcomes, whereas metacognitive skillfulness was of minor 
importance. In other words, adding the scores of the post-test from the 
intermediate and complex phases to the scores of the post-test of the easy 
phase reversed the effects found for the easy phase. This reversion, however, 
should be considered with caution because of insufficient reliability 
coefficients of the tests of the intermediate and complex phase.  
The mediating role of actions in the learning environments was somewhat 
different in the Optics Lab and the Heat Lab. In the easy phase of the Optics 
Lab there were strong relations between intellectual ability, metacognitive 
skillfulness, quantitative moves, measurement actions, and quantitative test 
scores. This indicates that there is a quantitative component in the inductive-
learning process in the Optics Lab. However, the number of qualitative moves 
in the Optics Lab was not related to metacognitive skillfulness and did not 
predict qualitative learning outcomes, which is contrary to what was found in 
the study described in Chapter 4. This suggests that mainly during the initial 
stage of inductive learning in a very complex environment it is wise to create 
many examples. For the Heat Lab, the correlations between the actions and 
the learning outcomes were not significant. This corroborates the results of the 
study of Veenman, Elshout, and Groen (1993). They found that actions in the 
Heat Lab had hardly any impact on post-test scores, except for a composite 
score of actions that accounted for nine percent of the variance in learning 
outcomes. This components score was strongly related to quality of 
metacognitive skills. In the present study, the number of complete 
experiments in the Heat Lab was a good indication for the quality of 
metacognitive skills. Thus, measures of actions in the learning environment, 
obtained from log files may be valuable for the operationalization of 
metacognitive skillfulness as long as the measures represent a judgment of 
quality. This may either be a distinction between good and bad experiments, 
between informative and uninformative experiments, or between working 
systematically and unsystematically (see Chapter 7). 
 
Conclusion 
The results of the present study indicate that for novice learners the quality of 
metacognitive skills is domain-independent rather than domain-specific. This 
allows the assessment of novices’ metacognitive skillfulness in anr inductive-
learning environment other than the criterion environment in which, for 
instance, instructional support is embedded.  
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Domain-independent predictors such as metacognitive skillfulness and 
intellectual ability may lead to domain-specific actions in the learning 
environment. The actions executed in the learning environments are modest 
predictors for learning outcomes. In spite of different options for 
manipulating variables in the Optics Lab and the Heat Lab, the pattern of 
correlations found in both inductive-learning environments corroborated the 
mixed model (Veenman, 1993). Thus, for novice learners it is the complexity 
of the learning environments that affects the pattern of correlations between 
metacognitive skillfulness, intellectual ability, and learning outcomes, rather 
than how variables are manipulated in the learning environments. 
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7 
INSTRUCTIONAL SUPPORT 
 
 
In Chapter 4 it was established that during initial inductive learning in a very 
complex environment the impact of intellectual ability on learning outcomes 
was moderate whereas the impact of metacognitive skillfulness was much 
more important. When the inductive-learning environment was less complex, 
such as in the easy phase of the Optics Lab in Chapters 5 and 6, the mixed 
model (Veenman, 1993) emerged from the data. These results corroborated 
Elshout’s (1987) theory of the threshold of problematicity, which postulates 
that the experienced task complexity will affect the impact of intellectual 
ability on learning outcomes (see also Raaheim, 1988, 1991). Moreover, the 
results were in line with the assumption that for novice learners an inductive-
learning task in a complex environment is positioned above their threshold of 
problematicity and, thus, that the initial inductive-learning process of novice 
learners is likely to be a heuristic, improvisational assembly process (Elshout, 
1987). Metacognitive skillfulness is associated with this assembly process 
(Veenman, 1993) and may be considered as a booster to novices’ initial search 
process and the generation of data. Results of the study described in Chapter 5 
indicate that interpretation of data is mainly associated with a high level of 
intellectual ability.  
The studies described in the previous chapters were quasi-experimental 
studies and mainly correlational. It is more convincing when, in addition to 
those studies, results of an experimental study corroborate Elshout’s theory of 
the threshold of problematicity as well as the assumption that metacognitive 
skillfulness is a booster for data generation. For instance, providing novice 
learners with instructional support aimed at data generation may affect the 
task complexity and, therefore, it may change the pattern of correlations 
between metacognitive skillfulness, intellectual ability, and learning 
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outcomes. To be more specific, if instructional support takes care of data 
generation, novice learners may more rapidly turn to data interpretation. The 
impact of intellectual ability on learning outcomes will probably increase 
accordingly. In the present study, novice learners will be provided with 
instructional support that is aimed at structuring the process of data 
generation. It is investigated whether this support is beneficial for inductive 
learning and whether this support will affect the impact of metacognitive 
skillfulness and intellectual ability on learning outcomes. The latter is a 
complex aptitude-treatment interaction (Snow, 1989), with instructional 
support as treatment, and metacognitive skillfulness and intellectual ability as 
aptitudes. 
There are many options for providing instructional support during an 
inductive-learning task. Support can be offered for hypothesis generation, for 
the design of experiments, for making predictions, and for regulative learning 
processes (De Jong & Van Joolingen, 1998). Especially the latter seems of 
interest here. Support aimed at regulation, in turn, can be provided by model 
progression (White & Frederiksen, 1990), planning support, monitoring 
support, and by structuring the discovery process. These methods were 
described in more detail in Chapter 3. For the present study planning support is 
used as the method of instructional support. Planning support is aimed at 
removing some decisions from learners such as the choice of the next action or 
next experiment. This can be done, for instance, by providing a normative 
step-by-step action program such as the Systematic Approach to Problem 
solving (Mettes, Pilot, & Roossink, 1981) or by providing a structured set of 
so-called telling experiments (Veenman & Elshout, 1991, 1995), in which 
learners are told explicitly which experiments they have to conduct. Hence, 
planning support may prevent novice learners from working 
unsystematically, which is what learners tend to do when they start out far 
above their threshold of problematicity (Elshout, 1987). Planning support 
may, therefore, be particularly helpful to novice learners (Charney, Reder, & 
Kusbit, 1990). The planning support in this study will be embedded in the 
assignments, that is, in the assignments learners will be asked to 
systematically alter independent variables in the learning environment. This 
way learners will likely cover the main part of the experiment space and 
obtain a rich systematic data set. 
Recently, Veenman and Elshout (1995) investigated a similar aptitude-
treatment interaction. In their study, instructional support consisted of 
planning support, model progression, and monitoring support. Veenman and 
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Elshout found main effects of metacognitive skillfulness and intellectual 
ability on learning but no main effect of instructional support. The results 
revealed that for learners with a low intellectual ability and a low 
metacognitive skillfulness instructional support was beneficial, whereas for 
learners with a low intellectual ability and a high metacognitive skillfulness 
the instructional support interfered with learning. Instructional support did 
not affect learning in learners with a high intellectual ability, irrespective of 
their level of metacognitive skillfulness. Veenman and Elshout (1995) argued 
that learners with a high intellectual ability may more easily adapt their 
strategies to a situation that is forced upon them by instruction or they may 
simply stick to their own method. In their study metacognitive skillfulness 
and intellectual ability were substantially related. Moreover, the learning 
environments used by Veenman and Elshout (1995) were less complex than, 
for instance, the Optics Lab. It may well be that when learners have to pass 
through a very complex learning environment, planning support will have a 
positive effect on learning outcomes. 
Furthermore, in the study of Veenman and Elshout (1995) the quality of 
metacognitive skillfulness was assessed by analyzing thinking-aloud 
protocols obtained concurrently during the inductive-learning tasks. 
However, the planning support might have affected the assessment of 
metacognitive skillfulness. Veenman, Elshout, and Busato (1994), for instance, 
found that the metacognitive skills of supported learners were of better 
quality than the metacognitive skills of unsupported learners. Therefore, in 
this study metacognitive skillfulness will be assessed using an inductive-
learning environment that differs from the Optics Lab, as metacognitive 
skillfulness can be conceived as a domain-independent skill (see Chapter 6 
and Veenman et al, 1997). Finally, due to selection of extreme intelligence 
groups, in the Veenman and Elshout study ANOVAs were executed to 
analyze the interaction effects, although metacognitive skillfulness was 
available as a continuous variable. For the execution of ANOVAs this variable 
had to be dichotomized, thereby causing loss of information. Snow (1989) has 
suggested regression analysis for the examination of aptitude-treatment 
interactions. This study follows this suggestion and will execute regression 
analysis in addition to ANOVAs. 
To study the aptitude-treatment interaction, with instructional support as 
treatment, and metacognitive skillfulness and intellectual ability as aptitudes, 
half of the sample will pass through the Optics Lab without instructional 
support and the other half through the Optics lab with planning support 
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embedded in the assignments. For each group separate regression analyses 
will be executed and different interaction effects are expected. In the Optics 
Lab without the support heuristic problem-solving behavior may be observed 
and learners may focus on data generation. Consequently, metacognitive 
skillfulness rather than intellectual ability is expected to be the main 
determinant for learning outcomes. Moreover, learners with low 
metacognitive skillfulness and high intellectual ability may tend to focus on 
data interpretation, which seems less appropriate and may even be 
detrimental. Figure 7.1 depicts the hypothesized main effect of metacognitive 
skillfulness on learning outcomes and the additional interaction with 
intellectual ability for novice learners who received no instructional support. 
In the Optics Lab with the instructional support the telling experiments, 
embedded in the assignments, regulate a major part of data generation. It is 
hypothesized that in this Optics Lab version novice learners do not so much 
need metacognitive skillfulness for data generation but cognitive skills to infer 
patterns and rules. Therefore, a positive main effect of intellectual ability on 
learning outcomes is expected. Moreover, learners with high metacognitive 
skillfulness and low intellectual ability may tend to focus on data generation. 
Their otherwise successful but inflexible habits may interfere with the 
instructional support (Veenman & Elshout, 1995). Figure 7.2 depicts the 
hypothesized main effect of intellectual ability on learning outcomes and the 
additional interaction for novice learners who receive instructional support. 
 
Method 
Participants 
The participants in this study were 80 social science students, 69 women 
and 11 men. All students were novices in the domain of physics, that is, they 
did not receive any physics education for at least the past three years. Also, 
their total physics education encompassed three years or less. 
 
Learning environments 
The Deton Lab. In the knowledge-lean fictitious computer simulated Deton 
Lab (Veenman, 1993; Veenman, Elshout, & Meijer, 1997) the explosive power 
of four unknown materials from an alien planet could be examined. Learners 
could pour the materials into a container and allow it to explode in an isolated 
compartment of the lab. The explosive power could be read from a meter. 
After the explosion, the container had to be emptied. The Deton Lab consisted 
of four phases. In the first phase the explosive power of each material had to 
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Figure 7.1. Hypothesized main effect and interaction between metacognitive skillfulness (MS) and 
intellectual ability (IA) for the group without instructional support. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.2. Hypothesized main effect and interaction between metacognitive skillfulness (MS) and 
intellectual ability (IA) for the group with instructional support. 
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be examined separately. In the second and third phase, combinations of two, 
respectively, three materials had to be examined. In the fourth and last phase, 
learners were asked to induce a formula for the explosive power of any 
combination of the four materials. 
The Optics Lab. The Optics Lab, a learning environment about geometrical 
optics, consisted of four phases. Two phases had the option of manipulating 
variables qualitatively and two phases had the options of manipulating 
variables qualitatively as well as quantitatively. The first phase was a 
qualitative phase wherein learners could conduct experiments with a lamp 
with parallel light rays. No tools for quantitative manipulation and measuring 
were available. In the second phase these tools were added. In the third 
phases learners could conduct experiments with a lamp producing diverging 
light rays. Again, no tools for quantitative manipulation and measuring were 
available. In the last phase these tools were added. Consequently, different 
levels of complexity were distinguished: a relative easy qualitative, a relative 
easy quantitative, a complex qualitative, and a complex quantitative phase. 
There were two versions of the Optics Lab. The versions differed only with 
respect to the instructional support provided. Learners who passed through 
the first version of the Optics Lab only received general assignments. For 
instance, the assignment of phase 1 was: Try to find out, by conducting 
experiments, what determines the position of the focal point. The second version of 
the Optics Lab contained instructional support embedded in the assignments. 
These assignments consisted of a series of sub-assignments or so-called telling 
experiments (Veenman & Elshout, 1991, 1995). For instance, in phase 1 
participants were asked to vary the height of the light source, to vary the 
distance between light and lens, and to rotate the light rays. These three 
actions could be applied to three lenses available in phase 1. Consequently, 
participants received nine sub-assignments in phase 1 of the Optics Lab 
version with instructional support. An example of such a sub-assignment was: 
Try to find out, by conducting experiments, to what extent the distance between the 
light source and the lens determines the position of the focal point of lens A. Place the 
light source at three different distances from the lens. In the same way the 
instructional support was embedded in the assignments in phase 2 – 4 of the 
Optics Lab.  
 
Procedure 
In the first session, the intellectual ability of all eighty participants was 
assessed by a series of six paper and pencil ability tests. In the second session 
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participants passed through the knowledge-lean Deton Lab learning 
environment (cf. Veenman et al., 1997) individually. In the third session, 
approximately two weeks after the second, they passed through the Optics 
Lab learning environment individually. Before entering one of the 
environments, the participants received a twenty minutes standardized 
instruction on how to operate in the environment. Subsequently, a pre-test 
measuring domain knowledge was administered. Participants could spend an 
hour in the Deton Lab, instruction included, and another hour in the Optics 
Lab, instruction excluded. Whilst working in the two learning environments 
participants were asked to think aloud. Think-aloud protocols were tape- 
recorded, but in this study the protocols were not transcribed and analyzed. 
Post-tests were administered to measure the acquired domain knowledge. 
 
Measures 
Intellectual ability. The intellectual ability of the eighty participants was 
assessed in a series of tests including five primary intelligence factors: 
inductive reasoning, quantitative reasoning, verbal ability, closure flexibility, 
and sequential reasoning (Carroll, 1993). The test battery included tests for 
vocabulary, verbal analogies, linear syllogisms, number series, number speed, 
and embedded figures. The unweighted mean of the scores on these six tests 
may be regarded as a measure of intellectual ability or an IQ equivalent 
(Veenman & Elshout, 1999). 
Metacognitive skillfulness. Metacognitive skillfulness was assessed by means 
of the Deton Lab logfiles. In the Deton Lab there is a limited number of 
possible combinations of the four materials, apart from the quantity of the 
material. For every tested combination learners received a bonus point. If 
learners conducted the experiments in a systematic order in phase two or 
three, the bonus points of the concerning phase were doubled. For every new 
experiment in phase four an extra bonus point was added, with a maximum 
of seven. Consequently, the maximum of bonus points was 33. Learners could 
also receive penalty points by forgetting to actually pour material into the 
container, by pouring twice, by forgetting to empty the container after the 
explosion, and by repeating an experiment they had already conducted. The 
bonus points minus the penalty points were taken as an assessment of the 
quality of metacognitive skillfulness. Re-analysis of the data set of Veenman 
and Verheij (2001) resulted in a correlation of .93 (p < .01, N = 16) between 
assessment of metacognitive skillfulness through Deton Lab logfile scores and 
assessment by analyzing Deton Lab think-aloud protocols. For this study the 
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think-aloud protocols obtained in the Heat Lab and the Optics Lab were not 
transcribed and analyzed. 
Actions in the Optics Lab. For each phase of the Optics Lab, three categories 
concerning the actions executed by the learners were distinguished: (1) 
orientation time, which is the total time that a learner used for consulting the 
theory and the assignment, (2) manipulation actions, which consist of the 
number of movements of the lens, the number of movements of the light 
source, and the number of rotations of the light beam, and (3) time on task, 
which is the total time a learner spent on executing the aforementioned 
orientation actions and manipulation actions. 
Learning outcomes. The Optics Lab pre-tests and post-tests consisted of 
WHAT-IF questions, described in the Chapter 2. The pre-tests and post-tests 
of phase 1 and phase 3 respectively consisted of 12 and 14 qualitative oriented 
WHAT-IF questions. The pre-test and post-test of phase 4 consisted of 14 
quantitative oriented WHAT-IF questions. There was no pre-test for phase 2. 
The post-test of phase 2 consisted of 6 WHAT-IF questions concerning the 
focus of the available lenses in that phase. The total score for each test was the 
number of correct answers. 
 
Statistical procedures 
The aptitude-treatment interaction was analyzed in two ways. First, a 
MANOVA with a 2 by 2 by 2 factorial design was executed, in order to 
replicate the study of Veenman & Elshout (1995). Independent variables were 
version of the Optics Lab, metacognitive skillfulness, and intellectual ability. 
The latter two continuous variables were transformed into dichotomous 
variables by a median split. Dependent variables were the post-test scores of 
the four phases of the Optics Lab. 
Second, the aptitude-treatment interaction was analyzed by a multiple 
regression analysis. In order to determine the interaction effect between 
metacognitive skillfulness and intellectual ability with respect to learning 
outcomes, an interaction variable had to be created. An interaction variable is 
any variable that is the product of two or more other variables (Allan, 1997). 
The way an interaction variable is created determines the characteristics of the 
interaction that will be examined. Since there were different hypotheses for 
the two groups, different interaction variables had to be created. For the 
learners who did not receive support it was expected that a high quality of 
metacognitive skillfulness and high intellectual ability would lead to good 
learning outcomes, and that a low quality of metacognitive skillfulness and 
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high intellectual ability would be detrimental. No main effect, or at most a 
moderate effect of intellectual ability was expected (see Figure 7.1). 
Consequently, the first interaction variable had to have a large value if both 
independent variables have large values and it had to have a relative small 
value if metacognitive skillfulness was low and intellectual ability was high. 
To create an interaction variable with these characteristics, first an equal value 
of 5 points was added to the z-scores of intellectual ability in order to make 
these values positive. Next, scores on this transformed variable and the z-
scores of metacognitive skillfulness were multiplied. Finally, this interaction 
variable was included in the multiple regression equation for learners who 
did not receive support. 
For the learners who received the instructional support it was expected that 
a high quality of metacognitive skills and a high level of intellectual ability 
would result in good learning outcomes. On the other hand, the support 
would interfere with learning for participants with a high quality of 
metacognitive skills and a relatively low level of intellectual ability (see Figure 
7.2). Consequently, the second interaction variable had to have a large value if 
both independent variables had high values and it had to have a small value if 
metacognitive skillfulness was high and intellectual ability was low. To create 
an interaction variable with these characteristics, first a value of 5 points was 
added to the z-scores of metacognitive skillfulness. Next, scores on this 
transformed independent variable and the z-scores of intellectual ability were 
multiplied. Finally, this interaction variable was included in the multiple 
regression equation for the participants who received the support embedded 
in assignments of the Optics Lab. 
 
Results 
Initial differences 
T-tests were performed to investigate whether there were any initial 
differences between the group that received no instructional support and the 
supported group. The two groups did not differ significantly with respect to 
metacognitive skillfulness (Mnosup = 7.88, SDnosup = 9.49; Msup = 7.83, SDsup = 
12.03), t(78) = 0.02, p = .98, and intellectual ability (Mnosup = – 0.01, SDnosup = 0.60; 
Msup = 0.01, SDsup = 0.65), t(78) = 0.19, p = .85. For both groups no significant 
correlation was obtained between metacognitive skillfulness and intellectual 
ability (rnosup = .15, p = .35; rsup = .23, p = .15). 
All participants passed through the first three phases of the Optics Lab. 
Only a few participants passed through the fourth phase. Therefore, the pre-
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test and post-test scores of phase 4 were excluded from the analyses. 
Cronbach's alphas of the pre-tests of phase 1 (12 items), phase 3 (14 items), 
and of the total pre-test (26 items) were .07, .06 and .20, respectively. In Table 
7.1 the means and standard deviations of the pre-test scores are depicted for 
the group that received no support as well as for the supported group. The 
two groups did not differ significantly with respect to the pre-test of phase 1, 
t(78) = 1.60, p = .12, the pre-test of phase 3, t(78) = 0.32, p = .75, and the total 
pre-test, t(78) = 1.20, p = .23. 
 
Actions in the Optics Lab 
Measures of actions in the Optics Lab were mutually correlated. For the 
group that received no instructional support significant positive correlations 
were obtained between orientation time and time on task in phase 1 (r = .54, p 
< .01) and phase 2 (r = .52, p < .01), and for the supported group in phase 1 (r = 
.48, p < .01), phase 2 (r = .56, p < .01) and phase 3 (r = .39, p < .05). For the group 
that received no instructional support the number of actions correlated 
significantly with time on task in phase 1 (r = .70, p < .01), phase 2 (r = .38, p < 
.05) and phase 3 (r = .37, p < .05), and for the supported group in phase 1 (r = 
.50, p < .01) and phase 2 (r = .37, p < .05). 
Significant differences between the two groups were found with respect to 
measures of orientation time. The group that received no support spent 
significantly less time on orientation activities than the supported group in 
phase 1 (Mnosup = 228 s, SDnosup = 99 s; Msup = 382 s, SDsup = 116 s), t(78) = 6.41, p < 
Table 7.1 
Means and standard deviations (in parentheses) of the pre-test and post-test scores of the 
Optics Lab 
 No support (n = 40) Support (n = 40) 
Pre-test 
Phase 1 4.80 (1.62) 5.35 (1.48) 
Phase 3 6.28 (1.72) 6.40 (1.78) 
Total 11.08 (2.35) 11.75 (2.69) 
Post-test 
Phase 1 7.43 (2.12) 7.65 (2.06) 
Phase 2 5.03 (1.14) 4.80 (1.32) 
Phase 3 7.30 (2.33) 6.93 (2.52) 
Total 19.75 (3.75) 19.38 (4.41) 
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.01, in phase 3 (Mnosup = 156 s, SDnosup = 56 s; Msup = 233 s, SDsup = 106 s), t(78) = 
4.04, p =.01, but not in phase 2 (Mnosup = 189 s, SDnosup = 69 s; Msup = 175 s, SDsup 
= 52 s), t(78) = 0.97, p = .34. Also for time on task significant differences were 
obtained. The group that received no support spent less time in phase 1 than 
the supported group (Mnosup = 736 s, SDnosup = 304 s; Msup = 1100 s, SDsup = 353 
s), t(78) = 4.94, p < .01) and less time in phase 3 as well (Mnosup = 745 s, SDnosup = 
172 s; Msup = 895 s, SDsup = 309 s), t(78) = 2.69, p < .01. For phase 2, it was the 
other way around (Mnosup = 688 s, SDnosup = 247 s; Msup = 460 s, SDsup = 136 s), 
t(78) = 5.10, p < .01. Furthermore, the group that received no support executed 
significantly more actions in phase 2 of the Optics Lab than the supported 
group (Mnosup = 37.70, SDnosup = 21.32; Msup = 16.03, SDsup = 13.96), t(78) = 5.38, p 
< .01. There were, however, no significant differences between groups for the 
number of actions in phase 1 (Mnosup = 67.65, SDnosup = 51.51; Msup = 88.53, SDsup 
= 59.82), t(78) = 1.67, p = .10, and phase 3 (Mnosup = 113.50, SDnosup = 71.57; Msup = 
94.80, SDsup = 30.89), t(78) = 1.52, p = .13.  
Metacognitive skillfulness and intellectual ability correlated significantly 
with some measures concerning the actions in the Optics Lab. For the group 
that received no support, positive significant correlations were found between 
metacognitive skillfulness and time on task in phase 3 (r = .32, p < .05) and 
between intellectual ability and number of actions in phase 3 (r = .32, p < .05). 
For the group with the instructional support, intellectual ability correlated 
negatively with orientation time in phase 2 (r = –.42, p < .01) and phase 3 (r = –
.36, p < .05), and negatively with time on task in phase 2 (r = –.32, p < .05). 
 
Learning outcomes 
Cronbach's alphas of the post-tests of phase 1 (12 items), phase 2 (6 items), 
phase 3 (14 items), and the total post-test (32 items) were .55, .52, .50, and .64, 
respectively. In Table 7.1 the means and standard deviations of the Optics Lab 
post-test scores are depicted for the group that received no instructional 
support and for the supported group. In general, participants acquired 
knowledge after conducting experiments in the Optics Lab. Differences 
between pre-test and post-test scores were significant in phase 1 for the total 
sample, t(79) = 9.94, p < .01, for the group that received no support, t(39) = 
7.31, p < .01, and for the supported group, t(39) = 6.69, p < .01. Also in phase 3, 
significant differences were found between pre-test and post-test scores for 
the total sample, t(79) = 2.45, p = .05, and for the group that received no 
support, t(39) = 2.42, p < .05). For the supported group there was no significant 
difference between pre-test and post-test score in phase 3, t(39) = 1.11, p = .27. 
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Determinants of learning  
First a MANOVA was performed, with version of the Optics Lab, 
dichotomized metacognitive skillfulness, and dichotomized intellectual ability 
as independent variables. Post-test scores of the three phase of the Optics Lab 
were the dependent variables. Subsequently, an ANOVA was performed with 
the same independent variables and the total post-test score as dependent 
variable. 
Contrary to what was expected, the supported group did not outperform 
the group that received no instructional support on post-test scores, F(3, 70) = 
0.55, p = .65. Also the ANOVA concerning the total post-test score revealed no 
main effect of version of the Optics Lab, F(1, 72) = 0.23, p = .63. Furthermore, 
no significant effects of metacognitive skillfulness were found on post-test 
scores of the three phases of the Optics Lab, F(3, 70) = 0.55, p = .65, and on the 
total post-test score (Mlow = 19.05, SDlow = 3.51; Mhigh = 20.02, SDhigh = 4.51), F(1, 
72) = 1.21, p = .27. Significant univariate effects of intellectual ability on post-
test scores were found. The high intellectual ability participants outperformed 
the relatively low intellectual ability participants in phase 3 of the Optics Lab 
(Mlow = 6.55, SDlow = 2.04, Mhigh = 7.68, SDhigh = 2.65), F(1, 72) = 4.08, p < .05, and 
on the total post-test score (Mlow = 18.38, SDlow = 3.69; Mhigh = 20.75, SDhigh = 
4.13), F(1, 72) = 7.09, p < .05. No interactions were found. 
Second, a multiple regression analysis was performed in order to analyze 
the aptitude-treatment interaction. For both groups the specified interaction 
variables were created. The interaction variable that was specific for the group 
that received no support in the Optics Lab correlated .98 (p < .01) with 
metacognitive skillfulness and .17 (p = .30) with intellectual ability. The 
interaction variable that was specific for the supported group correlated .15 (p 
= .36) with metacognitive skillfulness and .98 (p < .01) with intellectual ability. 
Table 7.2 depicts for each group the correlations between post-test scores and 
its possible determinants. The interaction variable in that table is group 
specific and the variables concerning actions in the Optics Lab are phase 
specific. For total post-test score the determinants that concern actions in the 
Optics Lab are summed variables of the three phases of the Optics Lab. For 
each group stepwise regression analyses were executed separately for the 
post-test of the phases of the Optics Lab as well as for the total post-test. 
According to Stevens (1996), for social science research about 15 participants 
per predictor are needed for a reliable equation. Therefore, measures 
concerning actions in the Optics Lab were excluded from the regression 
analyses. As intended, the variables that were included into the regression 
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analysis were metacognitive skillfulness, intellectual ability, and the 
interaction variable. 
For the group that received no support in the Optics Lab no variables 
entered the regression equations predicting post-test scores of phase 1, phase 
2 and predicting the total post-test score. Table 7.3 summarizes the remainder 
of the results of the regression analyses. To determine the incremental validity 
of the first interaction variable in phase 3 for the group that received no 
support in the Optics Lab, a regression analysis was executed where 
metacognitive skillfulness entered the regression equation first and the 
interaction variable entered secondly. Metacognitive skillfulness accounted 
for 12.3% of the variance in the post-test score of phase 3 and the interaction 
variable accounted for an additional 7.0%. 
For the supported group intellectual ability entered the regression equation 
in all phases of the Optics Lab except for phase 3 (see Table 7.3). In phase 3 the 
interaction variable entered the regression equation. To determine the 
incremental validity of this interaction variable, a regression analysis was 
executed whereby intellectual ability entered the regression equation first and 
the interaction variable entered second. Intellectual ability accounted for 
14.9% of the variance of the posttest score of phase 3 and the interaction 
variable accounted for an additional 7.1%. 
Table 7.2 
Correlations between post-test scores and its possible determinants 
Post-test MS IA MS x IA OT ACT TOT 
No support (n=40) 
Phase 1 .02 .09 .06 .11 .37* .35* 
Phase 2 –.11 .12 .02 –.40** –.12 –.35* 
Phase 3 .35* .11 .39* .06 .08 .14 
Total .20 .15 .24 –.24 .29 .06 
Support (n=40) 
Phase 1 .24 .43** .39* –.36* –.05 –.17 
Phase 2 .03 .44** .40** –.25 –.04 .01 
Phase 3 –.02 .38* .43** –.26 .16 .02 
Total .11 .56** .55** –.55** .09 –.21 
Note. MS = metacognitive skillfulness; IA = intellectual ability; MS x IA = interaction variable; 
OT = orientation time; ACT = number of actions; TOT means time on task. 
* p <.05. ** p <.01.       
       
 
 112
Discussion 
The purpose of this study was to investigate whether instructional support 
has beneficial effects on inductive learning in a complex learning environment 
and whether the support will affect the impact of metacognitive skillfulness 
and intellectual ability on learning outcomes. The latter is a complex aptitude-
treatment interaction (Snow, 1989), with instructional support as treatment, 
and metacognitive skillfulness and intellectual ability as aptitudes. The 
assumption was that the inductive-learning task in the Optics Lab without 
support is positioned above novice learners’ threshold of problematicity 
(Elshout, 1987). Thus, their initial inductive-learning process is expected to be 
a heuristic, improvisational assembly process (Elshout, 1987), which is 
associated with metacognitive skillfulness. Metacognitive skillfulness was 
expected to be the main determinant for learning outcomes in the Optics Lab 
without support. In the Optics Lab with planning support, a main part of the 
regulation of data generation is taken care of by telling experiments (Veenman 
& Elshout, 1991, 1995). Supported novice learners may then turn more rapidly 
to data interpretation, which is associated with intellectual ability. Thus, 
intellectual ability was expected to be the main determinant of learning 
outcomes in the supported environment. 
Contrary to what was predicted, no main effect of instructional support on 
learning outcomes was found. Apparently, in a very complex inductive-
learning environment the support could be helpful to some learners and it 
could interfere with the problem-solving style of others, just as the 
Table 7.3 
Summary of stepwise regression analyses for variables predicting post-test scores 
 Variable ß R2 
No support (n = 40) 
Phase 3 MSxIA .39* .16 
Support (n = 40) 
Phase 1 IA .43** .19 
Phase 2 IA .44** .19 
Phase 3 MSxIA .43** .19 
Total IA .55** .31 
Note. IA = intellectual ability; MSxIA = interaction between metacognitive skillfulness and 
intellectual ability. 
* p <. 05. ** p < .01. 
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unsupported Optics Lab could be beneficial to some and harmful to others. 
This seems analogous to the results of the Veenman and Elshout (1995) study. 
Veenman and Elshout found that instructional support was helpful for low 
intelligent learners with a low level of metacognitive skillfulness and 
detrimental for low intelligent learners with a high level of metacognitive 
skillfulness. For high intelligent learners the instructional support did not 
affect their learning processes. However, no such interactions were found in 
the present study.  
In contrast to the findings of the present study, Swaak et al. (1998) found 
positive effects of instructional support during an inductive-learning task. 
This support consisted of investigation assignments that were similar to the 
assignment used in the present study. However, in the Swaak et al. study the 
use of the assignments were optional and, thus, it is unlikely that the support 
interfered with learners’ inflexible habits. And more importantly, Swaak et al. 
combined planning support with model progression and explanations of the 
subject matter, thereby providing a much stronger support than in this study. 
Also in a study of Veenman, Elshout, and Busato (1994) beneficial effects of 
instructional support were obtained, for both low and high intelligent 
learners. These researchers combined planning support with metacognitive 
mediation, which consisted of prompts to paraphrase the assignment, to 
generate a hypothesis, to think out a detailed plan, to elaborate on the subject 
matter, and to make notes. Combinations of support are likely to be more 
effective. In general, instructional support and training aimed at regulation of 
the problem-solving process are found to be helpful when embedded in the 
curriculum and consisting of long term practice (e.g., Elshout-Mohr, 1992; 
Mettes, Pilot, & Roossink, 1981; Palincsar & Brown, 1984; Veenman, 1998; 
Volet & Lund, 1994) The purpose of providing planning support only in the 
present study was to find corroboration for the theory of the threshold of 
problematicity (Elshout, 1987), rather than to give learners the most effective 
instructional support. 
The analyses of variance revealed a significant main effect of intellectual 
ability on learning outcomes, similar to what was found by Veenman and 
Elshout (1995; Veenman, Elshout & Busato, 1994). However, no main effect of 
metacognitive skillfulness was obtained, which is contrary to the findings of 
the Veenman and Elshout studies. A difference between these studies and the 
present study is that in the present study metacognitive skillfulness and 
intellectual ability were not intercorrelated, probably due to the complexity of 
the Optics Lab and the qualitative nature of phase 1 and phase 3 of the Optics 
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Lab. If there is a substantial correlation between metacognitive skillfulness 
and intellectual ability, a significant effect of one of them could cause a 
significant effect of the other on learning outcomes, although this covariance 
does not explain the unique contribution of metacognitive skillfulness to the 
variance in learning outcomes that was found in the Veenman and Elshout 
studies. In the present study, different effects were hypothesized for the 
unsupported and the supported group of learners. It seems more interesting 
to examine the impact of the two determinants for each version of the Optics 
Lab separately rather than looking at the main effects for the total sample. 
For the group that received no instructional support regression analyses 
showed a significant impact of metacognitive skillfulness on learning in the 
third phase of the Optics Lab. This is partly in line with the results of the 
previous studies of this thesis, where similar correlations were found between 
metacognitive skillfulness and learning outcomes. Unexpectedly, for the other 
phases of the Optics Lab and for the total post-test metacognitive skillfulness 
had no significant impact on learning outcomes. Moreover, intellectual ability 
did not account for any of the variance in learning outcomes, which is in 
accordance with Elshout’s threshold theory (1987; see also Raaheim, 1988, 
1991). It supports the idea that novice learners are particularly involved in 
searching the experiment space (Klahr & Dunbar, 1988) when they are 
initially working in an unsupported complex learning environment such as 
the Optics Lab. During this search, they draw heavily on their metacognitive 
skillfulness rather than on their intellectual ability (see also Chapter 4). 
Furthermore, Elshout (1987) argued that learners who are working far above 
their threshold of problematicity tend to work unsystematically, due to a lack 
of domain-specific knowledge. Working unsystematically may lead to the 
generation of an unsystematic data set and an incomplete coverage of the 
experiment space. Consequently, the unsupported novice learners may have 
problems with data interpretation and their answers on post-test items may 
be instance-based rather than rule-based. The significant positive impact of 
frequency of manipulation actions on learning outcomes in phase 1 of the 
Optics Lab illustrated this. During initial inductive learning it is wise to 
conduct many experiments. For that matter, the correlation between 
metacognitive skillfulness and frequency of manipulation actions appeared to 
be lower than was found in the study described in Chapter 4 but similar to 
what was found in Chapter 5. 
As predicted, intellectual ability had a substantial impact on learning 
outcomes for the group who received the instructional support, whereas the 
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impact of metacognitive skillfulness was not significant. These results are 
opposite to those obtained for the other group. Furthermore, the group-
specific interaction variable accounted for an additional part of the variance in 
learning outcomes in phase 3. These findings corroborated the hypothesis that 
the telling experiments most probably help novice learners to cover a large 
part of the experiment space and to gather a systematic data set, suitable for 
interpretation. Therefore, novice learners draw less heavily on their 
metacognitive skillfulness in a supported environment, which was also found 
by Veenman, Elshout, and Busato (1994). Results of their study indicated that 
the impact of metacognitive skillfulness on learning was very much reduced 
when novice learners received instructional support that consisted of telling 
experiments and metacognitive prompts. The substantial positive correlation 
between intellectual ability and learning outcomes in the present study 
suggests that novice learners more rapidly turn to data interpretation because 
of the support. Consequently, their answers on post-test items are likely to be 
more rule-based instead of instance-based. In Chapter 5 it was found that 
using explicit rules during completion of the post-test was associated with 
intellectual ability. 
Thus, it is assumed that both groups predominantly used their own 
method of answering post-test items. Both methods could have an equal 
short-term effect and, thus, no main differences between versions of the 
Optics Lab were found for learning outcomes. According to Taatgen (1999), 
learning will be characterized initially by instance learning when it is hard to 
induce relations or abstractions, which may have been the case in the 
unsupported environment. In tasks where generalization of relations and 
abstractions is relatively easy, as may have been the case in the supported 
Optics Lab, the best explanation of performance will probably involve rule 
learning. For further research it would be interesting to investigate whether 
the supported learners actually used explicit rules more often than their 
unsupported fellow learners during completion of the post-tests. These data 
were not available because think-aloud protocols were not transcribed. What 
instance learning and learning of rules signify for long-term learning effects is 
not clear and needs further investigation, for instance, by including a 
retention test in the study, as Veenman, Elshout, and Busato (1994) did.  
Snow (1989) postulated that conventional research design and statistical 
significance testing practices in instructional psychology are heavily biased 
against aptitude-treatment interactions. He recommended the use of 
regression analysis for examining aptitude-treatment interactions. Indeed, 
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results of the present study indicated that ANOVAs were less informative 
than regression analyses. The transformation of two independent variables 
into an interaction variable is crucial within regression analytic research on 
aptitude-treatment interactions. The nature of this transformation determines 
which interaction will be studied, as was illustrated by the two different 
transformations in this study. Nevertheless, the interaction variables in this 
study did not have a large incremental value. It was hypothesized, however, 
that each interaction was additional to the main effect of a particular 
independent variable. Consequently, the interaction variable correlated 
substantially with that independent variable and the additional variance 
accounted for by the interaction variable was low. Investigating aptitude-
treatment interactions by regression analysis is probably more appropriate 
when disordinal interactions are predicted. The interaction variable will then 
be created by multiplication of the z-scores of the two interacting independent 
variables and will have low correlations with both independent variables. 
The findings of the present study indicate that during inductive learning in 
a complex environment high intellectual ability novice learners benefit by 
receiving instructional support aimed at regulating the search of the 
experiment space. This conclusion, however, does not imply that it is always 
wise to provide this kind of support to intelligent learners. It is the effect of the 
support that educators should be interested in rather than the effect with the 
support (Salomon, 1995). The latter means that there is only success for the 
learner in the specific supported environment, while the first means that the 
instructional support causes an effective inductive-learning process in 
performance on subsequent transfer tasks. Continuously providing support 
may lead to good learning outcomes, but in the long run it will not raise 
learners’ threshold of problematicity, that is, it will not make increasingly 
difficult instances of the task type unproblematic and routine based (Elshout, 
1987). According to Elshout, raising learners’ threshold of problematicity is 
the prime objective of education. 
 
Conclusion 
Novice learners who received instructional support did not outperform 
learners who received no support, but the support changed the relative 
impact of metacognitive skillfulness and intellectual ability. Metacognitive 
skillfulness was the main determinant of learning outcomes for the group 
without support whereas intellectual ability was the main determinant of 
learning outcomes for the supported group. Interactions effects were found in 
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the complex phase of the Optics Lab, although their incremental value was 
moderate. Moreover, it is suggested that the combination of support and skills 
determines whether learning is mainly instance-based or rule-based. Both 
ways of learning could be successful, at least in a learning environment that 
allows for qualitative manipulation and reasoning.  
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8 
EPILOG 
 
 
The general goal of this thesis was to examine the roles of metacognitive 
skillfulness and intellectual ability in different stages of the inductive-learning 
process in a complex computer simulated learning environment. The 
hypotheses of the studies were based on an extension of the threshold of 
problematicity theory (Elshout, 1987). It was predicted that metacognitive 
skillfulness would be the main determinant for learning during initial 
inductive learning, rather than intellectual ability. Furthermore, it was 
expected that the pattern of correlations between metacognitive skillfulness, 
intellectual ability, and learning outcomes of novice learners at a relative easy 
level of task complexity would be similar to the pattern of correlations of 
advanced learners at a more complex level. Finally, it was expected that 
metacognitive skillfulness would be the main determinant for learning 
outcomes in an unsupported complex inductive-learning environment 
whereas intellectual ability would be the main determinant in a supported 
complex environment. In the present chapter the results and conclusions of 
the studies will be drawn together. Theoretical and methodological issues as 
well as implications for future research and educational practice will be 
addressed.  
 
Determinants of inductive learning 
In general, the findings of the studies corroborated Elshout’s (1987) theory of 
the threshold of problematicity. In the study described in Chapter 4, novice 
learners were assumed to operate beyond their threshold of problematicity in 
the very complex Optics Lab. As expected, it was found that intellectual 
ability hardly had any impact on learning outcomes. Instead, metacognitive 
skillfulness was the main determinant of learning outcomes. Furthermore, 
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metacognitive skillfulness was not related to intellectual ability. Results of 
Chapter 5 showed that the pattern of correlations between metacognitive 
skillfulness, intellectual ability and learning outcomes depended on the 
experienced task complexity. The pattern of correlations for novices in the 
relative easy phase of the Optics Lab resembled the pattern of correlations for 
advanced learners in the intermediate phase, which indicated that the pattern 
of correlations between metacognitive skillfulness, intellectual ability, and 
learning outcomes depended on the experienced task complexity. The patterns 
found in Chapter 5 were in accordance with the mixed model (Veenman, 1993). 
Apparently, the Optics Lab version used in the study described in Chapter 5 
was less complex than the one used in the study in Chapter 4. The findings of 
the study described in Chapter 7 showed that metacognitive skillfulness and 
frequency of manipulation actions were predictors of learning outcomes for 
an unsupported version of the Optics Lab. This is similar to results of the 
study described in Chapter 4. In contrast, intellectual ability rather than 
metacognitive skillfulness was the main determinants of learning outcomes 
for a version of the Optics Lab that contained instructional support. 
Apparently, when regulation of the search process is embedded in the task or 
in the learning environment, novice learners do not have to draw heavily on 
metacognitive skills. They can more easily turn to data interpretation. 
With these results in mind one could sketch the inductive-learning process 
for novice learners in a complex learning environment. Novice learners are 
supposed to have limited relevant prior domain knowledge concerning 
variables and relations between variables. Therefore, they initially act as 
experimenters and search the experiment space (Klahr & Dunbar, 1988) in 
order to identify independent and dependent variables. Thus, a novice’s 
initial inductive-learning process mainly aims at data generation. Furthermore, 
novice learners predominantly have heuristics or weak methods available 
instead of algorithmic methods (Klahr & Simon, 1999). These weak methods 
severely strain working memory because learners have to keep track of goals 
and relevant traces (Kyllonen & Shute, 1989). Consequently, initial inductive 
learning is slow. Especially in a very complex learning environment, such as 
the Optics Lab in Chapter 4, the first stage of searching the experiment space 
probably takes quite a lot of time. Moreover, initially novice learners tend to 
operate and reason on a qualitative level (see Chapter 4; Plötzner & Spada, 
1992) and the acquired knowledge is consequently assumed to be instance-
based. The quality of their metacognitive skills determines whether novices 
are able to successfully use heuristics and gather a systematic data set. It is 
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assumed that a systematic data set, in turn, will facilitate data interpretation. 
Thus, for novice learners, metacognitive skillfulness is the main determinant 
of learning outcomes in the initial stage of inductive learning. At a later stage 
of the inductive-learning process, data interpretation becomes more and more 
important. Regularities and patterns in the data set will be induced and 
knowledge may become rule-based. Acquiring rule-based knowledge is 
associated with high intellectual ability (see Chapter 5). The relatively low 
intellectual ability learners, on the other hand, may stick to instance-based 
learning. Although hypothesis testing was hardly observed in the studies of this 
thesis, searching the experiment space may be based on products of data 
interpretation. Therefore, the correlation between metacognitive skillfulness 
and intellectual ability may increase with the acquisition of domain expertise. 
Eventually, learners’ descriptions of relations between variables may shift 
from a qualitative to a quantitative representation (Plötzner & Spada, 1993). 
Advanced learners, on the contrary, have domain knowledge and strategies at 
their disposal during inductive learning when they try to find regularities 
between variables. Prior domain knowledge is an important predictor of 
learning outcomes. Nevertheless, advanced learners may also reach a point at 
which their prior domain knowledge is insufficient and at which they have to 
rely on weak methods for problem solving. At that point a similar process to 
that of the inductive-learning process of novices may be observed (see 
Chapter 5). Thus, metacognitive skills may be regarded as a booster for 
inductive learning when learners operate at the boundaries of their 
knowledge. Intellectual ability is needed for data interpretation later on 
during the inductive-learning process. 
 
Methodological issues 
The studies described in Chapter 4 and 5 were quasi-experimental, 
correlational studies. Examining the elements of a correlation matrix for 
significance is problematic in the sense that the probability of spurious results 
is much larger than when a single correlation is examined (Stevens, 1996). Part 
of the significant results could be attributed to chance. According to Stevens, 
one way to circumvent this problem is to simply test each correlation for 
significance at a much more stringent level. Therefore, unpredicted or weak 
associations reported in this thesis should be regarded with caution. One 
could argue that it is only strong associations that may be of practical 
significance anyway (Stevens, 1996). The findings of the study described in 
Chapter 7 were more convincing as this study was experimental.  
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Instructional support could affect assessment of metacognitive skillfulness. 
For instance, Veenman, Elshout, and Busato (1994) found that the 
metacognitive skills of supported learners were of better quality than the 
metacognitive skills of unsupported learners. Thus, when instructional 
support is involved, metacognitive skillfulness as an aptitude should be 
assessed independently of the inductive-learning task and not concurrently 
during the inductive-learning task as Veenman and Elshout (1995) were 
forced to do. Evidence for the domain-independency of metacognitive 
skillfulness (Chapter 6; Veenman, Elshout, & Meijer, 1997; Veenman & 
Verheij, 2001) allows for such an independent assessment of metacognitive 
skillfulness. In Chapter 7 metacognitive skillfulness was assessed using the 
Deton-Lab log file scores as a representation of the quality of metacognitive 
skillfulness instead of using the laborious method of analyzing think-aloud 
protocols. It is important to notice that these Deton-Lab log file scores were 
not just frequency scores like the measures of actions in the Heat Lab in 
Chapter 6 and in the Optics Lab used in Chapter 4 to 7. In contrast, the Deton-
Lab log file scores were predominantly based on (1) learners’ systematic 
manipulation of the variables, by rewarding systematic order of experiments, 
and (2) on learners’ evaluation activities, by giving penalty points for omitting 
essential actions. A re-analysis of the data set of Veenman and Verheij (2001) 
yielded a strong correlation between the Deton-Lab log file scores and 
measures of metacognitive skillfulness obtained by analyzing think-aloud 
protocols. These correlations were stronger than correlations found between 
measures of action in the learning environment and measures of 
metacognitive skillfulness based on think-aloud protocols in the studies of 
this thesis.  
Complexity of the task was one of the main concepts in this thesis. It 
appeared that task complexity was difficult to operationalize. In the Optics 
Lab the objective task complexity had two dimensions: the size of the 
experiment space and the complexity of the relations between variables. By 
varying both dimensions it was easy to obtain several phases of the Optics 
Lab representing different levels of complexity. The hard part, however, was 
the estimation of the level of the experienced task complexity. The aim of this 
thesis was to examine determinants of novices’ inductive learning in a rather 
complex environment. The Optics Lab was chosen as a learning environment 
and had to be complex, but not too complex. Novice learners had to be able to 
acquire conceptual knowledge in a limited amount of time, without too much 
frustration. In fact, in the first study of this thesis, described in Chapter 4, the 
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skills of the novice learners were a bit overestimated. It took them far more 
time than was expected to acquire knowledge. For that reason the Optics Lab 
used in Chapter 5 to 7 was made less complex than the one in Chapter 4. In 
the same vein, it appeared to be difficult to estimate the difference between 
the experienced task complexity of novices and that of advanced learners in 
Chapter 5. It was unknown precisely how far away from each other the 
curves of novice and advanced learners were positioned (see Figure 3.2 in 
Chapter 3). Consequently, hypotheses concerning novices’ and advanced 
learners’ patterns of correlations between metacognitive skillfulness, 
intellectual ability, and learning outcomes were a bit imprecise. Empirical 
studies should provide more insight into how a particular group of learners 
experiences the task complexity of a particular learning environment. 
Although optics is a difficult topic for novice learners (Galili & Hazan, 2000), 
the Optics Lab has proven to be a beautiful and valuable learning 
environment in which to examine the inductive-learning process nevertheless, 
not in the least because of the option of manipulating variables qualitatively.  
The results concerning determinants of learning outcomes can only be 
generalized to initial inductive-learning processes in environments that allow 
for manipulating variables qualitatively and that contain qualitative relations 
between variables, such as the Optics Lab or electricity circuits described by 
White and Frederiksen (1987) and Veenman (1993). The role of metacognitive 
skillfulness and, especially, intellectual ability may be substantially different 
during inductive learning in an environment where learners are forced to 
operate mainly on a quantitative level. Also for experts, the pattern of 
correlations between metacognitive skillfulness, intellectual ability, and post-
test scores may differ. Borkowski, Carr, and Pressley (1987) suggested that 
metacognition seems no longer necessary when problem solving occurs 
automatically. On the other hand, one could rephrase this suggestion by 
stating that metacognition is an implicit rather than an explicit process when 
problem solving occurs automatically (see also Reder & Schunn, 1996). 
Implicit and automatic processes are not reportable and therefore hard to 
detect by the think-aloud method (Anderson, 1996b; Ericsson & Simon, 1993). 
To examine patterns of correlations between metacognitive skillfulness, 
intellectual ability, and learning outcomes of experts, log file measures such as 
the ones used in Chapter 7 will probably be more appropriate. Furthermore, 
generalization of the above-mentioned results is limited to the population of 
university students. It is recommended for future research to replicate the 
studies of these thesis, for instance with learners in secondary school or even 
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younger learners (e.g., Veenman, Wilhelm, & Beishuizen, 2001). According to 
Kuhn (2000, p. 178), “metacognition emerges early in life, in forms that are no 
more than suggestive of what is to come, and follows an extended 
developmental course during which it becomes more explicit, more powerful, 
and hence more effective, as it comes to operate increasingly under the 
individual’s conscious control.” It is interesting to examine the role of 
metacognitive skills during the inductive-learning process for different 
developmental stages.  
 
From verbal to computational models 
In this thesis results concerning metacognitive skillfulness were reported on 
the level of aggregated scores of the subscales orientation, systematic orderliness, 
evaluation, and elaboration. No separate analyses for these scales were 
executed, mainly because the subscales correlated substantially and because a 
large sample size is needed for analyses with many independent variables 
(Stevens, 1996). In research with the laborious think-aloud method the sample 
sizes are usually limited. Moreover, measures of metacognitive skillfulness in 
Chapter 4 to 6 applied to the whole task or large parts of the task. Thus, the 
conclusions reported in this thesis were rather general: during an inductive-
learning task novices’ metacognitive skillfulness may be associated with 
successfully searching the experiment space whereas intellectual ability may 
be associated with successfully interpreting data. 
It is, of course, of interest to examine the role of metacognitive skillfulness 
during inductive learning on a more detailed level, that is, on the level of 
operations rather than on the task level (see Newell, 1989). Operations last 
seconds instead of minutes or hours. Consequently, in research aimed at 
examining the role of metacognitive skillfulness on the level of operations, the 
time units and the segments of think-aloud protocols to be studied should be 
much smaller relative to the studies in this thesis. The focus will be on 
mechanisms and on specific sequences of operations and actions rather than 
the quality of behavior in general. A computational model would be useful 
when mechanisms and their interaction with the environment are too 
complex to make predictions regarding these mechanisms and interactions 
(Carpenter & Just, 1999). In computational models only some aspects of 
human cognition are simulated. When the performance of the model and the 
performance of humans relating to those aspects show similar patterns, this is 
regarded as a strong indication that the processes executed by the model 
resemble the processes executed by humans. Thus, a computational model 
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provides more explicit knowledge concerning the mechanisms that are 
actually taking place during task performance. A computational model may 
enable quantitative predictions whereas a verbal model enables predictions 
about the direction of the main effects or interactions (Carpenter & Just, 1999). 
In other words, by using computational models, reasoning about inductive 
learning may shift from a qualitative-relational to a quantitative-numerical 
level. Verbal models and computational models also differ in the way they are 
evaluated. A verbal model typically yields some hypothesis that is evaluated 
using hypothesis-testing statistics. When computational models are tested, the 
whole standard apparatus of significance tests is no longer applicable (Simon, 
1989). The evaluation of a computational model focuses on the model’s ability 
to perform a task and on the mapping of some aspects of the model’s 
performance and the human performance.  
Examples of computational models are EUREKA (Elio & Scharf, 1990) in 
the domain of solving physics problems, the computational model of Holland, 
Holyoak, Nisbett and Thagard (1986), and the ACT-R model of Schunn and 
Anderson (1998) in the domain of inductive learning. In the last model 
components of inductive learning were simulated, such as searching the 
experiment space, evaluation of evidence, and testing hypotheses (see also 
Chapter 2). This ACT-R model successfully simulated differences between the 
behavior of novices and that of experts, by omitting specific productions in 
the model of novices. However, it is doubtful whether the model of Schunn 
and Anderson (1998) is able to simulate individual differences between novice 
learners with a high level of metacognitive skills and learners with a low level 
of metacognitive skills. Their model did not contain specific productions 
representing metacognitive skills to simulate these differences. One could ask 
whether this is really necessary. Perhaps it is possible to simulate 
metacognitive skillfulness by using other characteristics of the ACT-R 
architecture. In order to understand the interplay between metacognitive 
skillfulness and intellectual ability during inductive-learning tasks on the 
level of operations, an attempt should be made to simulate novice learners’ 
individual differences, for instance the differences between learners with a 
high level of metacognitive skills and learners with a low level of 
metacognitive skills found in the studies of this thesis. According to Klahr 
(1995), using computational models to represent theories is the most 
promising direction for increasing the understanding of cognitive processes. 
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Knowledge acquisition 
In Chapter 2 it was hypothesized that novice inductive learners could acquire 
conceptual knowledge in two different ways: either by instance-based learning 
or rule-based learning. Analyses of the test-taking part of the think-aloud 
protocols in the study described in Chapter 5 supported this hypothesis. 
Learners differed in the number of explicit rules they mentioned while 
answering the post-test items. 
Whether or not either of both types of learning shows up during task 
performance may depend on their successfulness for task performance 
(Taatgen, 1999), which, in turn, may depend on the learning situation as well 
as on individual differences (Goschke, 1997). When rules are very hard to 
infer, as is the case for some learners in a very complex learning environment, 
behavior can be explained predominantly by instance-based learning. Other 
learners, however, may regard rule induction as useful. It appeared that in the 
Optics Lab of Chapter 5 the high intellectual ability learners more frequently 
used explicit rules when answering post-test items than the relatively low 
intellectual ability learners. Thus inferring rules may be profitable, but only 
for the high intellectual ability learners. This is consistent with the general 
finding that implicit-learning scores were unrelated to scores of intellectual 
ability whereas explicit-learning scores correlated substantially with scores of 
intellectual ability (Reber, Allen, & Reber, 1999). It would be interesting to 
examine whether rule-based knowledge shows more maintenance than 
instance-based learning, which calls for the use of retention tests. 
Unfortunately, there were no specific tests to measure rule-based learning 
and instance-based learning. The so-called WHAT-IF items (e.g., Swaak & de 
Jong, 1996) in the study of Chapter 5 could be answered with and without 
using explicit rules. Post-test reaction times did not provide any indication of 
whether test items were answered in a rule-based or instance-based manner. 
This implies that WHAT-IF items may not necessarily measure intuitive 
knowledge. Thus, when learners were not asked to think aloud during test 
taking, both types of learning could not be distinguished. It should be noted 
that data interpretation was not measured in the strict sense, for all learners 
gathered their own data set with a large variance amongst them. For instance, 
it is conceivable that some learners gathered a small set but only inferred a 
few correct rules while other learners gathered a large data set and also 
inferred a few correct rules. One could argue that data interpretations of these 
learners were not of the same quality. In order to examine data interpretation 
more closely, one could focus on the correctness of learners’ inferences based 
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on the experiments that learners actually performed (van Rijn, 2002) or one 
could focus on learners’ inferences based on an existing prefab data set (van 
Someren & Tabbers, 1998). Also in these research designs the impact of 
metacognitive skillfulness and intellectual ability on learning outcomes could 
be determined. Probably the impact of intellectual ability on learning will be 
larger than was found in the present studies. 
The knowledge gains by the novice learners were low, which is obviously 
the case when the inductive-learning task is rather complex. This complexity 
caused low internal consistency in the scores of the Optics Lab pre-tests and 
post-tests. Learners may have acquired only bits of conceptual knowledge, or 
they may have guessed when they answered the multiple-choice post-test 
items. Extending the size of the tests was an option that aimed at increasing 
internal consistency of the tests. This was done in Chapter 5 to 7. The Optics 
Lab in these chapters contained fewer phases than the Optics Lab in Chapter 
4, which made it possible to include parallel questions. The quantitative tests 
were even more difficult and hence their internal consistency was lower than 
the internal consistency of qualitative tests. As has been argued, novice 
learners started manipulating and reasoning on a qualitative-relational level, 
even though options of quantitative manipulation and measurement were 
available. A shift from qualitative-relational reasoning to quantitative-
numerical reasoning (Plötzner & Spada, 1993) could hardly be observed. 
Thus, learners were not able to infer the gaussian lens formula 1/v + 1/b = 1/f 
(Hecht, 1998). For function finding, numerical knowledge is essential 
(Haverty, Koedinger, Klahr, & Alibali, 2000), in addition to gathering 
quantitative data. Numerical knowledge may also be insufficiently available 
to the participants of the studies described in this thesis. On the other hand, in 
real life the level of reasoning is also mainly qualitative-relational, as for 
instance in the social sciences. 
 
Educational practice 
The findings in this thesis showed that in the Optics Lab many novice learners 
had problems with working systematically, they had problems interpreting 
evidence, and the amount of knowledge they acquired was disappointing. 
According to Elshout (2000), less intelligent students run more risks in 
inductive-learning situations than in structured environments. Furthermore, 
Jonassen (1992) and Spiro, Feltovich, Jacobson, and Coulson (1995) considered 
complex learning-centered environments as most effective for the stage of 
advanced knowledge acquisition rather than initial knowledge acquisition. 
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Does that mean that inductive-learning environments such as the Optics Lab 
are not useful in educational practice where it concerns novice learners? The 
answer is no. These environments could be very useful. First, the usefulness 
depends on the learning objectives. When students have to learn how to 
conduct experiments, how to interpret data, or how to test hypotheses, these 
environments are almost indispensable. Students need hands-on experiences 
in realistic learning environments in which they can conduct experiments on 
different levels of precision. Obviously, frustrating situations should be 
avoided. That means that instructional support may be necessary for students 
with low quality of metacognitive skills or for low intellectual ability students. 
The support should be aimed at stretching the zone of tolerable problematicity 
(Elshout, 1987) and letting students operate just above their individual 
threshold, for that would endorse learning (Elshout, 1987; Snow, 1989). When 
students operate just above their threshold, they are challenged to extend 
their heuristic and improvisational abilities. 
The acquisition of conceptual knowledge is the second learning objective 
for which complex computer simulations such as the Optics Lab may be very 
useful. That does not mean that the whole road to conceptual knowledge 
acquisition must be self-directed. Inductive-learning environments could be 
very effective in combination with expository teaching methods. For instance, 
the learning environment may provide students with concrete experiences, 
which may be important to acquire abstract knowledge (Beishuizen, 1998). 
Moreover, learners do not necessarily have to infer rules, as the inductive-
learning environment could also be used to let students test some parts of a 
provided theoretical model. In the domain of optics, for example, students 
could simply test the lens formula. When an inductive-learning environment 
is designed for rule induction, instructional support could be specifically 
aimed at systematic search of the experiment space, as in Chapter 7, to 
facilitate data interpretation. However, it is imaginable that in an educational 
setting forcing students to work systematically would remove some of the fun 
of explorative search. 
 
Conclusion 
Inductive learning appeared to be difficult for many learners (see also 
Elshout, 2000). During inductive learning they have to conduct their own 
experiments, they have to provide their own feedback, they have to keep 
track of their solution path and sometimes there are impasses. Sometimes 
there is hardly any progress, which could decrease motivation. Therefore, 
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inductive learners need time and perseverance. But most of all, novice 
inductive learners need metacognitive skillfulness to search a large 
experiment space systematically and intellectual ability to see patterns and 
rules. 
 
  
 
131
 
REFERENCES 
 
 
Alexander, P. A., & Judy, J. E. (1988). The interaction of domain-specific and strategic 
knowledge in academic performance. Review of Educational Research, 58, 375-401. 
Allan, M. C. (1997). Understanding regression analysis. New York: Plenum Press. 
Allon, M., Gutkin, T. B., & Bruning, R. (1994). The relationship between metacognition and 
intelligence in normal adolescence: Some tentative but suprising findings. Psychology in the 
Schools, 31, 93-97. 
Anderson, J. R. (1993). Rules of the mind. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
Anderson, J. R. (1996a). ACT: A simple theory of complex cognition. American Psychologist, 51, 
355-365. 
Anderson, J. R. (1996b). Implicit memory and metacognition: Why is the glass half full? In L. 
M. Reder (Ed.), Implicit memory and metacognition (pp. 123-135). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence 
Erlbaum Associates. 
Anderson, J. R., & Lebiere, C. (1998). The atomic components of thought. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence 
Erlbaum Associates. 
Anderson, J. R., & Schunn, C. D. (2000). Implications of the ACT-R learning theory: No magic 
bullets. In R. Glaser (Ed.), Educational design and cognitive science. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence 
Erlbaum Associates. 
Anzai, Y. (1991). Learning and use of representations for physics expertise. In K. A. Ericsson 
& J. Smith (Eds.), Towards a general theory of expertise (pp. 64-92). Cambridge, MA: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Beishuizen, J. J. (1998). Over concrete ervaring als basis voor kennisverwerving [Experience as 
a necessary basis for knowledge acquisition]. Nederlands Tijdschrift voor de Psychologie, 53, 
138-152. 
Berardi-Coletta, B., Buyer, L. S., Dominowski, R. L., & Rellinger, E. R. (1995). Metacognition 
and problem solving: A process-oriented approach. Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 21, 205-223. 
 132
Berger, R. S., & Reid, D. K. (1989). Diffrences that make a difference: Comparisons of 
metacomponential functioning and knowledge base among groups of high and low IQ 
learning disabled, mildly mentally retarded, and normally achieving adults. Journal of 
Learning Disabilities, 22, 422-429. 
Bisanz, J., Bisanz, G. L., & Korpan, C. A. (1994). Inductive reasoning. In R. J. Sternberg (Ed.), 
Thinking and problem solving (pp. 179-213). San Diego, CA: Academic Press. 
Boekaerts, M. (1997). Self-regulated learning: A new concept embraced by researchers, policy 
makers, educators, teachers, and students. Learning and Instruction, 7, 161-186. 
Boekaerts, M. (1998). Boosting students’capacity to promote their own learning: a goal theory 
perspective. Research Dialogue in Learning and Instruction, 1, 13-22. 
Boekaerts, M. (1999). Metacognitive experiences and motivational state as aspects of self-
awareness: Review and discussion. European Journal of Psychology of Education, 14, 571-584. 
Borkowski, J. G. (1996). Metacognition: theory or chapter heading? Learning and Individual 
Differences, 8, 391-402. 
Brody, N. (1992). Intelligence. San Diego, CA: Academic Press. 
Brown, A. L. (1987). Metacognition, executive control, self-regulation, and other more 
mysterious mechanisms. In F. E. Weinert & R. H. Kluwe (Eds.), Metacognition, motivation, 
and understanding (pp. 65-116). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
Brown, A. L., & Palincsar, A. S. (1989). Guided, cooperative learning and individual 
knowledge acquisition. In L. B. Resnick (Ed.), Knowing, learning, and instruction: Essays in 
the honor of Robert Glaser (pp. 393-451). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
Butler, D. L. (1998). Metacognition and learning disabilities. In B. Y. L. Wong (Ed.), Learning 
about learning disabilities (pp. 277-307). San Diego: Academic Press. 
Campbell, D. J. (1988). Task complexity: A review and analysis. Academy of Management 
Review, 37, 60-82. 
Carpenter, P. A., & Just, M. A. (1999). Computational modeling of high-level cognition versus 
hypothesis testing. In R. J. Sternberg (Ed.), The nature of cognition (pp. 245-293). Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press. 
Carroll, J. B. (1976). Psychometric tests as cognitive tasks: A new “Structure of intellect”. In L. 
B. Resnick (Ed.), The nature of intelligence (pp. 27-56). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum 
Associates. 
Carroll, J. B. (1993). Human cognitive abilities. A survey of factor-analytic studies. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Carver, C. S., Lawrence, J. W., & Scheier, M. F. (1996). A control-process perspective on the 
origins of affect. In L. L. Martin & A. Tesser (Eds.), Striving and feeling: Interactions among 
goals, affect, and self-regulation (pp. 11-52). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
Carver, C. S., & Scheier, M. F. (1990). Origins and functions of positive and negative affect: A 
control-process view. Psychological Review, 97, 19-35. 
133
Charness, N. (1991). Expertise in chess: The balance between knowledge and search. In K. A. 
Ericsson & J. Smith (Eds.), Towards a general theory of expertise (pp. 39-63). Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Charney, D., Reder, L., & Kusbit, G. W. (1990). Goal setting and procedure selection in 
acquiring computer skills: A comparison of tutorials, problem solving, and learner 
exploration. Cognition and Instruction, 7, 323-342. 
Chi, M. T. H. (1997). Quantifying qualitative analyses of verbal data: A practical guide. The 
Journal of the Learning Sciences, 6, 271-315. 
Chi, M. T. H., Bassok, M., Lewis, M. W., Reimann, P., & Glaser, R. (1989). Self-explanations: 
How students study and use examples in learning to solve problems. Cognitive Science, 13, 
145-182. 
Chi, M. T. H., Feltovich, P. J., & Glaser, R. (1981). Categorization and representation of physics 
problems by experts and novices. Cognitive Science, 5, 121-152. 
Chinn, C. A., & Brewer, W. F. (1993). The role of anomalous data in knowledge acquisition: A 
theoretical framework and implications for science instruction. Review of Educational 
Research, 63, 1-49. 
Chinn, C. A., & Brewer, W. F. (1998). An empirical test of a taxonomy of responses to 
anomalous data in science. Journal of Research in Science Teaching, 35, 623-654. 
Campione, J. C., Brown, A. L., & Ferrara, R. A. (1982). Mental retardation and intelligence. In 
R. J. Sternberg (Ed.), Handbook of human intelligence (pp. 392-490). Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Davidson, J. E., Deuser, R., & Sternberg, R. J. (1994). The role of metacognition in problem 
solving. In J. Metcalfe & P. Shimamura (Eds.) Metacognition, knowing about knowing (pp. 
207-226). Cambridge: MIT Press. 
Davidson, J. E., & Sternberg, R. J. (1998). Smart problem solving: How metacognition helps. In 
D. J. Hacker, J. Dunlosky, & A. C. Graesser (Eds.), Metacognition in educational theory and 
practice (pp. 47-68). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
Dominowski, R. L. (1998). Verbalization and problem solving. In D. J. Hacker, J. Dunlosky, & 
A. C. Graesser (Eds.), Metacognition in educational theory and practice (pp. 25-45). Mahwah, 
NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
Dunbar, K., & Klahr, D. (1989). Developmental differences in scientific discovery processes. In 
D. Klahr & K. Kotovsky (Eds.), Complex information processing: The impact of Herbert A. 
Simon (pp. 109-143). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
Dunlosky, J. (1998). Epilogue: Linking metacognitive theory to education. In D. J. Hacker, J. 
Dunlosky, & A. C. Graesser (Eds.), Metacognition in educational theory and practice (pp. 367-
381). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
Elio, R., & Scharf, P. B. (1990). Modeling novice-to-expert shifts in problem-solving strategy 
and knowledge organization. Cognitive Science, 14, 579-639. 
 134
Elshout, J. J. (1976). Karakteristieke moeilijkheden in het denken. Unpublished doctoral 
dissertation, University of Amsterdam. 
Elshout, J. J. (1983). Is measuring intelligence still useful? In S. B. Anderson & J. S. Helmick 
(Eds.), On educational testing (pp. 45-56). San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. 
Elshout, J. J. (1987). Problem solving and education. In E. de Corte, H. Lodewijks, R. 
Parmentier, & P. Span (Eds.), Learning and Instruction (pp. 259-273). Oxford: Pergamon 
Books Ltd. Leuven: University Press. 
Elshout, J. J. (2000). Constructivisme (?) en cognitieve psychologie [Constructivism (?) and 
cognitive psychology]. Pedagogische Studiën, 77, 134-138. 
Elshout, J. J., & Veenman, M. V. J. (1992). Relation between intellectual ability and working 
method as predictors of learning. Journal of Educational Research, 85, 134-143. 
Elshout, J. J., Veenman, M. V. J., & Hell, J. G. van (1993). Using the computer as a help tool 
during learning by doing. Computers and Education, 21, 115-122. 
Elshout-Mohr, M. (1992). Metacognitie van lerenden in onderwijsleerprocessen 
[Metacognition of learners in educational learning processes]. Tijdschrift voor 
Onderwijsresearch, 17, 273-289. 
Ericsson, K. A., & Lehman, A. C. (1996). Expert and exceptional performance: Evidence of 
maximal adaptation to task constraints. Annual Review of Psychology, 47, 273-305. 
Ericsson, K. A., & Simon, H. A. (1993). Protocol Analysis: Verbal reports as data. Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press. 
Ericsson, K. A., & Smith, J. (1991). Prospects and limits of the emperical study of expertise: an 
introduction. In K. A. Ericsson & J. Smith (Eds.), Towards a general theory of expertise (pp. 1-
38). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Ertmer, P. A., & Newby, T. J. (1996). The expert learner: Strategic, self-regulated, and 
reflective. Instructional Science, 24, 1-24. 
Ferguson-Hessler, M. G. M., & Jong, T. de (1990). Studying physics texts: Differences in study 
processes between good and poor performers. Cognition and Instruction, 7, 41-54. 
Flavell, J. H. (1976). Metacognitive aspects of problem solving. In L. B. Resnick (Ed.), The 
nature of intelligence (pp. 231-235). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
Flavell, J. H. (1979). Metacognition and cognitive monitoring. A new area of cognitive 
developmental inquiry. American Psychologist, 34, 906-911. 
Flavell, J. H. (1987). Speculations about the nature and development of metacognition. In In F. 
E. Weinert & R. H. Kluwe (Eds.), Metacognition, motivation, and understanding (pp. 21-29). 
Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
Gagné, R. M. (1984). Learning outcomes and their effects: Useful categories of human 
performance. American Psychologist, 39, 377-385. 
Galili, I., & Hazan, A. (2000). Learners’ knowledge in optics: Interpretation, structure and 
analysis. International Journal of Science Education, 22, 57-88. 
135
Garner, R., & Alexander, P. A. (1989). Metacognition: answered and unanswered questions. 
Educational Psychologist, 24, 143-158. 
Glaser, R. (1989). Expertise and learning: How do we think about instructional processes mow 
that we have discovered knowledge structures? In D. Klahr & K. Kotovsky (Eds.), Complex 
information processing: The impact of Herbert A. Simon (pp. 269-282). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence 
Erlbaum Associates. 
Glaser, R., & Chi, M. T. H. (1988). Overview. In M. T. H. Chi, R. Glaser, & M. J. Farr (Eds.), The 
nature of expertise (pp. xv-xxviii). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
Glaser, R., Schauble, L., Raghavan, K., & Zeitz, C. (1992). Scientific reasoning across different 
domains. In E. De Corte, M. Linn, H. Mandl, & L. Verschaffel (Eds.), Computer-based 
learning environments and problem solving (NATO ASI series F: Computer and System 
Series, Vol. 84, pp. 345-371). Heidelberg: Springer Verlag. 
Goschke, T. (1997). Implicit learning and unconscious knowledge: mental representation, 
computational mechanisms, and brain structures. In K. Lamberts, & D. Shanks (Eds.), 
Knowledge, concepts and categories (pp. 247-333). Hove, UK: Psychology Press/Taylor and 
Francis. 
Groot, A. D. de (1965). Thought and choice in chess. The Hague: Mouton. 
Guilford, J. P. (1965). Fundamental statistics in psychology and education. New York: McGraw-
Hill. 
Gulliksen, H. (1961). Theory of mental tests. New York: Wiley. 
Hacker, D. J. (1998). Definitions and empirical foundations. In D. J. Hacker, J. Dunlosky, & A. 
C. Graesser (Eds.), Metacognition in educational theory and practice (pp. 1-24). Mahwah, NJ: 
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
Haverty, L. A., Koedinger, K. R., Klahr, D., & Alibali, M. W. (2000). Solving inductive 
reasoning problems in mathematics: Not-so-trivial pursuit. Cognitive Science, 24, 249-298. 
Hecht, E. (1998). Optics. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. 
Holland, J. H., Holyoak, K. J., Nisbett, R. E., & Thagard, P. R. (1986). Induction: Processes of 
inference, learning, and discovery. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Hout-Wolters, B. H. A. M. van (1992). Cognitieve strategiën als onderwijsdoel [Cognitive 
strategies as an educational goal]. Groningen: Wolters-Noordhoff. 
Hout-Wolters, B. H. A. M. van (2000). Assessing active self-directed learning. In P. R. J. 
Simons, J. L. van der Linden, & T. M. Duffy (Eds.), New learning (pp. 83-99). Dordrecht: 
Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
Hulshof, C. D. (2001). Discovery of ideas and ideas about discovery: The influence of prior knowledge 
on scientific discovery learning in computer-based simulations. Unpublished doctoral 
dissertation, University of Twente, The Netherlands. 
Humphreys, L. G. (1968). The fleeting nature of the prediction of college academic success. 
Journal of Educational Psychology, 59, 375-380. 
 136
Jonassen, D. H. (1991). Objectivism versus constructivism: Do we need a new philosophical 
paradigm? Educational Technology Research and Development, 39(3), 5-14. 
Jonassen, D. H. (1992). Evaluating constructivistic learning. In T. M. Duffy & D. H. Jonassen 
(Eds.), Constructivism and the technology of instruction: A conversation (pp. 137-148). 
Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
Jonassen, D. H., & Grabowski, B. L. (1993). Handbook of individual differences, learning, and 
instruction. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
Jong, T. de, & Ferguson-Hessler, M. G. M. (1996). Types and qualities of knowledge. 
Educational Psychologist, 31, 105-113. 
Jong, T. de, & Joolingen, W. R. van (1998). Scientific discovery learning with computer 
simulations of conceptual domains. Review of Educational Research, 68, 179-201. 
Joolingen, W. R. van (1993). Understanding and facilitating discovery learning in computer-based 
simulation environments. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Technical University 
Eindhoven, The Netherlands. 
Joolingen, W. R. van (1995). QMaPS: Qualitative reasoning for intelligent simulations for 
instruction learning environment. Journal of Artificial Intelligence en Education, 6, 67-89. 
Joolingen, W. R. van, & Jong, T. de (1997). An extended dual search space model of scientific 
discovery learning. Instructional Science, 25, 307-346. 
Kalat, J. W. (1992). Biological Psychology. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Company. 
Klahr, D. (1995). Computational models of cognitive change: the state of the art. In T. J. Simon 
and G. S. Halford (Eds.), Developing cognitive competence: New approaches to process modeling 
(pp. 355-373). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
Klahr, D. (2000). Exploring science: The cognition and development of discovery processes. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Klahr, D., & Dunbar, K. (1988). Dual space search during scientific reasoning. Cognitive 
Science, 12, 1-48. 
Klahr, D., Fay, A. L., & Dunbar, K. (1993). Heuristics for scientific experimentation: A 
developmental study. Cognitive Psychology, 25, 111-146. 
Klahr, D., & Simon, H. A. (1999). Studies of scientific discovery: complementary approaches 
and convergent findings. Psychological Bulletin, 125, 524-543. 
Kluwe, R. H. (1987). Executive decisions and regulation of problem solving behavior. In F. E. 
Weinert & R. H. Kluwe (Eds.), Metacognition, motivation, and understanding (pp. 31-64). 
Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
Kobes, B. W. (1997). Metacognition and consciousness [Review of the book Metacognition: 
knowing about knowing]. Philosophical Psychology, 10, 93-102. 
Kuhn, D. (2000). Metacognitive development. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 9, 178-
181. 
137
Kuhn, D., Garcia-Mila, M., Zohar, A., & Andersen, C. (1995). Strategies of knowledge 
acquisition. Monographs of the Society for Research in Child Development, 60(4, Serial No. 245). 
Kunz, G. C., Drewniak, U., & Schott, F. (1992). On-line and off-line assessment of self-
regulation in learning from instructional text. Learning and Instruction, 2, 287-301. 
Kyllonen, P. C., & Shute, V. J. (1989). A taxonomy of learning skills. In P. H. Ackerman, R. J. 
Sternberg, & R. Glaser (Eds.), Learning and individual differences: Advances in theory and 
research (pp. 117-163). New York: Freeman. 
Land, S. M., & Hannafin, M. J. (2000). Student-centered learning environments. In D. H. 
Jonassen & S. M. Land (Eds.), Theoretical foundations of learning environments (pp. 1-23). 
Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
Lavoie, D. R., & Good, R. (1988). The nature and the use of prediction skills in a biological 
computer simulation. Journal of Research in Science Teaching, 25, 335-360. 
Lin, X. (2001). Designing metacognitive activities. Educational Technology Research and 
Development, 49(2), 23-40. 
Lin, X., & Lehman, J. D. (1999). Supporting learning of variable control in a computer-based 
biology environment: effects of prompting college students to reflect on their own 
thinking. Journal of Research in Science Teaching, 37, 837-858. 
Maqsud, M. (1997). Effects of metacognitive skills and nonverbal ability on academic 
achievement of high school pupils. Educational Psychology, 17, 387-397. 
Merriënboer, J. J. G. van (1997). Training complex cognitive skills: A four-component instructional 
design model for technical training. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Educational Technology 
Publications. 
Metcalfe, J. (1996). Metacognitive processes. In E. L. Bjork & R. A. Bjork (Eds.), Memory (pp. 
381-407). San Diego, CA: Academic Press. 
Mettes, C. T. C. W., Pilot, A., & Roossink, H. J. (1981). Linking factual and procedural 
knowledge in solving science problems: A case study in a thermodynamics course. 
Instructional Science, 10, 333-361. 
Minnaert, A. (1996). Can metacognition compensate for intelligence in the first year of belgian 
higher education? Psychologica Belgica, 36, 227-244. 
Neches, R., Langley, P., & Klahr, D. (1987). Learning, development, and production systems. 
In D. Klahr, P. Langley, & R. Neches (Eds.), Production system models of learning and 
development (pp. 1-53). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Neisser, U., Boodoo, G., Bouchard, T. J., Wade Boykin, A., Brody, N., Ceci, S. J., Halpern, D. 
F., Loehlin, J. C., Perloff, R., Sternberg, R. J., & Urbina, S. (1996). Intelligence: knowns and 
unknowns. American Psychologist, 51, 77-101. 
Nelson, T. O. (1996). Consciousness and metacognition. American Psychologist, 51, 102-116. 
Nelson, T. O. (1999). Cognition versus metacognition. In R. J. Sternberg (Ed.), The nature of 
cognition (pp. 625-641). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
 138
Nelson, T. O., & Narens, L. (1990). Metamemory: A theoretical framework and new findings. 
The Psychology of Learning and Motivation, 26, 125-173. 
Nelson, T. O., & Narens, L. (1994). Why investigate metacognition? In J. Metcalfe & A. P. 
Shimamura (Eds.), Metacognition, knowing about knowing (pp. 1-25). Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press. 
Newell, A. (1989). Putting it all together. In D. Klahr & K. Kotovsky (Eds.), Complex 
information processing: The impact of Herbert A. Simon (pp. 399-440). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence 
Erlbaum Associates. 
Newell, A. (1990). Unified theories of cognition. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University press. 
Newell, A., & Simon, H. A. (1972). Human problem solving. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice 
Hall. 
Nisbett, R. E. & Wilson, T. D. (1977). Telling more than we know: Verbal reports on mental 
processes. Psychological Review, 84, 231-259. 
Njoo, M., & Jong, T. de (1993). Exploratory learning with a computer simulation for control 
theory: Learning processes and instructional support. Journal of Research in Science Teaching, 
30, 821-844. 
O'Neil, H. F., & Abedi, J. (1996). Reliability and validity of a state metacognitive inventory: 
Potential for alternative assessment. The Journal of Educational Research, 89, 234-245. 
Osman, M. E., & Hannafin, M. J. (1992). Metacognition research and theory: Analysis and 
implications for instructional design. Educational Technology Research and Development, 
40(2), 83-99 
Otero, J. (1998). Influence of knowledge activation and context on comprehension monitoring 
of science texts. In D. J. Hacker, J. Dunlosky, & A. C. Graesser (Eds.), Metacognition in 
educational theory and practice (pp. 145-164). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
Plötzner, R., & Spada, H. (1992). Analysis-based learning on multiple levels of mental domain 
representation. In E. de Corte, M. Linn, H. Mandl, & L. Verschaffel (Eds.), Computer-based 
learning environments and problem solving (pp. 103-129). Berlin: Springer. 
Plötzner, R., & Spada, H. (1993). Multiple metal representations of information in physics 
problem solving. In G. E. Stelmach & P. A. Vroon (Series Eds.) & G. Strube & K. F. 
Wenders (Vol. Eds.), Advances in psychology: Vol. 101. The cognitive psychology of knowledge 
(pp. 285-312). Amsterdam: North-Holland. 
Popper, K. R. (1972). The logic of scientific discovery. (6th rev. ed.). London: Hutchinson & Co 
Ltd. 
Posner, M. I., Petersen, S. E., Fox, P. T., & Raichle, M. E. (1988). Localization of cognitive 
operations in the human brain. Science, 240, 1627-1631. 
139
Prins, F. J., Busato, V. V., Elshout, J. J., & Hamaker, C. (1998). Een nieuwe bijdrage tot de 
validatie van het (meta)cognitieve deel van de Inventaris Leerstijlen [A new contribution 
to the validation of the cognitive and metacognitive part of the Inventory of Learning 
Styles]. Pedagogische Studien, 75, 73-93. 
Prins, F. J., Busato, V. V., Hamaker, C., & Visser, K. H. (1996). Een bijdrage tot de validatie van 
het (meta)cognitieve deel van de Inventaris Leerstijlen [A contribution to the validation of 
the cognitive and metacognitive part of the Inventory of Learning Styles]. Pedagogische 
Studien, 73, 108-122. 
Prins, F. J., Veenman, M. V. J., & Bokhorst, C. (2001, August). Intellectual ability and 
metacognitive skillfulness determining an individual threshold of problematicity. Paper presented 
at the 9th meeting of the European Association of Research on Learning and Instruction, 
Fribourg, Switserland. 
Prins, F. J., Veenman, M. V. J., & Elshout, J. J. (1999, August). Self-directed inductive learning and 
the acquisition of expertise: the role of metacognitive skills and intellectual ability. Paper 
presented at the 8th meeting of the European Association of Research on Learning and 
Instruction, Göteborg, Sweden. 
Raaheim, K. (1988). Intelligence and task novelty. In R. J. Sternberg (Ed.), Advances in the 
psychology of human intelligence (pp. 73-97). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
Raaheim, K. (1991). Is the high IQ person really in trouble? Why? In H. A. H. Rowe (Ed.), 
Intelligence: Reconceptualization and measurement (pp. 35-46). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence 
Erlbaum Associates. 
Reber, A. S., Allen, R., & Reber, P. J. (1999). Implicit versus explicit learning. In R. J. Sternberg 
(Ed.), The nature of cognition (pp. 475-513). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Reder, L. M. (1996). Different research programs on metacognition: are the boundaries 
imiginary? Learning and Individual Differences, 8(4), 383-390. 
Reder, L. M., & Schunn, C. D. (1996). Metacognition does not imply awareness: Strategy 
choice is governed by implicit learning and memory. In L. M. Reder (Ed.), Implicit memory 
and metacognition (pp. 45-77). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
Reimann, P. (1991). Detecting functional relations in a computerized discovery environment. 
Learning and Instruction, 1, 45-65. 
Resnick, L. B., & Glaser, R. (1976). Problem solving and intelligence. In L. B. Resnick (Ed.), The 
nature of intelligence (pp. 205-230). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
Rijn, H. van (2002). From ignorance to eureka: Studying inductive learning by computational 
modeling. University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands. Manuscript in preparation. 
Roberts, M. J., & Erdos, G. (1993). Strategy selection and metacognition. Educational 
Psychology, 13, 259-266. 
 140
Salomon, G. (1995): What does the design of effective CSCL require and how do we study its 
effects? Retrieved December 22, 2001, from: http://www-cscl95.indiana.edu/cscl95/ 
outlook/62_Salomon.html . 
Schauble, L., Glaser, R., Raghavan, K., & Reiner, M. (1991). Causal models and 
experimentation strategies in scientific reasoning. The Journal of the Learning Sciences, 1, 
201-238. 
Schauble, L., Glaser, R., Raghavan, K., & Reiner, M. (1992). The integration of knowledge and 
experimentation strategies in understanding physical systems. Applied Cognitive psychology, 
6, 321-343. 
Schneider, W. (1998). The development of procedural metamemory in childhood and 
adolescence. In G. Mazzoni & T. O. Nelson (Eds.), Metacognition and cognitive 
nearopsychology: Monitoring and control processes (pp. 1-21). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum 
Associates. 
Schnotz, W. (1991). Metacognition and self regulation in text processing: some comments. In 
M. Carretero, M. Pope, P. R. J. Simons, & J. J. Pozo (Eds.), Learning and instruction (pp. 365-
375). Oxford: Pergamon Press. 
Schoenfeld, A. H. (1987). What’s all the fuss about metacognition? In A. H. Schoenfeld (Ed.), 
Cognitive science and mathematics education (pp. 189-215). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum 
Associates. 
Schraw, G. (1998). Promoting general metacognitive awareness. Instructional Science, 26, 113-
125. 
Schraw, G., & Moshman, D. (1995). Metacognitive theories. Educational Psychology Review, 7, 
351-371. 
Schraw, G., Dunkle, M. E., Bendixen, L. D., & DeBacker Roedel, T. (1995). Does a general 
monitoring skill exist? Journal of Educational Psychology, 87, 433-444. 
Schunn, C. D., & Anderson, J. R. (1998). Scientific discovery. In J. R. Anderson & C. Lebiere 
(Eds.), The atomic components of thought (pp. 385-427). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum 
Associates. 
Schunn, C. D., & Anderson, J. R. (1999). The generality/specificity of expertise in scientific 
reasoning. Cognitive Science, 23, 337-370. 
Shimamura, A. P. (1996). The role of the prefrontal cortex in controlling and monitoring 
memory processes. In L. M. Reder (Ed.), Implicit memory and metacognition (pp. 259-274). 
Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
Shimamura, A. P. (2000). What is metacognition? The brain knows [Review of the book 
Metacognition and cognitive neuropsychology: Monitoring and control processes]. American 
Journal of Psychology, 113, 142-146. 
Shute, V. J., Glaser, R. (1990). A large-scale evaluation of an intelligent discovery world: 
Smithtown. Interactive Learning Environments, 1, 51-77. 
141
Siegler, R. S., & Crowley, K. (1991). The microgenetic method: A direct means for studying 
cognitive development. American Psychologist, 46, 606-620. 
Simon, H. A. (1976). Identifying basic abilities underlying intelligent performance of complex 
tasks. In L. B. Resnick (Ed.), The nature of intelligence (pp. 65-98). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence 
Erlbaum Associates. 
Simon, H. A. (1989). The scientist as problem solver. In D. Klahr & K. Kotovsky (Eds.), 
Complex information processing: The impact of Herbert A. Simon (pp. 375-398). Hillsdale, NJ: 
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
Simon, H. A. (1996). Closing remarks. In L. M. Reder (Ed.), Implicit memory and metacognition 
(pp. 339-348). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
Simon, H. A., & Chase, W. G. (1973). Skill in chess. American Scientist, 61, 394-403. 
Simon, H. A., & Lea, G. (1974). Problem solving and rule induction: a unified view. In L. W. 
Gregg (Ed.), Knowledge and cognition (pp. 105-127). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum 
Associates. 
Snow, R. E. (1989). Aptitude-treatment interaction as a framework for research on individual 
differences in learning. In P. H. Ackerman, R. J. Sternberg, & R. Glaser (Eds.), Learning and 
individual differences: Advances in theory and research (pp.13-59). New York: Freeman. 
Snow, R. E., & Lohman, D. F. (1984). Toward a theory of cognitive aptitude for learning from 
instruction. Journal of Educational Psychology, 76, 347-376. 
Someren, M. W. van, & Tabbers, H. (1998). The role of prior qualitative knowledge in 
inductive learning. In N. Bennett, E. DeCorte, S. Vosniadou, & H. Mandle (Series Eds.) & 
M. W. van Someren, P. Reimann, H. P. A. Boshuizen, & T. de Jong (Vol. Eds.), Advances in 
learning and instruction series: Learning with multiple representations (pp. 102-120). 
Amsterdam: Pergamon. 
Someren, M. W. van, Barnard, Y. F., & Sandberg, J. A. C. (1994). The think aloud method: A 
practical guide to modelling cognitive processes. London: Academic Press. 
Spiro, R. J., Feltovich, P. J., Jacobson, M. J., & Coulson, R. L. (1995). Cognitive flexibility, 
constructivism, and hypertext: Random access instruction for advanced knowledge 
acquisition in ill-structured domains. In L. P. Steffe & J. Gale (Eds.), Constructivism in 
education (pp. 85-107). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
Stankov, L. (2000). Complexity, metacognition, and fluid intelligence. Intelligence, 28, 121-143. 
Sternberg, R. J. (1985). Beyond IQ: A triarchic theory of human intelligence. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University press. 
Sternberg, R. J. (1988). Intelligence. In R. J. Sternberg & E. E. Smith (Eds.), The psychology of 
human thought (pp. 267-308). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Sternberg, R. J. (1994). Intelligence. In R. J. Sternberg (Ed.), Thinking and problem solving (pp. 
179-213). San Diego, CA: Academic Press. 
 142
Sternberg, R. J. (1998). Metacognition, abilities, and developing expertise: What makes an 
expert student? Instructional Science, 26, 127-140. 
Stevens, J. (1996). Applied multivariate statistics for the social sciences. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence 
Erlbaum Associates. 
Swaak, J. (1999). What-if: Discovery simulations and assessment of intuitive knowledge. 
Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Twente, The Netherlands. 
Swaak, J., & Jong, T. de (1996). Measuring intuitive knowledge in science: the development of 
the what-if test. Studies in Educational Evaluation, 22, 341-362. 
Swaak, J., Joolingen, W. R. van, & Jong, T. de (1998). Supporting simulation-based learning; 
the effects of model progression and assignments on definitial and intuitive knowledge. 
Learning and Instruction, 8, 235-252. 
Swanson, H. L. (1990). Influence of metacognitive knowledge and aptitude on problem 
solving. Journal of Educational Psychology, 82, 306-314. 
Taatgen, N. A. (1999). Learning without limits: From problem solving towards a unified theory of 
learning. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Groningen, The Nether lands. 
Taatgen, N. A. (2000). Proceduralization in ACT-R (Tech. Rep.). Groningen University, The 
Netherlands. Retrieved June 13, 2001, from http://www.ai.rug.nl/~niels/proceduralization 
/proceduralization.doc 
Vanderlocht, M., & Damme, J. van (1989). Probleemaanpak en het oplossen van 
natuurkundige problemen: Een literatuuroverzicht [Problem approach and solving 
problems in physics: A literature review]. Pedagogische Studiën, 66, 97-106. 
VanLehn, K. (1989). Problem solving and cognitive skill acquisition. In M. I. Posner (Ed.), 
Foundations of cognitive science (pp. 527-579). Cambridge: MIT Press. 
Veenman, M. V. J. (1993). Intellectual ability and metacognitive skill: Determinants of discovery 
learning in computerized learning environment. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University 
of Amsterdam, The Netherlands. 
Veenman, M. V. J. (1998). Kennis en vaardigheden: Soorten kennis en vaardigheden die 
relevant zijn voor reken-wiskunde taken [Knowledge and skills: Types of knowledge and 
skills that are relevant for mathematical tasks]. In A. Andeweg, J. E. H. van Luit, M. V. J. 
Veenman, & P. C. M. Vendel (Red.), Hulp bij leerproblemen: Reken-wiskunde (pp. G0050.1-
13). Alphen a/d Rijn: Samson H. D. Tjeenk Willink. 
Veenman, M. V. J., Beishuizen, J. J., & Niewold, P. (1997, August). Intellectual ability and 
metacognitive skills during text studying. Paper presented at the 7th meeting of the European 
Association of Research on Learning and Instruction, Athens, Greece. 
Veenman, M. V. J., & Elshout, J. J. (1991). Intellectual ability and working method as 
predictors of novice learning. Learning and Instruction, 1, 303-317. 
Veenman, M. V. J., & Elshout, J. J. (1992). Intelligentie en metacognitieve vaardigheden 
[Intelligence and metacognitive skills]. Tijdschrift voor Onderwijsresearch, 17, 290-302. 
143
Veenman, M. V. J., & Elshout, J. J. (1995). Differential effects of instructional support on 
learning in simulation environments. Instructional Science, 22, 363-383. 
Veenman, M. V. J., & Elshout, J. J. (1999). Changes in the relation between cognitive and 
metacognitive skills during the acquisition of expertise. European Journal of Psychology of 
Education, 14, 509-523. 
Veenman, M. V. J., Elshout, J. J., & Busato, V. V. (1994). Metacognitive mediation in learning 
with computer-based simulations. Computers in Human Behavior, 10, 93-106. 
Veenman, M. V. J., Elshout, J. J., & Groen, M. G. M. (1993). Thinking aloud: does it affect 
regulatory processes in learning? Tijdschrift voor Onderwijsresearch, 18, 322-330. 
Veenman, M. V. J., Elshout, J. J., & Hoeks, J. (1993). Determinants of learning in simulation 
environments across domains. In D. Towne, T. de Jong, & H. Spada (Eds.), Simulation-based 
experiential learning (pp. 235-249). Berlin: Springer Verlag. 
Veenman, M. V. J., Elshout, J. J., & Meijer, J. (1997). The generality vs. domain specificity of 
metacognitive skills in novice learning across domains. Learning and Instruction, 7, 187-209. 
Veenman, M. V. J., Kerseboom, L., & Imthorn, C. (2000). Test anxiety and metacognitive 
skillfulness: Availablity versus production deficiencies. Anxiety, Stress, and Coping, 13, 391-
412. 
Veenman, M. V. J., Prins, F. J., & Elshout, J. J. (2002). Initial inductive learning in a complex 
computer simulated environment: the role of metacognitive skills and intellectual ability. 
Computers in Human Behavior, 18, 327-342. 
Veenman, M. V. J., Prins, F. J., & Verheij, J. (2002). Learning styles: Self-reports versus thinking-
aloud  measures. Manuscript submitted for publication. 
Veenman, M. V. J., Samarapungavan, A., Hout-Wolters, B. H. A. M. van, & Beishuizen, J. J. 
(1992). De relatie tussen cognitieve en metacognitieve vaardigheden: Een introductie [The 
relation between cognitive and metacognitive skills: An introduction]. Tijdschrift voor 
Onderwijsresearch, 17, 269-272. 
Veenman, M. V. J., & Verheij, J. (2001). Technical students’metacognitive skills: Relating general vs. 
specific metacognitive skills to study succes. Manuscript submitted for publication. 
Veenman, M. V. J., Wilhelm, P. & Beishuizen, J. J. (2001).  The relation between intellectual and 
metacognitive skills from a developmental perspective. Manuscript submitted for publication. 
Veermans, K., De Jong, T., & Van Joolingen, W. R. (2000). Promoting self-directed learning in 
simulation-based discovery learning environments through intelligent support. Interactive 
Learning Environments, 8, 229-255. 
Vermunt, J. D. H. M. (1992). Leerstijlen en sturen van leerprocessen in het hoger onderwijs: Naar 
procesgerichte instructie in zelfstandig denken [Learning styles and regulation of learning 
processes in higher education: Towards a process-directed instruction in independent 
thinking]. Amsterdam: Swets and Zeitlinger. 
 144
Vermunt, J. D. (1998). The regulation of contructive learning. British Journal of Educational 
Psychology, 68, 149-171. 
Vermunt, J. D. H. M., & Rijswijk, F. A. W. M. van (1987). Inventaris leerstijlen voor het hoger 
onderwijs [Inventory of learning styles for higher education]. Tilburg: Catholic University 
of Brabant. 
Volet, S. E., & Lund, C. P. (1994). Metacognitive instruction in introductory computer 
programming: A better explanatory construct for performance than traditional factors. 
Journal of Educational Computing Research, 10, 297-328. 
Wang, M. C., Haertel, G. D., & Walberg, H. J. (1990). What influences learning? A content 
analysis of review literature. Journal of Educational Research, 84, 30-44. 
Weinert, F. E. (1987). Introduction and overview: Metacognition and motivation as 
determinants of effective learning and understanding. In F. E. Weinert & R. H. Kluwe 
(Eds.), Metacognition, motivation, and understanding (pp. 1-16). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence 
Erlbaum Associates. 
White, B. Y., & Frederiksen, J. R. (1987). Qualitative models and intelligent learning 
environments. In R. W. Lawler & M. Yazdani (Eds.), Artificial intelligence and education: Vol. 
1. Learning environments and tutoring systems (pp. 281-305). Norwood: Ablex Publishing 
Corporation. 
White, B. Y., & Frederiksen, J. R. (1990). Causal model progression as a foundation for 
intelligent learning environments. Artificial Intelligence, 24, 99-157. 
White, B. Y., & Frederiksen, J. R. (1998). Inquiry, modeling, and metacognition: Making 
science accessible to all students. Cognition and Instruction, 16, 3-118. 
Wilhelm, P. (2001). Knowledge, skills, and strategies in self-directed inductive learning. 
Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Leiden, The Netherlands. 
Wilhelm, P. & Beishuizen, J. J. (1999, August). Self-directed inductive learning: Influence of 
domain knowledge and cognitive ability. Paper presented at the 8th meeting of the 
European Association of Research on Learning and Instruction, Göteborg, Sweden. 
Winne, P. H. (1996). A metacognitive view of individual differences in self-regulated learning. 
Learning and Individual Differences, 8, 327-353. 
Winne, P. H., & Hadwin, A. F. (1998). Studying as self-regulated learning. In D. J. Hacker, J. 
Dunlosky, & A. C. Graesser (Eds.), Metacognition in educational theory and practice (pp. 277-
304). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
Wittgenstein, L. (1953). Philosophical Investigations. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 
Yarrow, F., & Topping, K. J. (2001). Collaborative writing: The effects of metacognitive 
prompting and structured peer interaction. British Journal of Educatiuonal Psychology, 71, 
261-282. 
Zimmerman, B. J. (1995). Self-regulation involves more than metacognition: a social cognitive 
perspective. Educational Psychologist, 30, 217-221. 
145
Zimmerman, B. J., & Pons, M. M. (1986). Development of a structured interview for assessing 
student use of self-regulated learning strategies. American Educational Research Journal, 23, 
614-628. 
 
 
 
 
147
 
SAMENVATTING 
 
 
ZOEKEN EN ZIEN: De rollen van metacognitieve vaardigheden en 
intelligentie tijdens beginnend inductief leren in een complexe via de 
computer gesimuleerde omgeving. 
 
Er zijn vele momenten in het leven dat iets nieuws moet worden geleerd. 
Soms is het mogelijk een boek of een proefschrift te pakken of om te surfen 
naar een internetpagina voor het verkrijgen van adequate uitleg, verklaringen 
of instructies. Andere keren moet je, zoals scholieren in het studiehuis en 
wetenschappers, experimenten uitvoeren en regels afleiden uit de resultaten 
van deze experimenten. Deze laatste manier van leren heet inductief leren. In 
dit proefschrift is de invloed van metacognitieve vaardigheden en intelligentie op 
het leerresultaat, behaald na inductief leren in een complexe omgeving, 
onderzocht. De verwachting was dat de invloed van deze twee determinanten 
variabel zijn, afhankelijk van het niveau van taakcomplexiteit. Eerst zal een 
korte uitleg worden gegeven over deze begrippen alvorens de 
onderzoeksresultaten worden samengevat. 
Inductief leren kan worden omschreven als het afleiden van regels uit 
voorbeelden. Deze voorbeelden kunnen door de lerende zelf worden 
verzameld via het uitvoeren van experimenten of door anderen aan de 
lerende worden verstrekt. De eerstgenoemde, zelfgestuurde manier van 
inductief leren is bestudeerd in het onderzoek van dit proefschrift. Wanneer 
lerenden hun eigen gegevens moeten verzamelen zullen ze zelf moeten 
beslissen over de aard, de volgorde en de hoeveelheid experimenten die ze 
doen. Klahr en Dunbar (1988) formuleerden een model genaamd scientific 
discovery as dual search (SDDS) [wetenschappelijk ontdekken als tweeledig 
zoeken], waarin inductief leren gekarakteriseerd wordt als een zoekproces en 
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waarin beschreven staat welke activiteiten plaats kunnen vinden tijdens het 
inductief leren. Zij onderscheidden twee ruimten waarin lerenden kunnen 
zoeken, te weten een experiment-ruimte, bestaande uit alle experimenten die 
kunnen worden uitgevoerd, en een hypothese-ruimte, die bestaat uit alle 
mogelijke hypothesen binnen een domein. De twee ruimten zijn gerelateerd: 
hypothesen kunnen getoetst of gegenereerd worden door het evalueren van 
experimenten. Bovendien maakten Klahr en Dunbar onderscheid tussen 
experimenteerders en theoretici. De experimenteerders, meestal beginners in het 
domein, hebben onvoldoende voorkennis en zoeken daarom tijdens een 
inductieve taak hoofdzakelijk in de experiment-ruimte, niet zozeer in de 
hypothese-ruimte. Ze voeren voornamelijk experimenten uit zonder een 
hypothese voor ogen te hebben, ze zijn data-gestuurd en houden zich de eerste 
tijd van het experimenteren vooral bezig met het genereren van hypothesen. 
Theoretici, daarentegen, zijn vaak gevorderden in een domein en hebben wel 
voldoende voorkennis om experimenten te doen op grond van een hypothese. 
Zij zijn zogezegd model-gestuurd en zoeken in de hypothese-ruimte naar 
nieuwe hypothesen. 
Tijdens een inductief-leertaak kunnen lerenden kennis opdoen over relaties 
tussen variabelen. Deze kennis kan gemeten worden met een WHAT-IF-test 
[WAT-ALS-test] (Swaak & de Jong, 1996). Een WHAT-IF-vraag heeft drie 
delen: condities, acties en voorspellingen. De condities worden gepresenteerd 
via een afbeelding van een specifieke situatie, een actie beschrijft een 
verandering in die situatie en de voorspellingen geven aan wat de gevolgen 
van die verandering zouden kunnen zijn. Bij het beantwoorden van een 
WHAT-IF-vraag gaat het erom aan te geven welke voorspelling de juiste is. 
Een WHAT-IF-vraag kan op tenminste twee manieren beantwoord kan 
worden. Ofwel de lerende vergelijkt de afgebeelde situatie in de vraag 
impliciet dan wel expliciet met een specifieke situatie die de lerende eerder 
heeft gezien (instantiegebaseerde kennis) ofwel de lerende beredeneert op grond 
van een regel het antwoord op de vraag (regelgebaseerde kennis). In hoofdstuk 2 
is uitgebreid ingegaan op theorieën over inductief leren, op inductief-
leertaken en op de typen kennis die via inductief leren verworven wordt. 
In hoofdstuk 3 is aandacht besteed aan twee belangrijke determinanten van 
succesvol inductief leren, te weten de kwaliteit van metacognitieve vaardigheden 
en intelligentie (zie ook Veenman, 1993). Metacognitieve vaardigheden zijn 
kortweg te omschrijven als zelfregulatieve activiteiten zoals oriëntatie, 
planning, monitoring, evaluatie en elaboratie. De kwaliteit van deze processen 
zijn meetbaar via de hardop-denkmethode. Intelligentie wordt gezien als een 
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verzameling van informatieverwerkende componenten, gemeten door een 
intelligentietest. Veenman (1993) vond in verscheidene studies dat 
metacognitieve vaardigheden en intelligentie gerelateerd waren, dat ze 
gezamenlijk een deel van de variantie in leerresultaat bepaalden, maar dat 
beide determinanten ook onafhankelijk substantiële invloed hadden op het 
leerresultaat. Hij noemde dit patroon het gemengde model. Wanneer lerenden 
meer expertise verwierven verminderde de invloed van intelligentie op het 
leerresultaat echter (Veenman & Elshout, 1999). Dit suggereert dat de invloed 
van intelligentie op het leerresultaat niet altijd dezelfde is en dat de ervaren 
taakcomplexiteit een belangrijke rol speelt bij de invloed van intelligentie op 
inductief leren. Elshout (1987) beschrijft in zijn theorie over de threshold of 
problematicity [problematiciteitsdrempel] de veranderende invloed van 
intelligentie op leerresultaat als functie van de complexiteit van de taak. Zijn 
theorie suggereert dat de invloed van intelligentie erg laag is wanneer een 
taak als erg makkelijk of juist als zeer complex wordt ervaren. Bij een 
gemiddelde taakcomplexiteit is er sprake van een maximale invloed van 
intelligentie op leren. In dit proefschrift is nadrukkelijk gekeken naar de 
rollen die metacognitieve vaardigheden en intelligentie spelen bij complexe 
inductieve taken. Hypothesen daaromtrent zijn gebaseerd op Elshouts 
theorie.  
In de eerste studie, beschreven in hoofdstuk 4, zijn de rollen van 
metacognitieve vaardigheden en intelligentie onderzocht door beginners te 
laten werken in een zeer complexe leeromgeving. Deelnemers aan die studie 
waren 23 eerstejaars psychologiestudenten zonder substantiële kennis van 
natuurkunde, waarvan 16 studenten een relatief lage intelligentiescore 
hadden en 7 studenten een hoge. Hen werd gevraagd in een via de computer 
gesimuleerd complex Optica-laboratorium regels af te leiden over de 
geometrische optica via het uitvoeren van experimenten. In het Optica-
laboratorium konden ze verschillende situaties creëren door met lampen en 
lenzen te schuiven, waarbij ze allerlei metingen konden verrichten zoals 
bijvoorbeeld het meten van de afstand tussen een lens en een snijpunt van 
lichtstralen. Welke experimenten ze uitvoerden en hoe vaak ze metingen 
verrichten mochten ze zelf bepalen. Met Elshouts theorie in het achterhoofd 
werd voorspeld dat voor initieel inductief leren in een complexe 
leeromgeving metacognitieve vaardigheden aanzienlijk belangrijker zouden 
zijn voor het leerresultaat dan intelligentie en dat dus niet het gemengde 
model van toepassing zou zijn, zoals het geval was bij minder complexe taken 
zoals de taken gebruikt door Veenman (1993). Dit is ook gevonden. 
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Intelligentie bleek nauwelijks van invloed te zijn op het leerresultaat, terwijl 
de kwaliteit van metacognitieve vaardigheden de belangrijkste determinant 
van leerresultaat was. 
 In Elshouts (1987) theorie wordt verondersteld dat de ervaren 
taakcomplexiteit de invloed van intelligentie op leerresultaat bepaalt. Deze 
veronderstelling is onderzocht in de studie beschreven in hoofdstuk 5. 
Deelnemers aan de studie waren 44 eerstejaars psychologiestudenten, 
waarvan 10 relatief laag intelligente beginners, 12 hoog intelligente beginners, 
13 relatief laag intelligente gevorderden en 9 hoog intelligente gevorderden. 
Hen is gevraagd regels over optica te ontdekken door experimenten te doen 
in het Optica-laboratorium, dat nu bestond uit een relatief eenvoudig deel, 
een deel van gemiddelde complexiteit en een complex deel. Een taak die door 
beginners als moeilijk wordt ervaren zal voor gevorderden waarschijnlijk 
gemakkelijker zijn. De verwachting was daarom dat het patroon van 
correlaties tussen metacognitieve vaardigheden, intelligentie en leerresultaat 
van beginners voor het relatief eenvoudige deel van het Optica-laboratorium 
gelijk zou zijn aan het patroon van gevorderden voor het gemiddeld of 
complex deel. De resultaten ondersteunden inderdaad deze hypothese. 
Tevens is onderzocht of de kennis die beginners op zouden doen 
voornamelijk instantiegebaseerd zou zijn en de kennis van gevorderden 
vooral regelgebaseerd. Daarom is alle deelnemers is gevraagd de WHAT-IF-
testen hardopdenkend te beantwoorden. Het waren echter niet de 
gevorderden die bij het beantwoorden van de vragen vaker dan beginners 
expliciete regels gebruikten maar hoog intelligente studenten die dat vaker 
deden dan relatief laag intelligente studenten. 
In hoofdstuk 6 is onderzocht of voor beginners de kwaliteit van 
metacognitieve vaardigheden afhankelijk is van het domein waarop de 
inductief-leertaak betrekking heeft en van specifieke kenmerken van de 
leeromgeving, zoals de mogelijkheid om variabelen in een leeromgeving 
kwalitatief te manipuleren. Deelnemers aan deze studie waren 15 studenten 
sociale wetenschappen. Hen werd gevraagd hardopdenkend regels over 
optica te ontdekken in een Optica-laboratorium en regels over warmte in een 
Warmteleer-laboratorium (Veenman, 1993). De resultaten toonden dat de 
kwaliteit van metacognitieve vaardigheden gemeten in de ene leeromgeving 
sterk samenhing met de kwaliteit van metacognitieve vaardigheden gemeten 
in de andere leeromgeving. Dit staat toe om in de laatste studie van dit 
proefschrift, beschreven in hoofdstuk 7, de kwaliteit van metacognitieve 
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vaardigheden vooraf te meten in een andere leeromgeving dan het Optica-
laboratorium.  
In de studie beschreven in hoofdstuk 7 zijn de rollen van metacognitieve 
vaardigheden en intelligentie voor het leerresultaat van beginners onderzocht 
door de objectieve taakcomplexiteit te variëren. Deelnemers aan deze studie 
waren 80 studenten sociale wetenschappen zonder substantiële 
natuurkundekennis. Vooraf werd de kwaliteit van hun metacognitieve 
vaardigheden en hun intelligentiescore bepaald. Vervolgens werd hen 
gevraagd regels over optica te ontdekken in een Optica-laboratorium. De helft 
van de deelnemers kreeg daarbij metacognitieve ondersteuning en de andere 
helft niet. Verwacht werd dat metacognitieve vaardigheden de belangrijkste 
determinant voor leerresultaat zou zijn in het moeilijkere laboratorium 
zonder metacognitieve ondersteuning en dat intelligentie de belangrijkste 
determinant voor leerresultaat zou zijn in de relatief eenvoudiger 
leeromgeving met ondersteuning. Resultaten lieten zien dat er geen verschil 
in leerresultaat was tussen beide groepen. Wel werd gevonden dat de 
kwaliteit van metacognitieve vaardigheden de belangrijkste voorspeller was 
voor leerresultaat in de groep zonder ondersteuning en dat intelligentie de 
belangrijkste voorspeller was in de groep met ondersteuning.  
In het laatste hoofdstuk zijn enkele methodologische kanttekeningen 
geplaatst bij de uitgevoerde studies. De eerste betrof het feit dat de studies 
van hoofdstuk 4 en 5 quasi-experimentele, correlationele studies zijn. De 
veelheid aan correlaties in een correlatiematrix heeft het gevaar dat een 
gedeelte van de significante resultaten toegeschreven zouden kunnen worden 
aan toeval. Met correlaties die niet voorspeld of zwak zijn moet daarom 
voorzichtig worden omgegaan. De resultaten van de experimentele studie in 
hoofdstuk 7 waren overtuigender. De tweede kanttekening betrof de 
moeilijkheid om het niveau van de ervaren taakcomplexiteit van de deelnemers 
in te schatten. Het Optica-laboratorium dat gebruikt werd in hoofdstuk 4 
bleek erg moeilijk. Het kostte de deelnemers aan die studie behoorlijk veel tijd 
en inspanning om een beetje kennis te vergaren. De versie van het Optica-
laboratorium in hoofdstuk 5, 6 en 7 is daarom wat eenvoudiger gemaakt. 
Voor de studie beschreven in hoofdstuk 5 bleek het bovendien lastig om in te 
schatten hoe groot het verschil in ervaren taakcomplexiteit was tussen 
beginners en gevorderden. Daardoor waren hypothesen betreffende 
verschillen tussen beginners en gevorderden niet exact te formuleren. Ten 
derde zijn er enkele beperkingen wat betreft generalisatie naar andere 
situaties en groepen. De resultaten gelden voor leeromgevingen waarin 
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objecten kwalitatief gemanipuleerd kunnen worden en waarin kwalitatieve 
relaties tussen variabelen bestaan. Bovendien hebben de resultaten betrekking 
op beginners en universitaire studenten. Het verdient aanbeveling om 
soortgelijk onderzoek uit te voeren met experts en met middelbare scholieren 
of zelfs jongere kinderen. Het is mogelijk dat het patroon van correlaties 
tussen metacognitieve vaardigheden, intelligentie en leerresultaat er anders 
uitziet voor deze groepen. 
Op grond van de resultaten van de studies is tenslotte een schets gemaakt 
van het inductief-leerproces van beginners in een complexe leeromgeving. 
Beginners in een zeker domein hebben beperkte voorkennis over variabelen 
in dat domein en over relaties tussen die variabelen. Daarom handelen ze in 
de eerste fase van het inductief-leerproces als experimenteerders en zoeken ze 
hoofdzakelijk in de experiment-ruimte om onafhankelijke en afhankelijke 
variabelen te identificeren. Aanvankelijk is het inductief-leerproces van 
beginners dus gericht op dataverzameling. Opgedane kennis zal in deze fase 
vooral instantiegebaseerd zijn. De kwaliteit van hun metacognitieve 
vaardigheden bepaalt of beginners in staat zijn om tot een systematische 
dataset te komen. In een latere fase van het inductief-leerproces wordt data-
interpretatie steeds belangrijker. Hoog intelligente lerenden zien 
regelmatigheden en patronen in de verzamelde dataset en hun kennis wordt 
meer regelgebaseerd. Minder intelligente beginners zullen waarschijnlijk 
blijven steken in instantiegebaseerde kennis. 
De moeite die veel beginners hebben met inductief leren in het Optica-
laboratorium maakt dit type leeromgevingen nog niet direct ongeschikt voor 
de onderwijspraktijk. Ze kunnen juist erg bruikbaar zijn om studenten te leren 
experimenteren, data te interpreteren en hypothesen te testen. Ook voor het 
vergaren van conceptuele kennis kunnen deze leeromgevingen effectief zijn. 
Het is niet nodig om het hele kennisvergaringstraject zelfgestuurd en 
inductief te maken. Een leeromgeving kan ook gebruikt worden voor het 
toetsen van expliciet gegeven hypothesen. In het opticadomein bijvoorbeeld 
kunnen studenten eenvoudig de lensformule toetsen. Ook kan hier en daar 
ondersteuning gegeven worden, afhankelijk van de leerdoelen en de 
vaardigheden van de studenten. Beginners hebben wel veel tijd en 
doorzettingsvermogen nodig voor het opdoen van conceptuele kennis via 
inductief leren. En bovenal, voor beginners zijn goede metacognitieve 
vaardigheden essentieel voor het systematisch zoeken in een grote 
experiment-ruimte. Intelligentie is essentieel voor het zien van patronen en 
regels. 
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Het proefschrift is af, mijn Leidse jaren zijn voorbij. Het was een goede tijd, 
door de enorme vrijheid die ik had en vooral doordat ik met enkele speciale 
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konden luchten over ons salaris, de dataverzameling en wat andere zaken. 
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onmisbaar. Ook dank ik de “senioren” van de andere drie projecten uit het 
aandachtsgebied: Ton de Jong, Wouter van Joolingen, Jos Beishuizen, Bob 
Wielinga, Maarten van Someren, Bert Bredeweg, en Jan Wielemaker. Onze 
bijeenkomsten verliepen soms wat stroef, vond ik, maar ze leverden ook 
waardevolle informatie en een prachtige leeromgeving op. De afgelopen jaren 
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was ik bovendien erg blij met de zeswekelijkse bijeenkomsten van de 
HogCog, waar verschillende onderwijswetenschappers belangenloos elkaars 
werk bespraken. Vroeger dacht ik dat alle wetenschap op deze manier werd 
bedreven, inmiddels weet ik beter. De bijeenkomsten hebben mijn kennis 
zowel verbreed als verdiept. 
Caroline Bokhorst, dank je wel voor jouw belangrijke bijdrage aan de  
dataverzameling en data-analyses voor de studie beschreven in hoofdstuk 7.  
Je was een geschenk uit de hemel. Ronete Cohen, alle lof voor je grappen en 
voor je werk verricht voor de studie beschreven in hoofdstuk 6. Ik wens jullie 
succes in je verdere carrière. Stephanie van Schagen, geweldig dat je al die 
bandjes hebt willen uittypen. De deelnemers aan mijn onderzoek bedank ik 
voor hun serieuze inzet en hun doorzettingsvermogen. Het viel jullie soms 
zwaar, zag ik, om experimenten in het Optica-laboratorium te doen en zo 
enkele regels van de optica te ontdekken, maar jullie beten jullie als terriërs 
vast in de materie.  
 
Er is ook nog heel wat leven geweest naast mijn promotieonderzoek. Zo heb 
ik initiatief genomen om meer te weten te komen over de bestuurlijke en 
politieke kanten van de wetenschap. Het heeft me eigenlijk verbaasd dat een 
onderzoeker in opleiding louter een inhoudelijke opleiding krijgt, terwijl 
onderwijskundige vernieuwingen voor een groot deel vanaf de vergadertafels 
gestuurd worden. Gelukkig trof ik de afgelopen jaren vele promovendi die 
ook bestuur en politiek hebben opgezocht. Hein Broekkamp, Perry den Brok, 
Dorien Hamstra, Eline Lankhuijzen en Pascal Wilhelm van het bestuur van 
het vPO 1999-2001, alle actieve vPO-leden, het bestuur van het Leids 
Promovendi-overleg LEO 2000-2001, de promovendi van het LAIOO, de 
actieve promovendi van het promovendi-overleg van de Leidse Faculteit der 
Sociale Wetenschappen, en enkele niet-promovendi, zoals de redactie van het 
faculteitsblad Tout Court 1998-2000 en het VOR-bestuur 1999-2001, bedankt 
voor de inzichten en de leuke samenwerking. 
Verder zijn er enkele personen geweest die op hun eigen bijzondere wijze 
een schakel zijn geweest in mijn promotie-traject en die ik graag bij naam wil 
noemen. Vittorio Busato, je zette me aan te promoveren en demonstreerde mij 
dat squash en wetenschap een ideale combinatie vormen. Evelien Stoutjesdijk, 
je relativeerde tijdig voor mij de wetenschap. Cees van Putten, onze 
kamergenoot in de eerste maanden van onze aanstelling, je bezorgde Pascal 
en mij de nodige rust om goed van start te gaan. Verderop tijdens het 
promotie-traject bleek trouwens dat harde muziek op de achtergrond een 
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hoger rendement opleverde. Fleur Prinsen, Hanneke van der Geest, Sandra 
Spuijbroek, jullie zorgden voor veel gezelligheid in 2A11. Samantha 
Bouwmeester, jij was altijd in voor een clusteranalyse en in voor Bram  (het is 
een wedstrijd, het is een wedstrijd, het is een wedstrijd die je niet winnen kan). De 
AIO’s van OTEC, Dominique Sluijsmans, Ron Salden, Huib Tabbers, Jan-
Willem Strijbos, P. J. Beers, Angela Stoof, Liesbeth Kester, Silvia Dewianti, Bas 
Giesbers, bedankt dat jullie mij als “oude” OIO zeer gastvrij opnamen in de 
groep en dat ik stoom kon afblazen wanneer het nodig was. Adriaan Kole, 
leuk dat je enkele malen opdook met een zak vis. Koen Hofkes, bedankt voor 
alle titels die je voor dit proefschrift hebt bedacht en die het allemaal niet 
geworden zijn. Elpine de Boer, wij konden als geen ander praten over het 
gevecht dat promoveren heet. Vrienden en familie, heel fijn dat jullie de 
afgelopen jaren steeds belangstellend hebben gevraagd of ik nu eindelijk eens 
een keer klaar was met mijn studie. Bijna, heb ik steeds gezegd. Nu is het dan 
zover. 
 
Bovenal waren Teun, Kees en Nandi belangrijk voor me de afgelopen tijd. 
Teun en Kees hebben weliswaar niet direct bijgedragen aan mijn proefschrift, 
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